The London School of Economics and Political Science

Alternative forms of power in East Timor 1999-2009: a historical perspective

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2013

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

This thesis presents an alternative to prevailing understandings of politics in East Timor in the period 1999-2009. Employing the language of state-building, dominant views posit that the new nation's 'crisis' in 2006 is attributable to a 'weak state', arguing that substantial constraints on 'human development', a legacy of either the Indonesian period or failures of UN state building, presented insurmountable challenges to 'capacity building' which hampered the development of a public administration and other arms of the state. A closely related body of analysis attributes the causes, passage and resolution of 'crisis' to actors from the political elite. In this view, intra-elite conflict foreclosed the possibility of the crisis's early resolution, and attributed crisis to bad 'policy-making'. A second perspective posits that a crisis was the result not of a weak state, but of the disempowerment of a strong civil society, that through 'networked governance', a legacy of the resistance network against Indonesia, can be relied on to rule. This thesis suggests that the remarkable uniformity of these analyses can be explained by their having: a) largely overlooked pre-1999 politics; and b) used a liberal perspective in which both abstractions and technical solutions (rule of law, capacity building) are assumed to be able to 'correct' 'problems' leading to 'crisis'.

This thesis proposes an explanation for contemporary politics found not solely in crisis or peace, but in the past. The postcolonial state is examined through the lens of colonial power relations, in terms of the extent and limits of modern 'bio-power'. Successive chapters examine health and hygiene, the inculcation of norms and dispositions, family and habitat, and monetization. These themes are related back to state formation across the 20th century, and moreover, to an evaluation of life and death, processes evident throughout the practices of contemporary politics, including being significant in the institution of the postcolonial state. A key site of this power across time has been 'missionary power', embedded and semi-autonomous from the colonial state, rather than the Catholic Church *per se*. The manifold limits of colonial bio-power are identified not only as being a result of the paucity of material resources of the state, therefore, but also colonial ambivalence over subjects, durable relations between (and divergent representations of) missionaries and indigenous authorities, and contradictions between 'modernity' and 'tradition', all of which are shown to play out in contemporary politics. Through this analysis, the thesis reveals an alternative interpretation of East Timor since 1999, and offers possibilities for considering politics in other postcolonial contexts.

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Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to Professor John Sidel who over many years has provided invaluable advice and support, without which this thesis would most likely not have come to fruition. His insightful readings of the text and feedback allowed me to see a way to make the pieces of what follows fit together.

In East Timor, I am grateful to all the people who shared their experiences with me during my time there. I need to thank Mariano Pereira for his good humour, and stories and advice about where to look and what to say. Merry Afonso de Jesus, Yasinta Lujina, Ines Martins and Guteriano Nicolau were colleagues and excellent friends during two of the four years I spent in the country, as were the staff of Hak and IEP/Sahe and Nug Kacasungkana and Titi Irawati, who also put me up alongside their dozen cats.

Elsewhere, I thank Peter Carey, Anthony Goldstone and Geoffrey Robinson, for discussions about East Timor and Rudy Bauss, Ernie Chamberlain, Luis Lopes, Marie Imelda Mcleod, Antonio Barbedo Magalhaes, Kevin Sherlock, Beatriz Basto da Silva, P.P. Shirodkar and Ian Rowland for locating and providing advice about sources. I benefitted from feedback on draft chapters from William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Claudia Merli and Claire Sutherland.

In the Department of Politics and International Studies at SOAS, my fellow teaching fellows David Harris and Simona Vittorini provided humour and advice on completing. Daria Trentini and Mei Wu's *esprit de corps* showed what being in it together really

meant, and Ed Kirby made the morning walk along York Way not only bearable but also enjoyable.

I acknowledge funding provided by the Leverhulme Trust and LSE.

Lena joined me during research, and remained patient and supportive throughout, and beyond. Without her love and companionship, I would not have completed the thesis. During our almost annual trips to Belfast many years ago, my parents explained to me what the colourful flags, murals, kerbs and characters of the city meant, and I'm sure this has found its way into the thesis. All of them showed love and encouragement when it mattered and it is to them that the thesis is dedicated.

ACRONYMS

Indonesian (I)

Portuguese (P)

Tetum (T)

ABRI - Indonesian Army and National Police Force (since 2000 replaced by separate Armed Forces (TNI) and Police (Polri))

ACBO – *Antigo combatentes Bases Orsnaco* / Ex-Combatants' Orsnaco Bases (T)

AMP – *Aliança com Maioria Parlamentar/*Alliance with a Parliamentary Majority (P)

ASDT - *Associação Social Democrática Timorense* **/** Association of Timorese Social Democrats (P)

CAVR - *Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação*/Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (P)

CCF – *Comite Central de Fretilin*/Central Committee of Fretilin (P)

CivPol - United Nations Civilian Police

CNRM (*Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere*) - National Council of Maubere Resistance. Formed 1987, became CNRT in 1998 (P)

CNRT *Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense* - National Congress for Reconstruction of Timor-Leste (political party formed 2007); National Council of Timorese Resistance formed 1996, comprising UDT, Fretilin and others pro-Independence political groupings (P)

CPCC – *Centro Promotor de Civilização Crista /* Promoter Centre of Christian Civilisation (P)

CPD-RDTL - *Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor-Leste*/Popular Committee for Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (P)

CPLP - *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* / Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (P)

CRRN – *Concelho Revolucionária de Resistencia Nacional* / Revolutionary Council of National Resistance

Falintil - *Forças Armadas de Libertação de Timor-Leste*- Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (P)

FBA – *Falintil Bases de Apoio* / Falintil Bases of Support)

F-FDTL *Falintil-Forças Defensas Timor Lorosae* / Falintil-Defence Force of Timor Lorosae (P)

FNJP – *Frente Nacional ba Justisa no Paz* **/** National Front for Justice and Peace

FRAP - Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Project

Fretilin *Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente* - Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste

GNR - *Guarda Nacional Republicana* / National Republican Guard

GPK - *Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan* / Security Disruptors' Movement

IDPs - Internally Displaced Persons

InterFET - International Force in East Timor from September 1999 to February 2000.

ISF - International Stabilisation Force (Australia and New Zealand)

JTF – Joint Task Force, Australian military contingent, May 2006

KOK – *Komando Operasaun Konjunto* / Joint Operation between F-FDTL and PNTL (T)

KOTA - *Klibur Oan Timur Aswain* / Sons of the Mountains (T)

Kopassus - *Komando Pasukan Khusus /* Indonesian Special Forces Command (I)

KWI – *Konferensi Walegereja Indonesia* / Indonesian Bishops' Conference (I)

MUNJ – *Movimentu ba Unidade Nasional no Justisa* / Movement for National Unity and Justice (T)

MTCI – *Ministério do Turismo, Comércio e Industria* / Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (P)

OJECTIL- *Organização de Juventude e Estudante Catolica de Timor-Leste* / Organisation of Youth and Catholic Students of East Timor (P)

PAN – *Partai Amanat Nasional* / National Mandate Party (I)

PD – *Partido Democrático* / Democratic Party (P)

Pemileg – *Pemilihan Legislatif* / Legislative Elections (I)

PNT - *Partido Nacional Timorense* / Timorese National Party (P)

PNTL - *Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste* **/** National Police Service of Timor-Leste

PolRI – *Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia* / Police of the Republic of Indonesia (I)

PPT - *Partido de Povo de Timor* / People's Party of Timor (P)

PSD - *Partido Social-Democrata*/ Social-Democrat Party (P)

PUN - *Partido de Unidade Nacional* / National Unity Party (P)

RDTL - *República Democrática de Timor-Leste* / Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (P)

RENETIL - *Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste* / National Resistance of East Timorese Students (P)

SAPT - *Sociedade Agrícola, Pátria e Trabalho* / Society of Agriculture, Homeland and Work (P)

SCU - Serious Crimes Unit

STL - *Suara Timor Lorosae* / East Timor Daily newspaper (T)

TBO - *Tenaga Bantuan Operasi* / Operational Assistant (I)

TP - Timor Post. East Timor Daily newspaper.

TS – Tempo Semanal. East Timor Daily newspaper.

TNI - Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Armed Forces

TVTL - *Televisão Timor-Leste*/*Televizaun Timor Lorosae*/East Timor Television (P, T)

UDT - *União Democrática Timorenese* / Timorese Democratic Union (P)

UNAMET - United Nations Mission to East Timor

UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR - UN High Commission for Refugees

UNMISET – United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

UNMIT – United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNOTIL – United Nations Office in East Timor

UNPOL - United Nations Police (was CivPol)

UNTAET - United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

WHO - World Health Organization

GLOSSARY

Indonesian (I)

Portuguese (P)

Tetum (T)

Adat - customary village law. Similar in meaning to *lisan* (T)

Adipura - a 'clean city' programme begun by the Indonesians in 1986 (I)

Ai-Tarak – name of militia formed by Indonesian military operating in East Timor, 1999; lit. 'thorn' (T)

Aldeia - hamlet, a sub-division of a *suco* (see below) (P)

Asrama – military dormitory (I)

Assuwain - a warrior, traditionally status attained by decapitating head of an enemy.

Avos - grandparents, ancestors (T, P)

Balai desa – village hall (I)

Balisa - boundary between chiefdoms

Barlaki/Barlaque - Marital exchange, or giving and taking of women as wives, resulting in the forging of alliances (T, P)

Besi Merah Putih – militia operating in the western part of East Timor during the late 1990s, especially in Liquica district. (I)

Buan – witch (T)

Camat – subdistrict head (I)

Catana: machete *(T)*

Chefe de suco - Chief of a *suco* (see below), administrative unit introduced by Portuguese in early 20th century (P)

Civilidade e urbanidade - civility and politeness (P)

Comissão de Homenagem – Commission of Homage established to make awards to ex-combatants (P)

Concelho - administrative subdivision of *distrito* under Portuguese rule (P)

Contra-Costa - the south coast of Timor, on the Timor Sea (P)

Contratado - indigenous person contracted to work sometimes forcibly (P)

Dato - noble or chief in the hierarchy of a *reino* (see below) and by extension, person in charge of a *suco* (see below) (T)

Dimajukan – 'developed', advanced (I)

Dom – honorific title for male (P)

Dona – honorific title for female (P)

Escuteiros - Portuguese scouts (P)

Estilo/Estylo - indigenous ritual (P)

Externato: day school (P)

Feiticeira/o – witch, sorcerer (P)

Finta: tribute, tax paid by the *reinos* to colonial administration; abolished in favour of a head tax (P)

Formação/formasaun - in narrow sense, teaching/training; in broader sense, dispositions acquired from a particular environment (P, T)

Funu - war (T)

Funu Nain – warrior (T); see also *assuwain.*

Gentio: non-christian, 'uncivilised' member of the indigenous population

Hansip – Pertahanan Sipil / Civil defence forces (I)

Heróis Tombadas – Fallen Heroes, referring to deceased ex-combatants (P)

Imposto de Capitacão – Head Tax

Indígena: Portuguese term for indigenous person

Intel: Indonesian state intelligence service

Internato: boarding school (P)

Julgamentu: Judgement (T)

Katuas – elder male, term of respect

Kerja Bakti - work in voluntary service in Indonesia (I)

Kopassus - *Komando Pasukan Khusus* / Special Forces Command (I)

Lia Nain: lit. 'keeper of the word' (T)

Lisan - authority of traditional elders; customary village justice (T)

Liurai - chief of a reino in Timor (T)

Loromonu - west, 'westerners' (T)

Lulic/lulik - taboo, sacred (T)

Malai - non-Timorese, foreigner (T)

Maneiras de comportamento: modes of behaviour (P)

Matandoc – 'witchdoctor' or 'shaman'. Lit 'distant eye' (T)

Maubere - From an indigenous Timorese language, originally a derogatory term for indigenous East Timorese people; later coopted to mean people of the resistance (T).

Mestizo/a - person of mixed Timorese and Portuguese ancestry (P)

Morador - indigenous militia organised under Portuguese rule (P)

Nai lulic - wielder of sacred power (T)

Olheiros – overseers (P)

Operasi Kikis – Operation attrition, Indonesian military operation (I)

Operasi Pagar Betis – Operation fence of legs, Indonesian military operation (I)

Pataca: monetary unit introduced in Portuguese Timor in 1894 (P)

Palacio do Governo – Government Palace (P)

Pancasila - Indonesian state ideology (I)

Ponta Leste – Falintil's area of operation in the far eastern part of the territory (P)

Povoação – village and smallest territorial unit (P); later replaced by *aldeia* (P)

Povu - the people (T)

Pramuka - Indonesian national scouts (I)

Processo – trial, judicial process (P)

Regulo – reino's chief, petty king (P)

Reino - 'kingdom' or political unit through which Portuguese ruled Timor until early 20th century (P)

Sagrada Familia - 'Holy Family' established by L-7 (Cornelio Gama) and other Falintil guerrillas in Baucau area in 1989 (P)

Seara – Dili Diocese's publication from the second half of 20th century until 1975. Restarted after 1999 (P).

Seminario menor – minor seminary (P)

Suanguice – 'witchcraft', 'sorcery' (I, rendered in P)

Suangge – 'witch', 'sorceror' (I, rendered in P)

Suco: sub-division of a reino in Portuguese Timor, and subsequently sub-division of subdistrict in Independent East Timor (P,T)

Surat Jalan – 'travel letter', needed by East Timorese if travelling between districts or outside East Timor prior to 1989 and by those accused of compromising 'security' thereafter (I)

Terbelekang – backwards, underdeveloped (I)

Tuaca/tua-sabu - palm wine (T)

Uma lisan/lulic: wooden building containing sacred objects (T)

1. Introduction

I. 1999-2009: existing interpretations

This study develops an alternative interpretation of politics in East Timor in the period 1999-2009, by showing the extent and limitations of colonial attempts to institute bio-power and its resultant manifestations in the present. In 1999, precipitated by a United Nations-sponsored referendum in which almost 80% of the territory's population voted in favour of independence, East Timor became subject to a UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET), thus ending Indonesia's 24-year occupation. Indonesian rule had originally begun with a military invasion in 1975, shortly after the declaration of East Timor's independence, following Portugal's declaration of its intent to decolonise the previous year. With a budget of hundreds of millions of US dollars and relative peace, the UN hailed its mission as a success of state building, after a series of shortcomings in other missions such as Somalia. After the end of its mandate in 2002, a government led by the political party Fretilin, originally the movement that during the first years of Indonesian occupation led resistance, took power, after elections in 2001. The UN maintained a large contingent of administrators and peacekeepers, charged with 'building capacity' in a fledgling civil service and security forces, in accompanying roles. Much of the RDTL budget was coordinated through dispensations of aid through donor countries, so that in 2004, the state's own internally raised national budget amounted to only about a tenth of the combined sources donors' budget. In 2006, following protracted tensions in the state's UN-created military, F-FDTL, a breakdown occurred in that institution, in which soldiers from the west of the country protested

against ‘discrimination’ by a mainly eastern officer corps. Apparently ‘spreading’ quickly[1] through the population, the crisis caused widespread displacement, damage to property, and recriminations between different groups and individuals in East Timor’s society. On the surface, these events, referred to as a ‘crisis’, fed into long dormant regional (sometimes described as ‘ethnic’) identities. The ‘crisis’ saw the intervention of a non-UN-mandated ‘Joint Task Force’ (JTF), an Australian military contingent, later known as the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), that operated alongside UN police and which was responsible for peacekeeping. Several other initiatives beyond those in the sphere of ‘security’ were attempted by the country’s political elites and donor countries to put a halt to events of ‘crisis’, including encouraging the return of ‘internally displaced people’ from camps in the capital Dili and elsewhere that allegedly accommodated as many as 10% of the population.

Meanwhile, political configurations of events, which had in 2006 led to a temporary dissolution of both F-FDTL and the police, PNTL, saw the surrender, imprisonment, then escape, of Major Alfredo Reinado, the deserting head of F-FDTL’s Military Police. Certain themes, in many senses motifs of the events, animated and gave traction to Reinado’s cause, including affinity with petitioning soldiers and voicing grievances of ‘westerners’, rather than easterners, who were held to have been in the ascendancy under the Fretilin government and in its institutions, especially the military. Reinado’s communications from hiding, directed towards a wide and in many instances sympathetic public audience, were held to have dictated the tempo of events with increasing frequency during 2006-7. His death at the house of the president, Jose Ramos-Horta in February 2008 – allegedly a reaction by Ramos-Horta’s security detail

[1] The thesis argues that the tensions in the military were in fact inseparable from those that existed in society at large

to Reinado's surprise 'attack' – appeared however to mark the end of tensions that had begun approximately two years earlier. This event has often been regarded as the end of a 'crisis' from which East Timor would thereafter return to 'normality'.

Elite attempts to arrest these events, as noted in brief above, had already begun prior to the death of Reinado in 2008. After the resignation of the Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri in July 2006, an interim Fretilin government served until national elections in 2007. The election as Prime Minister of Xanana Gusmao's newly formed CNRT party (named in imitation of the nationalist movement formed and led by him in the middle of the Indonesian period) in June 2007, along with the election as president of long-time ally Jose Ramos-Horta at the same time, is often regarded as forestalling the end of crisis. Gusmao's heading of a broad coalition government (AMP), appeared to have aspired to a 'national unity' government, the kind of which the opposition party, Fretilin did not agree to in their first, and so far only term of office. The election of Gusmao and Ramos-Horta, who promised to end crisis by negotiating with Reinado, are held by some to have been key markers of an apparent recovery. The coalition government's term in office until 2009 was marked by much higher public spending, enabled by money channelled through a state petroleum fund. Designating 2009 the 'year of infrastructure' appeared to signal both the AMP's intent to direct the country out of crisis, as well as UNTAET's inadequate reconstruction efforts after the territory was laid waste to by departing Indonesian forces in 1999. The influx of oil money also heralded a sharp increase in instances of large and small cases of corruption. Seen from this perspective, the trajectory of politics between 1999-2009 appeared to many to follow a straightforward sequence of events. After initial stewardship by the UN, the post-independence state struggled with limited resources, an unskilled workforce and

competitions in security and other institutions became ‘unmanageable’. Resolution of ‘crisis’ came in the form of greater democracy represented through greater party political participation, and the election of popular leaders of the resistance movement who, although renowned for their charisma, aspired to a technocratic form of government. However, further examination of scholarly explanations is required to provide a closer focus on the period in question.

From the early post-1999 period scholarly focus was trained on UNTAET. It quickly became evident that a gap existed between the UN’s own pronouncements on its successes, and the version produced by scholarship critical of its government (Chopra 2000, Gorjao 2002, Philpott 2006). This criticism was based on a lack of inclusiveness of East Timorese in leadership structures (beyond a small coterie of the elite), profligate spending on the salaries of international staff, and a determination to create a profoundly centralised concentration of power after previous disastrous missions. Among the most important of these failings under the UN’s reign of ‘benevolent despotism’ was that it did not come to terms and work with existing East Timorese social organisations that it found on arrival in 1999, but sought to remake the population by fragmenting it to the level of rational individuals who were regarded as ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ (Hughes, 2009b). By contrast, the UN could point towards peace as justification for such a centralised form of government, replacing its mission UNMISET in 2005 with a scaled down ‘Office’ (UNOTIL). In 2006, the territory’s political crisis, however, invalidated such claims. As ‘sovereignty [had been] observably held hostage by a veritable army of international experts, advisors, donors, and peacekeepers’, (Hughes, 2009a:1) so it initially seemed that the UN’s unequal ‘dispensation’ of power was key to diagnosing the unequal material outcomes that led to crisis. This causality

seemed especially clear as the same lack of economic development under UN governance was repeated during Fretilin's term in office (2002-7). Materialist readings proposed that, in contrast to relatively higher spending in the capital Dili, another UN legacy, agricultural extension programmes of the Indonesian era were discontinued, sharpening grievances against the government (Moxham, 2008; Kingsbury, 2009).

Against this backdrop, some scholars found a more specific and seemingly self-evident explanation for East Timor's 'problems' in the form of a weak state. This work saw in both a weak society, and 'internal disunity' among political elites, a need for deeper intervention to forge a liberal state. Both intra-elite conflict, and Fretilin's inability to 'keep control', presumably a reference to security institutions' endemic weaknesses, allegedly foretold the possibility of 'state failure' (Cotton, 2007). The crisis was explained as a legacy of UNTAET (Ingram, 2012), whereby institutions that it created, including the military (F-FDTL) and police (PNTL), had been the subject of poor policymaking by political elites. Until 2006, regional differences between easterners (*firaku*) and westerners (*kaladi*) were thought to have been confined to security institutions (Simonsen, 2009; Sahin, 2007). These works attributed to regionalism a sudden combustibility within society at large at this time. Intra-elite conflict and bad policymaking was triangulated by the 'low capacity' of the RDTL's public administration. This was occasionally attributed to the historical reason that its East Timorese agents were either hamstrung by lowly rank and inadequate experience during the Indonesian period, though also to inadequate training by international consultants after independence (La'o Hamutuk, 2005). Ample evidence seemed to exist for this view, whether in the unfulfilled goals of the National Development Plan seen through low Ministerial budget execution, or police brutality. Others sought to link this 'low

capacity' of the state with its inability to fend off challenges from 'traditional authority structures' (Zaum, 2007). The problem for these scholars seemed to be managerial failings and vaguely defined historical antipathies of a political elite, combined with weak 'capacity' in state institutions bequeathed by UNTAET. The state required more foreign assistance, and more engagement of the kind likely to help ensure that liberal norms became institutionalised. In a criticism of this view, it has been proposed that while problems are invariably seen as originating in the state and a handful of its agents, their resolution can only be found within the state (Grenfell, 2008). However, an alternative perspective is not brought forward. Yet whether regarded as 'strong' or 'weak', the view of the state often posited remarkably abstract views of its workings. In accounting for the crisis, a diagnosis of 'weak institutions' took its place alongside an 'undermined' constitution and political system that had been 'shaken to its base and fractured' (Weldemichael, 2012:309). Commentators were sure that the events of 2006-8 were inevitable indicators that East Timor had lacked the 'rule of law' (Jolliffe 2007; Kingsbury, 2008).

By contrast, others viewed postcolonial politics as characterised not by a weak state, but a society that was not fulfilling its potential. Some drew attention to elite relations with the international community, characterised by deals and accommodations, but achieved at the expense of 'popular' rather than 'state sovereignty', whereby a suppressed society languished as the state did the international community's bidding (Hughes, 2009a). Indeed, East Timor's society also became part of the solution to 'resolving' 'crisis'. Society was frequently glossed as 'civil society', with an activist heritage from the Indonesian period. In one reading, civil society 'transformed itself' from a 'people's movement' into 'development organisations' after independence. In such analyses, the

case for civil society as representative of the authenticity or 'reality' of society is seen through a generational distinction drawn between civil society - its members grew up under Indonesian rule - and a lusophone elite 'who returned at independence'. 'Civil society' has even been posited as an autochthonous core of 'tradition' that 'maintained respect for local knowledge and practices of their elders' (Wigglesworth, 2013). Given this overwhelmingly positive evaluation, it is no surprise that others have sought to further develop the idea of a society with activist roots checking the power of an out-of-touch state. In this reading, society made a virtue out of participating in the Indonesian bureaucracy, by using its structures to engage in clandestine work in support of the resistance. 'Networked governance', originally resulting from the clandestine movement had primed East Timor for liberal democracy more effectively than in many 'developed' states. Using a normative framework derived from republican theory, Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares suggest that a 'networked politics of hope' defeated Indonesia and 'realist' states complicit in the occupation, both through clandestine activism within East Timor and abroad where its exiled leaders were resident. A key relation of networked governance is, they argue, that it elided 'hierarchical bureaucratic power', with its agents using these bureaucracies from within. At the dawn of independence, such a form of governance had the potential to avert the tyranny that many postcolonial countries fall prey to. The UNTAET period generated unacceptable concentrations of power in elites that along with inadequate oversight of security institutions, effectively led to the 2006 crisis, from which, they suggest, lessons have been drawn by the same elites. Thus, they insist, 'increasingly variegated checks and balances', deriving from 'networked resistance' can ensure a robust response in the event of state abuses of power (Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares, 2012).

This view of a strong, 'untapped' society, key to both amelioration of crisis and preventing the state from becoming too powerful, finds resonances with an established liberal perspective on state-society relations. Joel Migdal (1988) posited a typology of strong and weak states, attributing a mixture of reasons to the inability of 'third world' states to become strong. The presence of local 'strongmen' in society often cannot be overcome, he argued, if there was no strong state that could rotate officeholders, an assurance against concentrations of power in individuals. War and dislocation also militated against the build up of 'social control' by the state. Through determining the state's 'capabilities' as either 'low' or 'high', states are assessed in terms of how well they fit within existing typologies (for example 'authoritarian bureaucratic') that may contribute in turn to a state's 'strength' or 'weakness'. Migdal's work has been looked on favourably by recent advocates of 'hybrid governance', who posit 'customary solutions' (Asfura-Heim, 2013:15), of enlisting 'traditional security providers', or, the support of 'society' where building a 'strong state' alone is financially or politically unviable. Hybrid governance, which proposes a synergistic relationship between state and society, posits among other things, that as societies become more 'open' the state continues to need the engagement of 'civil society' and NGOs in order to govern effectively (Spink and Best, 2009). Clearly, there is much overlap between Migdal's and the 'hybrid governance' view, of which 'networked governance' appears to be a variation.

Map 1

East Timor showing locations mentioned in thesis.

More particularly, these views posit that states or societies are agents of social and economic 'development'. This is significant to the liberal statebuilding project in East Timor, and interpretations of postcolonial politics in general. In particular, as Devant has noted of the view, 'crisis' is viewed as an aberration from development, because development is taken to be peaceful (Devant, 2008). The resolution to crisis may come in identifying its events, rather than understanding it, a precondition for making recommendations for its redress that steadfastly centre on the strengthening of state institutions and promotion of civil society, which may play a role in mediating between antagonistic political factions (Kingsbury, 2008). Yet the slippery issue of history and its legacies are not adequately reconciled in this view. The resistance movement is the basis for civil society and the fount of political legitimacy for elites. Paradoxically it may also have the potential to compromise 'good governance', because explanations of crisis have been sought in the latent or open criminality of agents of the resistance movement (ICG, 2006; Nixon, 2011). In this view, East Timor's politics is still characterised by certain 'subterranean' features innate to the clandestine movement, and lacks 'openness' and 'transparency'. Thus, a further feature of building a liberal state involves 'professionalisation'. Had, for example, F-FDTL been rendered free of 'political' interests associated with resistance politics from its inception, (with which, conversely, society had been so richly endowed) and been subject to assertive civil leadership, it is suggested, it might have remained peaceful.

The Catholic Church is also often cited as another element of 'civil society'. Many sources explain the Church's contemporary power as deriving exclusively from the Indonesian period, which ostensibly represented a complete break with the previous Portuguese period. The Church was a bulwark against Indonesian attempts to

'Indonesianise' East Timor's society and supplant its culture from the 1980s. Indonesian requirements compelled mass conversions to Catholicism, but also reflected the population's need for protection (Kohen, 1999:132). Father Martinho da Costa Lopes was installed as leader of the Church after 1977 followed by Bishop Belo's inauguration in 1984. As Carey and others have pointed out, key moments of the Church's developing affinity with the nationalist cause can partly be identified by decisions taken within the Church as an institution. These include placing East Timor directly under the authority of the Vatican by making it an independent diocese in 1981, and thus outside the jurisdiction of the Indonesian Bishop's Conference (KWI). This was preceded shortly before by the publication of the Catholic liturgy in Tetun, a language banned under Indonesian rule. During this period the Church used its ability to communicate with the outside world to relay information about human rights abuses. Others have similarly cited legal agreements to assert that the traditional role of the Church vis-a-vis the Portuguese colonial state, represented by the 1940 Concordat making 'faith and fatherland indissociable' (Castelo, 1998:132), was ruptured after Soeharto's signing of a document integrating East Timor into Indonesia in June 1976 (Lennox, 129).

Moreover, in this context, it is claimed that the period after 1975 saw a break with the past and the birth of a new Church and faith (Hodge, 2012). Other accounts have argued that in the aftermath of the invasion, it is difficult to regard the Catholic Church's clergy as monolithically activist, partly due to constraints of the occupation, but also due to inertia (Smythe, 2004 in Field, 2008). There is, furthermore, evidence of continuity between the historical time periods that cannot be traced through legal agreements. A network of indigenous catechists, trained under Portuguese rule and more numerous

than priests or nuns, played an important role in conversions before and after 1975 (Martins, 2001:9). Aside from clergy, the majority of the population converted to Catholicism during the Indonesian period, but 20% or more had converted before Portuguese decolonisation, of whom many were influential elites. The Tetum liturgy may have been published at a crucial historical moment in the early years of Indonesian occupation, but this built on prior missionary publications in the Tetum language, the first as early as the late 19th century. It has been asserted that many of the generation of 'political' elites educated in Portuguese-era missionary schools in the 1960s and 70s had been deeply influenced by their educational experiences (Dunn, 2003). However, the same argument is not often made for their contemporaries that went on to become East Timorese Catholic priests and nuns despite often more prolonged training. This picture raises questions not only about how civil society is to be regarded, but also what other sources of historical continuity there are in the contemporary Church's power, and how this may be understood through its relations with the state and population.

Thus, to summarise, a series of paradoxes exists in contemporary thinking about postcolonial politics. A weak state must be strengthened to avoid conditions of the kind that led to crisis in 2006. Yet an excessively 'strong' state is undesirable and to mitigate this possibility, society, particularly, 'civil' society must play a balancing role. 'Civil' society is formed out of the clandestine resistance network. Association with the resistance movement is a prime source of political legitimacy, but also criminality.

II. Towards an alternative framework for understanding politics after 1999

State-society analyses frequently use a simple formula to highlight apparent discontinuities between anti-colonial liberation movements and post independence 'instability'. Yet as seen above, they also give rise to other configurations that can be compared with earlier accounts of state-society relations. Writing 15 years after Indonesia's independence, for instance, Clifford Geertz saw in Indonesia – East Timor's former coloniser - a tension between, on one hand, the primordial attachments of sub-national populations, whether to communal, racial, religious or regional identities, and on the other, a 'demand for progress…a rising standard of living [and] more effective political order' represented in a central modernising state (Geertz, 1963:111). In common with other views of 'primordialism', Geertz saw in the modern state an inability to penetrate society that operated according to different rules. Like others that pit state against society, Geertz's analysis operates according to a familiar configuration. If Geertz's view is to be distinguished, it is through historical contingency, particularly as it was written as the 'new states' came into being, out of synch with primordial societies in the 1940-1960s (Two decades later, a different account by Benedict Anderson, (1990) posited that Indonesia had by contrast a 'new society' and an 'old state' inherited from the Dutch colonial period). That prevailing views of given time periods inform accounts during which they were written is not surprising. However, this is only one part of the significance of a historical perspective. In East Timor, the impact of history in the present is evident in other ways than the recent past, and the perceived implications of this history to the present, i.e. the Indonesian period. East Timor is, after all, a nation with a renowned, deeply impacting,

and possibly unique history of colonial contact and subjection (c.1600s-1943, Portugal; 1943-1945, Japan; 1945-1975, Portugal again; and 1975-1999, Indonesia).

Thus, other considerations related to a historical perspective need to be considered. For example, distinct historical periods are entwined with the epistemological conditions that give rise to different understandings of state and society over time. Acknowledging this raises questions that state-society analyses may address (for example, where does the boundary between state and society lie, or what are the exterior limits of each? What implications does this have for their relations, and the rule of law?) and seems to be not simply a matter of objective reason, as much as informed by a desire to strike a balance, even a contract, between the two. While liberal scholars assert the importance of establishing where the state's remit is, and the conditions for its relations with society, much of this analysis tends to overlook how each was constituted historically. As Mohammed Mamdani has suggested, a 'bifurcated state' was a decisive legacy of colonial state formation in Africa, in which two systems of law operated, civil for urban areas, and customary for 'the hinterlands'. Colonialism, it is suggested, sought to institutionalise segregation, as an alternative to the 'civilising' mission, which by the early 20th century was increasingly viewed as unworkable. By putting the population outside urban areas under the direct control of tribal authorities that it empowered, customary law in the hinterlands was to be contrasted with civil society under civil law in urban areas. Such a historical analysis is necessary to account for 'civil society' as a derivative of racist notions of 'civilised' society, rather than in an unremitting programmatic and ideological sense (Mamdani, 1996:6-14). This is a variation of Ranger's concern, also about Africa, that studies of anti-colonial movements have

"served in all too many cases as moral propositions rather than intellectual ones" (Ranger, 1985:3). Grounding examinations of contemporary states with reference to colonial formations of power therefore may present an alternative to either liberal statebuilding or hybrid/networked governance scholarship, that view 'weak' states or civil society as needing to be strengthened/empowered.

Timothy Mitchell (2005) has similarly sought to treat the state through historicizing it, rather than defining its boundaries. Mitchell views power as being generated through the production of categories such as state and society, elaborating on Foucault's observation that knowledge is brought to bear in the creation of binary divisions of all kinds, which are 'characteristic of modernity' (Foucault, 1991a:74). Thus rendered, and following Foucault, Mitchell sees the state not as a place where power emanates from, but where it is contested. Power is therefore evident in many locations, not only the state. In other readings, the state is not an abstraction where policy is devised, nor a centre from which power is dispersed, but a 'site' of power through which struggle between competing groups and individuals over discourse and practices takes place (Joyce and Bennett, 2010). The analysis of these scholars suggests that taken-for-granted distinctions are themselves the result of knowledge formations. Interrogating them may reveal the source(s) of their power.

i. Governmentality and bio-power

In a practical example, examining the construction of categories such as civil society serves to show that multiple sites of power exist, including those embedded in others. The Church, for instance, is an institution often posited as a key element of 'civil

society'. Its distinction as apart from the state is a cornerstone of 'modern' government. Analysing the practices of power that led to this distinction found in 17th century Europe are informative not only of how the idea of 'modern' government of the kind described above began to take shape, but also how the church, through this separation, came to be regarded as part of a 'civil society' and therefore as 'contest[ing] and repel[ling] the will of government' (Gordon, 1991:23). For Foucault, the precursor to 'governmental' power was the power of the 'pastorate': priests, their communes, and the structures and interests of medieval Christianity. The principal historical reason for the diminishment of pastoral power was resistance to it from within the Christian population, made possible by the 'institutionalisation' of the pastorate from the early centuries after the advent of Christianity.

The Church's imbrication in political power, indeed its indivisibility from it, especially after its increasing use of juridical norms in the seventh and eight centuries and its acquisition of land and people ('feudalisation'), were the catalysts for a profusion of 'counter-conducts' – dissent from the prescribed conduct inherent in the obedience pledged to the shepherd by the flock. However, Foucault wanted to draw attention to the detail of this institutionalisation in terms of its internal struggles as much as grand sweeps of history. Material, but also epistemological inequities were resisted by the flock, such as the surrender of knowledge of one's self to the priest through confession. The pressures created by the requirement of the pastor's charges to be unquestioningly obedient, opened avenues for small acts of dissent and larger acts of revolt, the most famous example of which has been termed 'Reformation'. It is tempting to see such 'great events' as of overarching significance. Yet, again, the changes wrought as the result of counter-conducts took place at the micro-social as well as grand historical

level, and Foucault emphasised that these changes were usually linked to other grievances or events (Foucault, 2009:194). They are significant in explaining that the power of the Church was not suddenly replaced in the 16th century with the secular state (Foucault, 2009:229). Indeed, religion and politics in the modern west are better described by the complex insinuation of pastoral into governmental power, rather than simply by relations between church and state (Foucault, 2009:191; Elias 1994:279). Consequently, changes took place over time, *within* institutions of Christianity.

This shows two key ideas of power relations, as Foucault saw them, that later emerged as part of modern 'governmentality'. As seen above, power and resistances to it, were inseparable. Pastoral power did not so much become intertwined with political power, but was already a key part of its constitution. Christianity's institutionalization therefore entailed the diversification of practices by the flock – asceticism, mysticism, the predominance of the power of the priest over scripture, community resistance and eschatology - all played a part in resistance. These were all what could be called 'tactics' for resisting power from within, political tools often improvised within broader regularised practices. Foucault used the term in a wider sense: the 'deployment of tactics' described how discourse became the site of struggle in which the formation of knowledge was at stake. Tracing these 'discursive deployments' through 'genealogies' illuminated the formation of fields of knowledge inherent in modern government (Foucault, 2003:190-212). Tactics and strategies described practical engagements, and were thus distinctive from power conceived by Marxian scholars in which knowledge - perception, modes of consciousness, and ideology - preceded political action (Han, 2002:114). Moreover, knowledge was inseparable from power itself. In other words, the fields of knowledge used in modern government were implicit to power.

When this analysis was applied to the history of the emergence of modern government, the apparent paradox in this long process was that although a 'privatised' religion emerged from the drawing back of the power of the Church, resulting from internal counter-conducts – an 'intensification of the pastorate in its spiritual forms' – these counter-conducts extruded upwards and wrought change at a public level. It is important to take account of this, not only because it shows a connection and causality between these two 'levels', but also because it shows the central relevance of the 'individualised' relationship in pastoral power to later forms of government according to 'rationalities'. A key feature of governing rationalities, as before, was that each individual would be known and acted on. Pastoral power therefore changed in form – whereby a 'government of souls' was superseded by a 'government of men', but pastoral power still appeared to transcend historical ruptures. However, there were important differences in modern government. I will make some remarks that will necessarily be general, outlining the nature of these differences, amounting to a discussion of governmentality and bio-power, before moving on to the extent and limits of this in colonial government.

'Governmentalities' means government through rational knowledge, and as the word 'mentalities' implies, a way of thinking about and acting on the population as a result of the deployment of rational knowledge formulated through the human sciences. 'Mentalities' in this context refers to how the social world is understood and produced collectively, rather than through cognitive and rational processes at the individual level. In particular, the population became the object of government, which has two precedents appearing to derive from Enlightenment thought, but on closer inspection,

transcend its associated events. First, acting on the population as an object of modern government required calculation and measurement, deriving from the fields of knowledge implicit to this government – the human 'sciences' - such as political economy, the precursor to the discipline of economics, and sociology and criminology (Dean, 2009:28).

Second, the human population came to be regarded as a species distinct from other species, and acted on as an object of improvement. This perspective is a starting point for the emergence of 'bio-power', the form of knowledge characteristic of modern government whereby the human sciences were used to intervene and ensure the flourishing of the population's health, productivity, and protection, a precursor of modern 'biopolitics'. The transition to government with these 'modern' characteristics was accompanied by a transition away from sovereign rule being a royal God-given prerogative, and towards democratic government (Dean, 2009:29). The analogies with earlier pastoral power are necessary to keep in mind. The sovereign was still regarded as God's government on earth. This 'dispensation' ensured that the sovereign would act in the common good, distinct from individuals according to self-interest, a view put forward by Thomas Aquinas, and later, Hobbes. Modern govermentality retained earlier features of royal sovereignty that took rule to be based not only on God's will but secession and kinship, and an ineluctable association between blood symbolism and territorial sovereignty (Foucault, 1998 [1978]:149). Yet changes were wrought in modern government that reflected moves away from the sovereign's 'right of power over life and death'. In times of war, a projection of power was no longer a defence of a sovereign with a divine right to rule, but a defence of the health and security of the population. In times of peace, bio-power supported the emergence of capitalism,

through the "controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes" (Foucault, 1998 [1979]:141). In short, bio-power as a characteristic of government aimed to defend, preserve and make use of the population.

The role of sovereign guidance had an analogy in both the father's rule over the family, and the pastor's rule over the flock (Foucault, 2009:232-3). In the persistence of this motif of a single individual as knowledgeable of and responsible for the wellbeing of many individuals, resonances with bio-power could also be found. Thus, in a general sense, the characteristics of governmentality are to be found in the individualising calculations on which rational government was to be based, which found expression in making the population productive according to economics and biopolitics, disciplines of the human sciences. The nature of struggle in the forging of these disciplines illuminates how government was structured, but moreover, the nature of rationality as something that could produce ostensibly 'objective' forms of knowledge.

The third element of governmentality, discipline, forms a 'triangle' with sovereignty and the population as object of governmental management (Dean, 2009:31). In particular, disciplinary power was distinct from sovereign power, in that it sought to order and regulate the number of people in a particular territory by organising them through institutions. It was here that disciplinary power was found to have commonalities with pastoral power in its existence in medieval monastic institutions. Its nature has direct resonances with the power relation between shepherd and flock because monastic orders required observances of strict hierarchies, bodily discipline, and total subservience to the monastic superior, all later found in modern institutions of

state such as schools, prisons and the military (Foucault, 1991b; Asad, 1993:135-165). Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of disciplinary power is its quality as inducing productivity in its subjects from the inside out. A comparison with Marxian views of power – which views power as essentially repressive and applied externally - is again instructive.

What emerges from the above is that Foucault thought that pastoral power was instituted in the modern state. Changes in power were wrought over time and sometimes in peculiar ways. For the purposes of this study, however, it is evident that these epistemological and socio-historical conditions in Western Europe raise questions about their applicability beyond these contexts. In addressing this, it is necessary to think about how and whether these concepts can be used when decontextualised, but also how their conceptual elaboration can be made sense of in the particular contexts of colonialism and later, postcolonial states.

ii. Modern government and bio-power in East Timor?

In this regard, existing studies have largely posited that while 'disciplinary power' in institutions of modern European government led to increasingly dense grids of surveillance and reflexive behaviours by the population, the same cannot be said for government in its colonies. Colonial sovereignty in such contexts is regarded by some as having been characterised by instability, improvisational strategies of government and the anxiety of colonial officials rather than the surety of authoritatively-executed grand plans (Stoler, 2009). The nature of colonial power in these contexts was 'patchy and highly uneven', dependent on 'excessive and spectacular' displays of violence, and

frequently subcontracted to local auxiliaries (Stepputat and Hansen, 2005:26). Subcontracting bears a resemblance to elements of colonial bifurcation, particularly 'decentralised despotism' (Mamdani, 1996). Another body of literature stresses reflexivity and even reciprocity so that knowledge flowed as much from the colonies to the metropole as the other way round (Stoler and Cooper, 1997; van der Veer, 2001). In a general and fundamental sense, the dynamics of colonial 'governmentality' are significantly different to those found in Western Europe.

This divergence is in no place more evident than in East Timor, Portugal's most remote possession, described by some as being closer to a protectorate than a colony until the late 19th century (Tomasz, in Silva 2012), and similarly lacking a 'state' until the same time. Alternatively, rather than look for evidence of a state, or lack of it, others have proposed that parasitism was a key power dynamic underpinning the pre-1975 colonial-indigenous relationship (Roque, 2010). A number of recent studies of contemporary politics have reflected the significance of the intervening period of the Indonesian occupation, and have also provided analyses sometimes amenable to Foucauldian perspectives on the operations of power. Silva has argued that power relations between elites within the state initiated under UNTAET, structured the subsequent RDTL state. Despite the view of a 'structured' state, this is subject to important qualifications, for instance, 'Portuguese colonisation [was] discursively constructed, retrospectively, as a positive experience' by RDTL state elites. Particularly important in this regard was and continues to be the 'pretence of moral and cultural similarity', between the East Timorese population and Portuguese on which resistance to Indonesia could be based (Silva, 2012:46). The unearthing of discursive categories among elites and the population at large has similarly revealed flaws in the grand narratives of resistance

(Kammen, 2003; 2009). Within these historical and ethnographic approaches, abiding binaries of modernity and tradition have been problematized, which were used not only by colonial authorities until 1999, but also by postcolonial elites and social scientists (Silva and Simião 2012). Besides ethnographic work, scholars have analysed the production of 'objective' knowledge in international institutions, examining the discourses that arise during the course of truth-establishing procedures (Devant 2008; Drexler, 2010). These studies all show how certain kinds of discourses might be subject to examination in order to establish more closely the workings of power/knowledge.

Ethnographic studies have also highlighted what may first appear to be the postcolonial state being held to account by society's invocations of cultural codes such as reciprocity (Silva, 2010). This view posits that while the governing elite had been supported by the population in the resistance struggle, the population had not been 'paid back' for their support after independence. Proponents of this view show, however, that reciprocity, and the mass of 'the people' are conceptually different from the modernist vision of an activist society holding the state accountable. In a clearly articulated account, Elizabeth Traube showed how the Mambai ethnic group demonstrated political elites' unfulfilled obligations to them by incorporating historical events into local narrative (Traube, 2008). These are narratives of 'nationhood' in which the state does not figure, except as a means with which to satisfy 'unpaid wages' and the notion of elites held accountable by 'citizens' is not entertained. Traube's account is reminiscent of the scholarly identification of a 'little tradition' of peasant struggle, embedded in, but semi-autonomous from an urban, educated elite, operating in a 'great tradition' (Scott, 1977). Kammen (2009) has traced points at which a 'little tradition' existed within the resistance movement, from which utopian visions would be realised after independence.

Kammen showed that East Timor's little tradition in places looked forward to 'traditional' monarchies, a far cry from abstractions of citizenship, the rule of law, development, and other teleologies that prescribed a proper role and relationship between state and society. Both of these accounts usefully retrieve and show how subaltern aspirations and beliefs from the resistance period were manifested after 1999.

In related ways, ethnographic studies have broached the question of land. In particular, these studies explain the significance of 'traditional authorities' invoking precedence by (re)constructing ritual houses and performing ceremonies. This is an important dynamic, McWilliam and Traube argue, of post-1999 politics in that it represents the '…enduring associations that people assert and sustain with the land of their ancestors' (McWilliam and Traube, 2011:1). This is of significance in understanding long-term patterns of displacement and resettlement throughout the Portuguese and Indonesian periods, but also conflicts inherent in these processes (Bovensiepen, 2010). The legacies of this displacement, McWilliam and Traube argue, 'continue to inform social and political agendas in contemporary Timor-Leste' (Ibid, 9). Yet the limits of ritual authority are to be found, it has also been proposed, at the point at which this authority encounters the state. This meeting point is explored by examining recent land law legislation, with other scholars arguing that claims of precedence over land can be equated and understood in western legal terms in a qualified sense, as 'first possession' (Fitzpatrick, Barnes and McWilliam, 2012). The analysis of these separate systems - prompted by attempts to reconcile state legislation and cultural practice – lend further weight to the idea of a historical division between two systems of law stemming from the colonial period. Land is also of relevance to understanding the causes and meanings

of ‘crisis’, (Devant, 2008; Silva, 2010), and to identifying how contemporary politics relates to claim making to land and space.

III. Outline of argument

The thesis proposes an alternative interpretation of politics of East Timor through an examination of the limiting factors and parameters of bio-power; and looks at how this played out in the present. As noted above, the dominant view of East Timor’s postcolonial politics has been informed by liberal perspectives that see a configuration (and correct and relative positioning) of the boundaries of the state in relation to society, which serves to check state power. In proposing alternatives I describe attempts under the late phase of Portuguese colonialism to forge a ‘classically’ Foucauldian ‘biopolitical’ regime, where the population could be decisively shaped as modern subjects, and argue that this approach was only partly ‘effective’. Furthermore, the contemporary state has often been seen as subject to mediating forces of ‘pre-colonial’ tradition (often used to contrast with elite modernization). The thesis examines the extent and limitations of ‘bio-power’ under colonialism in successive chapters, bringing into focus themes of health and hygiene, the inculcation of dispositions, practices related to the family, habitat, monetization, the value of life and death; relating these themes as they developed during colonial periods to the post-colonial era.

Moreover, a more nuanced view is elicited by examining the particular nature of power in East Timor. On the one hand, while power, contemporary sociality and politics have been explored through a lens of ‘the resurgence of tradition’, or of modernity, rather than searching for points where these two perspectives may be reconciled, the thesis aims to problematise their boundaries by showing that their creation depended on the

historical workings of power. In short, the thesis historicizes, rather than defines categories. A second point specifically concerns power's quality. In the Foucauldian view, as noted, power does not only issue from the state, but from multiple locations. Moreover, it may be seen through discourses, practices, and symbols, rather than material evidence of 'development'. This has implications for its third aspect. Rather than analyse power by looking at how it is distributed by the state in contemporary politics *per se*, the focus is on the historical constitution of power in the colonial period and the ways in which it has fed into the present. Similarly, the significance of power's multiple locations and relations can be seen in an extended analysis of 'missionary power'. This comprises a significant part of the argument of the thesis because missionaries were embedded in communities and the colonial project (cf. Foucault, 2009), as well as often being closer to the indigenous population than other colonial personnel, historically during the course of postings to remote locations. As such, it is argued, missionaries sought and achieved influence not through force, but by means such as the family, providing one of several points during the 20th century through which they attempted to negotiate the transmission of modernity.

IV. Methodology

This thesis is based mainly on a year's fieldwork carried out between September 2008 and September 2009. I also drew on interviews conducted in two further periods, between November 2006 and August 2007, and in a follow-up period from April to June 2010. Interviews were conducted exclusively in Tetum, which I had become proficient in before September 2008, having lived and worked in East Timor for almost three years prior to the beginning of my main period of fieldwork. This earlier

experience was highly significant because it gave me an ability to conduct research without needing to spend time learning the language, or working through an interpreter; and consequently gave me a level of independence that I might otherwise not have experienced. It also allowed me to understand important elements of my planned research and how to approach it before I 'formally' investigated it.

This process, though far from smooth or predictable, was greatly facilitated by enhanced opportunities to converse with a network of East Timorese and foreign contacts. Some, but not all, are mentioned in my acknowledgements. By and large, however, only in a few cases did I rely on friends and regular informants to establish contact with potential interviewees, more often relying on many dozens of conversations with East Timorese beyond this circle of regular informants for background information. Indeed, these conversations over the years helped to identify topics, a process that seldom came about in a linear fashion. In chapter four, for example, I had originally intended to study the postcolonial influence of a resistance-era 'subgroup' in Baucau district. Ultimately, however, I switched to researching what I found both to generate more information and to be more interesting - the history and contemporary claims to a natural resource in the same geographical area.

In order to identify topics, and provide context, I also relied on reading daily newspapers in depth. When I wanted to look more closely at an event or series of events (such as can be seen in chapter two) I requested access to the archives of two such newspapers located in Dili, namely Timor Post and Suara Timor Lorosae. Both institutions always graciously complied with my requests. My choice of locations for fieldwork (in roughly half of East Timor's districts - Ainaro, Baucau, Covalima, Dili,

Ermera, Lautem and Manufahi) was largely determined by events and actors that illustrated the rich political landscapes that I was beginning to observe and have tried to describe and explain.

The nature of interviews often required their arrangement by meeting in person with a potential interviewee, or telephoning in advance, explaining on these occasions the purpose of interviews. It was sometimes possible to conduct my mainly semi-structured interviews on a first meeting in this way, while at other times interviewees needed more time to prepare or to consider my request. I requested interviews with one or at most two people at once, rather than group interviews. On occasion, other trusted individuals would accompany interviewees. Several interviewees were men in positions of authority at local and national level, many were people with less discernibly high status. I sought contrasting views among interviewees and often encountered contentious perspectives; I selected interviewees on the basis of their apparent knowledge or proximity to and recollection of events, corroborating this where possible with others. In several instances when I considered the subject matter too sensitive to reveal an interviewee's identity, I anonymised their contributions and the location of interviews and associated information. Where possible, I attempted to interview women, although I should stress that achieving parity of gender representation among interviewees was one consideration among many regarding who should be interviewed (the number of women that I spoke with in informal conversations over the years amounted to many times the number of formal interviews conducted). In any case, attempting to do so would have been an arguably flawed way of addressing the issue of gender. Instead, I address it directly and indirectly (chapters three and five), but since it has not been an explicit aim of research, I have largely left it and associated debates to be addressed elsewhere.

The focus of my thesis changed according to possibilities determined by interviews and sources, but also according to how various 'components' of research could be mutually complementary or otherwise. Interviews in particular that I conducted on the subject of the politics of language and the Tetum liturgy required my submitting a list of questions to two individuals associated with the Catholic Church (who helped write the liturgy) in advance. Despite the very interesting insights these interviews produced, I could not accommodate their subject matter within the themes of existing chapters. In a particular way, omitting this element of research shows the extent to which my research changed from the seeds of an initial idea in 2005 to the conclusion of fieldwork in 2010. Having witnessed the church-led demonstrations in April and May 2005, dealt with in chapter six, I had originally planned to address the broad theme of the role of religion in East Timor's society since 1975, and against this background, the specific question of how political transitions affect religious institutions.

Two things, both involving the practicalities of research, changed the trajectory of this plan. The first was the 'crisis' in 2006 that drew my interests towards its associated events, and how it had been both explained at the time and later by others. Second, before fieldwork, I had been aware of possible limitations of conducting research on an institution such as the East Timorese Catholic Church. Access to records was limited by their destruction in 1999, and also by the variable cooperation of its personnel in complying with my requests (interviews, and above all, documents) for information since that time. These limitations were underscored by my experiences during the first five months of my research. Recognising this, I refocused my research to encompass a broader range of themes for the remainder of my fieldwork. Still convinced of the

necessity to explain the influence of religion and other modalities of power, during my later fieldwork, I started to develop a historical explanation based on documents then at my disposal, that I hoped would eventually transcend focuses on power as residing in institutions, often privileged by conventional political science.

In the course of formulating this approach, I identified sources located in libraries and archives in London, Lisbon, Porto, Macau, East Timor and Darwin. In two instances, I found it easier to access sources outside East Timor that were theoretically available in country. For example, I consulted many more duplicates of CAVR sources in London than the originals held in Dili. Likewise, although I used little of my research at the Museum of Resistance in Dili in my final thesis, it was much easier to access these records, which at the time were available via the website of the Mario Soares Foundation in Lisbon. I was very grateful to have had the full cooperation and assistance of the staff at Dili and Baucau district courts when conducting research there.

IV. Chapter outline

These considerations inform an analysis of how pre-existing forms of power mediated bio-power, and the sequence of the thesis chapters. Chapter one explores how the events of the postcolonial period are best understood by examining the schisms and struggles that took place in the resistance movement. Governing elites' efforts to make the state in the image of the resistance movement signalled an attempt to consolidate an authentic version of history in which the dead and living could be ordered, but such designations became subject to contestation. Chapter two examines the problematic nature of these historical categories by which contemporary awards are made, through an examination

of witchcraft and witchfinding. It suggests that persecution of 'witches' was intertwined with power and resistance against Indonesian rule. As such the scope of bio-power is broader than the state's ordering and recognition suggests.

Chapter three suggests that the narrow focus of the postcolonial state's awards and designations be seen through an examination of state formation beginning in the early 20th century. Taxation, forced labour, and monetization were all features of state formation. The chapter questions whether these constituted the kind of intrusive interventions characteristic of 'modern bio-power', and how the postcolonial state is perceived at the local level, and in light of historical experience. Chapters four to six examine how far 'missionary power' can be regarded as having instituted a form of contemporary bio-power. In chapter four, missionary promotion of modern habitat and forms of the family is considered against the backdrop of the use of older forms of power. The effects of missionary education are also proposed for consideration not only through the prism of the Indonesian period, when its influence cultivated local resistance, but through the origins and technologies of colonial education. In light of the uses to which populations put monetary awards conferred by the postcolonial state, the chapter explores whether either distributive forms of power and reciprocal relations, or bio-power are adequate ways of characterising how colonial power formations have been made manifest in the present. Chapter five continues the theme of missionary education through an analysis of the inculcation of norms of 'civility' and 'courtesy' and examines in historical perspective how far this may have constituted the basis for 'civil society'. This is again compared with ostensibly 'pre-modern' forms of missionary power, interwoven into a discussion of the Catholic Church's relations with the state that preceded the events of 2006-8.

Chapter six examines the extent of bio-power by way of looking at the contemporary public policy of mass street cleanings. It examines the historical antecedents of a policy often supposed to have emerged in the wake of 'crisis', by asking how far colonial notions of subjecthood and citizenship form the basis for the policy's supposed civic dimensions. Against a background of colonial practices relating to hygiene, and postcolonial posturing that a social contract underwrites relations between citizen and state, it explores whether public cleaning is able to induce 'productive' behaviours in subjects, given historical experiences of repression. The conclusion revisits the central question of how far 'modern bio-power' is evident in light of the alternative forms of power outlined throughout the thesis.

2. Instituting the State: Evaluating life and Death

This week the world has witnessed a world-offence being committed in East Timor…What good, you may ask, is a moral stand against an armed militia. The doubt is rational, but it coexists with something larger, a feeling that there is court of appeal beyond the rational… This is the high court of the spirit where hope and justice are realities, simply because their reality is kept alive by...our need to rescue them from the bloody catastrophe of history and re-enshrine them constantly as sacred words and redemptive possibilities.

Seamus Heaney, on the steps outside the US Embassy in Dublin, September 1999

I. Introduction: building a modern state?

A discussion of the state serves as a starting point of the thesis as a whole. As noted in the introductory chapter, almost every analysis of East Timor's post-colonial politics has included discussion of the state (its agents, its role, and occasionally, its nature) usually conceiving of it as working synergistically with, or opposed by society, and therefore one of two sources of power. A consideration of the state therefore serves to address a theme that appears in existing studies. However, in presenting an alternative view, many of this chapter's themes appear throughout the rest of the thesis, in relation to subjects primarily other than the state. For example, existing studies largely conceive

of the state as a modern, secular, rational, rule-bound, elite-led entity. Equally, however, the state can be sacred, characterised by its practices rather than rules, a site of struggle rather than being the end result of anti-colonial resistance, and 'traditional', or at least appeal to the idea of tradition. These motifs point towards the themes of subsequent chapters. As Seamus Heaney's words above indicate, the struggle for East Timor's independence was kept alive inside and outside the territory often against rational calculation. By 1999, therefore, to many this struggle had become one of rescuing East Timor from the historical and depositing it with the transcendental. My aim at the outset is to address this by showing how after 1999, history was not discarded but 're-enshrined' in the state and postcolonial politics.

The state may be understood in a wide sense, as a representation of ideas through symbols and discourses, and as a series of practices comprising 'temporal arrangement, spatial organisation, supervision and surveillance' (Mitchell, 2005:184). This analysis concentrates on the way in which the state is comprised through ideas. This can be summed up in the central paradox that while the international community argued that instituting abstract processes of the state and constructing its material institutions would inaugurate 'transition' and establish a decisive break with a violent past, discourses of the resistance period unsurprisingly persisted. This chapter argues that representations of the resistance period were key to constructing the state. Between c.2000-2006, elites attempted to reconcile the present with the past in several ways. They attempted to make the state distinct from its contenders by establishing a monopoly over symbols and discourses associated with the resistance movement (1975-99), by excluding 'imposters' and 'collaborators'. These latter designations were also easily understood and used by the population at large because, as the following section shows, internal

struggle was a mainstay of the resistance movement that was constituted by the population. These designations, and others connected with regionalism, overshadowed more complicated struggles among the population, explored in later chapters.

The following section then shows how the state was recast in three ways. In contrast to the period 2000-2006, state elites after 2006 devised and disseminated official narratives of the resistance, aiming to definitively achieve a monopoly on its discourses and symbols. This practice differed from similar attempts before 2006 through attempts to incorporate ex-combatants within the state, signified by extracting, exposing and archiving their histories. Such practices showed state elites' intentions to institute the state in its own image, by attempting to take charge of history. More than simply designating ex-combatants as loyalists, however, they were assigned values, underpinned by material rewards and regalia. Yet, these designations, ranks and awards were unstable. Not all groups and individuals that sought recognition for pre-1999 activities were able to fit archetypes of resistance, an argument substantiated by examining in some detail below a group that claimed a part in resistance. In sum, the first section explores the Indonesian period, interpreting the meaning of struggles within the resistance movement and how this meaning was interpreted to produce an official history. The following section then traces how, after 1999, state elites attempted to establish a monopoly over signs and discourses of resistance. The profusion of claims to historical truth in this immediate post-colonial period among the population at large preceded the events of 2006. State attempts at redress involved producing and conferring a 'quality of resistance'. The subsequent case of the problematic nature of this process serves as a prospectus for the theme in subsequent chapters.

The use of the armed resistance as a focus of analysis intends to explore the idea of its 'transition' into F-FDTL, the military formed in the early 2000s. It presents an alternative to existing views of F-FDTL's significance to postcolonial politics. On one hand, F-FDTL is viewed either as having been created by the UN in the context of a continuing threat from militias, or in an attempt to satisfy an 'indigenous demand' for its creation (Rees, 2004). A closely related view has it that F-FDTL's creation was a mistake – a military had no place, so the view had it, in a democratic modern state (Oliveira, interview, 2006). By contrast others have posited that excessive attention on both the armed resistance and F-FDTL has distracted from the subaltern histories that remain unrecognised in the state's annals of resistance (Kent 2011:453 in Soares, 2012:126). In this view, "unofficial memory practices" have served to invoke the past at a local and often personal level, in ways that the governing elite has eschewed or has even attempted to suppress. This view partly addresses the issue, raised throughout the thesis that official categories of recognition are unable to account for those that fall outside the state's designations.

This view also questions the nature of 'transition' in official (i.e. state) renderings in which atrocities committed in the past are forgotten in the pursuit of better relations with Indonesia or because of abuses carried out by the resistance movement against the population. Instead, it is argued here that the means through which official practices and discourses are constructed should not be overlooked exclusively in favour of a subaltern perspective. The creation of an official history needs to be understood because it is an important means of showing how power operates. The representation of resistance in the state is a powerful practice connected not only with 'official' discourse but with government in its broadest sense, i.e. as a means to conduct and represent. Lastly, at

stake in a debate about transition and the state is another debate about 'tradition' and 'modernity', or rather, why the ways these things are conceived of and practised, impacts on politics. The construction of the state in the present is connected, however distantly, with the way resistance was in part orientated using selective experiences and motifs of late-colonial Portuguese modernity. As will become clear, this was more complicated than simply taking cues from ex-colonisers[1], not least because of the experiences of Indonesian occupation. If the aims of the resistance movement in the past were to realise modernity and independence from Indonesian rule, then the way that past is officially represented in the present cannot only be understood by the ways in which it is forgotten.

II. The 'resistance in the resistance': official history and its struggles

After 1999, symbols and discourses associated with resistance became subject to contestation in the context of elite attempts to achieve a monopoly over them and make them coterminous with a state. This section explores antecedents of struggle over discourse in the resistance period which generated histories of alleged treachery and loyalty in the postcolonial period.

The armed wing of the resistance movement, Falintil, was transformed into F-FDTL during UN governance in 2001 and constructed with the remnants of Falintil guerrillas and new recruits. For more than a year after the arrival of UN forces in September 1999, they were kept in cantonment, causing tensions with the UN government, and among

[1] At certain junctures, resistance leaders reproduced symbolic repertoire of late-Portuguese colonialism. In preparations for the 1983 ceasefire negotiations between Falintil and the Indonesian military, Xanana Gusmao requested that 're-tailored' Portuguese military fatigues be provided rather than an ABRI uniform (Chamberlain, 2008:85).

guerrillas. In January 2006, 159 western soldiers in F-FDTL presented a long list of grievances stretching back to the period of cantonment in Aileu, in a petition to then president Xanana Gusmao. All of the top-ranking officers in the new military were easterners, and the petition detailed complaints against several senior officers of F-FDTL, except its commander Taur Matan Ruak. Their dismissal from F-FDTL for going on strike, the subsequent resignation of a further 500 western officers who supported their cause, and the support of Gusmao, emboldened them to march on Dili in April 2006 in a bid to seek redress. The events of that period increased tensions precipitating 'crisis': within Dili, disputes over land and property and regionalist-sectarian identifications were superimposed onto territorialised divisions leading to displacement of the population. Regional identifications manifested in this period were complex and have been explored in historical perspective partly with reference to Timor Island's ecology (Kammen, 2010). This analysis attempts instead to place regional identifications alongside other struggles over discourse during the resistance period.

The ascendancy of officers from the east in F-FDTL originates from the period in which the armed resistance was destroyed in the west of the country in the late 1970s. After 1977 the wearing down of resistance as a result of Indonesian aerial and sea bombardments and infantry offensives saw a more consolidated presence in the western border region, and by 1979, the military had a stronger presence throughout the territory, including the lowland northern and southern coastal regions. Despite this, the strength of its units varied greatly depending on locale. In 1978, in the east, its infamous 'encirclement and annihilation' operations forced the local population and guerillas, who had until then remained together in 'liberated areas' (*Bases de Apoio*), to take shelter en masse on Mount Matebian. Judging the strategy to be ultimately futile against

overwhelming military force, the population surrendered. After their descent to lowland areas they were rounded up and placed in concentration camps, according to a military strategy of dividing 'civilians' from 'security disturber groups' (GPK). Despite the reduction in numbers of Falintil by 80% and its arms by 90%, however, armed resistance persisted, as fifty guerrillas escaped to the far eastern point of the island (known as *Ponta Leste*) after the Mount Matebian siege, where they regrouped during the course of the following three years.

The persistence of armed resistance throughout 1980-83, indicated changes in strategy by both Falintil and the Indonesian military. The creation of resettlement hamlets by the Indonesian military created more permanent establishments through which the population could remain under surveillance. The military conducted a psychological warfare ('hearts and minds') strategy, but due to low troop morale, related to inadequate preparedness to face a guerrilla opposition, and limited resources, these campaigns were imperfectly executed (Budiardjo and Liem, 1984:44-7). Meanwhile, the much-reduced strength of the resistance movement in the East led to its reorganisation in 1981 under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao. Prior to the reorganisation, only three members of Fretilin's Central Committee within the territory remained alive, including Gusmao. The reorganisation removed Falintil from party political influence (that of Fretilin), aimed to build a clandestine front in the population, and adopted a guerrilla strategy (Budiardjo and Liem, 1984:72). These strategic changes, and attempts to enlist the population precipitated renewed Falintil offensives against the Indonesian military up to 1982. As noted previously, the strength of Indonesian military units varied, and the success of offensives caused informal ceasefire and co-existence agreements to be brokered between Falintil and local Indonesian commanders that could not answer these

attacks. On this basis, the Indonesian military and Falintil agreed a ceasefire that commenced in January 1983.

i. ‘Treason’ in the people’s army: 1970s-1990s

Prior to the 1983 ceasefire, divisions had already appeared in the resistance movement. The first notable struggle was between those that saw the movement best served through concentrating on a ‘military’ strategy, and those that favoured a ‘political’ approach, when such a debate was still possible. This occurred some months after the Indonesian invasion during May 1976 near Soibada at a meeting of the Central Committee of Fretilin (CCF). The debate within the CCF in which these views were aired, occurred at a time when a majority of the population accompanied armed guerrillas that still controlled a sizeable proportion of the territory. The ‘political’ approach won out, with the leadership of the movement subsequently controlled by a council of members ideologically wedded to Marxist-Leninism. A purge was conducted in 1977 of less radical leaders associated with Fretilin’s first president Xavier do Amaral, with his supporters treated, according to Abilio Araújo, a CCF member, to “summary justice, persecutions and killings, inflicted in cold blood on [Xavier’s] faithful combatants” (Araújo, 2012:165).

These previous internecine struggles, culminating in Xavier’s capture, also caused mutual distrust among a dispersed external leadership. Fretilin’s leaders abroad - the ‘external front’ that departed East Timor before the 1975 invasion - had in any event difficulty communicating with the internal front. In 1978, Alarico Fernandes, a CCF member based within East Timor, negotiated with Indonesia in an attempt to oust the

CCF leadership, along with the newly elected president Nicolau Lobato, by denouncing his leadership on 'Radio Maubere'. The broadcasts and apparent collaboration between Fernandes and the Indonesian military precipitated an Indonesian assault leading to Lobato's death in December of that year. Unclear whether the broadcasts were Indonesian-inspired 'black propaganda' or a purely internal affair, Fretilin leaders abroad became consumed by infighting amidst allegations of 'betrayal' within their ranks[2]. Although apparently amicably resolved, according to Abilio Araújo, it had "an enormous repercussion on the External Front, leaving injuries that were never healed" (Araújo, 2012:153-5).

Similar 'unhealed injuries' again emerged just before the 1983 ceasefire. The commitment to an ideological strategy by members of Fretilin's Central Committee persisted following the 1981 reorganisation. Kilik Wai Gae, Falintil's Chief of Staff, and two other members of Falintil's 'Red Brigade', Ologari Asuwain and Mauk Moruk, disagreed with the ceasefire and wanted to maintain offensives. Furthermore, they disagreed with the premise of admitting UDT - the losers of the 1975 civil war - to a movement of national unity (Rees, 2004:41). A notable eruption occurred when Mauk Moruk, Falintil's Chief of Staff, disagreed with Gusmao, exchanging heated correspondence through a messenger (Direito, 2003). Gusmao subsequently demoted Mauk, who then surrendered to the Indonesian military under duress. Gusmao later claimed that Mauk Moruk attempted to depose him (the 'supreme command') (Rees,

[2] Araújo (2012:153-5) described how Radio Maubere's broadcasts and the group's exile combined to 'generate a climate of 'who is the traitor?...He is betraying! He is the traitor!'. In this atmosphere, Rogerio Lobato became convinced that Mari Alkatiri and José Ramos-Horta, based in Maputo, Mozambique, were the sources of attempts to unseat his brother, Nicolau Lobato. On arriving in Maputo, Lobato found that they were in New York, and so held their wives hostage in Fretilin's house. After his arrest and release from custody, Fretilin's external leadership held a meeting, mediated by the Mozambican Government. They compromised to elect a new spokesperson (José Luis Guterres) and agreed that the source of betrayal had not come from within their ranks.

2004:41). Kilik Wae Gae, and two other guerrillas unsympathetic to the ceasefire, Carlele and Oka, went missing in unclear circumstances (Direito, 2003). Several different incarnations of the resistance movement followed these events, including the abandonment of its revolutionary socialist credo under the name of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (CRRN), and the forging of a closer relationship with the Catholic Church. This, along with an earlier decision to situate Falintil beyond party politics, were precursors to closer engagement of a clandestine base of support in the population at large, another policy instituted in 1981.

In the following years, engaging as wide a section of the population as possible became a key aim of the resistance movement and a precursor to the departure from Fretilin of Gusmao and José Ramos-Horta, the leader of the diplomatic front abroad, in 1987. The same year Ojectil, a student resistance organisation was founded based in East Timor, and the following year, the foundation of Renetil, led by Fernando de Araujo, a clandestine organisation of Timorese students in Indonesian universities, further signalled Gusmao's intention that the leadership of the movement should lie less in a party structure and increasingly under a broader front led by him. The decision to unify the armed, diplomatic, and clandestine wings of the organisation under the banner of the CNRM in late 1988 confirmed such a strategy. In the wake of the Dili massacre in November 1991, in which several hundred people were killed after the Indonesian military opened fire on funeral-goers, a crackdown on the clandestine organisation as well as a sustained campaign of military offensives severely weakened the resistance. The number of its guerrillas was reduced so that overall numbers fell to a third[3].

[3] In some instances, the reduction was much greater. The border zone (*fronteira*) went from having 200 to 14 guerillas (Carrascalao, 2012:85)

The general decline in the resistance's fortunes appeared to be sealed by Gusmao's capture in late 1992. Again, this was believed by senior leaders such as Taur Matan Ruak to be the result of betrayal (Carrascalao, 2012:99-100)[4]. The longstanding situation of 'easterners' in all senior roles therefore continued as Mau Hunu, the only founder of Fretilin that had not been either killed or captured, assumed the leadership. Gusmao's role as 'historic leader' was undisputed, but his functions were frozen due to imprisonment. Mau Hunu led through a politico-military council of Fretilin members with two vice-secretaries, Lu-Olo and Konis Santana. Thus when Mau Hunu re-confirmed a longstanding decision to keep Falintil free of party affiliation, Fretilin still continued to be a key symbolic and organisational element of the resistance movement, and had the loyalty of many senior leaders.

The offensives against Falintil and the clandestine network throughout 1992 also had the effect of disconnecting one region, where guerrillas operated, from another. Each regional commander thereafter proceeded more autonomously. Now organised as four regions, not only were the majority of leaders of eastern origin, but the most detached of all was the '*Ponta Leste*' zone, where the Indonesian presence was least stable, and numerous guerrilla offensives took place under the leadership of Lere Anan Timor (Mattoso, 2005:230). By this stage, the Indonesian military also had a greater knowledge of the entire territory than ever. Its paramilitary intelligence operatives, Intel, had become increasingly adept at recruiting double agents to infiltrate the clandestine network on which the movement relied. It was this infiltration that led to the capture of Mau Hunu in April 1993. With the capture of leaders of the armed movement

[4] Taur attributed this not to enemies within the leadership, but to the necessary use of clandestine resistance networks. Indonesia let these grow, he suggested, so that they could be more easily infiltrated (Carrascalao, 2012:100)

in consecutive years, by the mid-1990s, leader of the executive council Konis Santana, and Chief of Staff Taur Matan Ruak, thought that they could not change the political situation militarily (Carrascalao, 2012:86). They perceived a long-term campaign of urban resistance, combined with pressure at the diplomatic level as a necessity. To reflect Santana's role as leader of the executive council, closely in touch with the clandestine network, he permanently relocated to the west (and mainly the mountainous Ermera district) in the early 1990s. His assumption of the leadership seemed temporarily to have caused a rift with Taur which subsequently eased when it became clear that he was trusted by Gusmao (Mattoso, 2005:223).

Yet beyond these alliances betrayal continued to take place. Another of the 'troika' of leaders, Sabalae, leader of the clandestine wing, disappeared in 1995 following a meeting in Gleno[5]. Outside East Timor, other parts of the resistance movement in exile, including former Fretilin Central Committee member Abilio Araújo wanted to pursue a policy of 'reconciliation' with the Suharto regime (and was accordingly isolated by others). Throughout their joint leadership, Santana and Sabalae, close friends since school, identified challenges to their leadership and perceived these to have originated in a betrayal of the movement as a whole (Mattoso, 2005:260-3). Their perspective was not unique: the impression that the resistance movement was being subverted from within was reinforced by the disappearance in June 1997 of David Alex, another leader of more than two decades' standing, almost two years to the day following Sabalae's disappearance.

[5] Mattoso (2005:258) notes that rumours that his successor, Manudati, had accompanied Sabalae to Dili shortly before his disappearance persisted; likewise, an ex-leader of the clandestine resistance, and former close confidant of Xanana, Ai-Tahan Matak, latterly leader of the CPD-RDTL, was tainted by rumours of collaboration following his release from imprisonment

Thus, despite the award of Nobel prizes to Ramos-Horta and Bishop Belo in 1996, the resistance inside Timor remained at a low ebb throughout that and the following year. Santana expressed a desire to Gusmao and Ruak to hand over his duties to another leader. This was a marked change, since at the end of 1992 – another low ebb – he had talked several deputies, including an aide from the west, Tara, out of surrendering. As far as is known, this appears to contrast with declarations by Lere Anan Timor during the same period, that he would 'fight to the death' (Mattoso, 2005:196;209). In the context of the disappearance of senior leaders, the fluctuating fortunes of the movement at home and abroad, and Santana's own 'crisis of confidence' (Jolliffe, 2010:79), his death in February 1998, ostensibly the result of an 'accident', inevitably became subject to rumours of betrayal. An official story released by the resistance, that Santana had died from a fall while in Ainaro, was intended to prevent the real location of his death in Ermera becoming known to the Indonesian military. Although the whereabouts of his remains were known, his death was attested to by only a handful of people, giving it a 'certain mystery' (Mattoso, 2005: 300). This, together with the fate of others that disappeared, both armed, clandestine, and those beyond these resistance structures, represent two important themes that provided discourses that continued in the postcolonial period such as identification along 'regionalist' or 'nationalist' lines.

The idea of 'betrayal' was an unavoidable dynamic of the resistance movement after 1975. It was first evident with the division of those favouring 'military' and 'political' approaches in May 1976. Other fissures were given traction as the armed resistance was decimated in the west and remained alive in the east, and as the population separated from the armed movement. As stated above, the armed leadership's concentration in the east, formed another discourse that transcended the resistance movement's formative

experiences. Lastly, the involvement of the population in the 1980s and 1990s created opportunities for Indonesian infiltration of the clandestine resistance movement. Especially after 1983, with attempts to 'normalise' Indonesian rule, the use of East Timorese auxiliaries became more pronounced, culminating in the 1999 arming and organisation of East Timor's militias. This picture does not diminish the efforts of the resistance movement. Rather it describes divergent practices including deceits that emerged from collective attempts to counter Indonesian colonial rule. After the Indonesian departure in 1999, these were themes that, as suggested above, were perpetuated.

ii. Subverting symbols: 'imposters'

The transition of the armed resistance to a notionally 'professionalised military', was inexorably tied up with the policies and politics of the UN Transitional Administration that sanctioned its creation. The criticisms of this process were that little attention had been given by its international sponsors to how a guerrilla force could transition to a military[6,7] with aid badly coordinated, legal frameworks inadequate, and political will to exert 'civilian power' largely absent. While these observations still stand, it is suggested here that the political meanings of the resistance period in this context have been left relatively unexplored. The representation of its legacies were of greater importance than its supposedly logical converse – that civilian power over the military would be

[6] The UN's plans have been described as a capitulation to 'indigenous pressure' to make a new military (Rees), but also subject to minimal review. The SRSG Sergio de Mello gave the Timorese representative body only a two-day window in which to review during UNTAET.

[7] For example, Rees describes weak coordination of aid to F-FDTL from its bilateral donors, which were supposed to work through the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD), coordinated by the UN, but rarely did so in a coordinated fashion (Rees, 2004; Lao Hamutuk, 2005). Together with inadequate legislation, according to conventional standards of 'security sector reform', the policy and legal framework to affect control over the military known as 'civilian power over the military' was regarded as inadequate.

desirable or acceptable to either state elites or F-FDTL's leadership. This section develops this argument by examining how tensions in F-FDTL in particular were refracted through discourses of the resistance period, rather than simply catalysed by post-1999 policies. The same discourses, along lines of regionalist or nationalist identification, and often in combination with each other, found resonances in society at large because, as shown, struggle was implicit to the nature of the resistance movement.

After 1999, governing elites attempted to commandeer the discursive bases of the resistance and refashion and produce new symbols associated with it. As in the period 1981-85, competing visions characterised this period. Hence, for example, in a speech to parliament two months after independence, the leader of the opposition Democratic Party (PD), Fernando de Araujo, accused the governing party Fretilin of treachery:

> 'Fretilin became the best collaborators of *Kopassus,* giving information and revealing all of the strategies of the struggle, helping the enemy to plan and persecute Falintil and its cadres…[Fretilin] came to be better Indonesians, with *more regalia than the Indonesians themselves*' (TP, 16 July 2002) (emphasis added).

Politicians also made public attempts to discredit the idea that society should still be divided along the lines of those that favoured independence or autonomy in the 1999 referendum (TP 18 June 2002). Yet the idea not only persisted but was inherent to the politics of the post-referendum period. It was also marked by the (re)appearance of discourses, such as regionalism, which was superimposed onto claim-making about which region had ostensibly been 'nationalist' or 'collaborated'. Warnings about the

corrosiveness of eastern and western identifications over the cause of national unity were made by both senior military and civilian figures. However, there are also indications that public discourse differed markedly from private discourse, or more specifically, that conducted within institutions (TP, 14 February 2004)[8]. Both 'treachery' and 'regionalism' are considered in the context of contestation over the resistance, but first, those regarded as its pretenders (or 'imposters') are considered in the immediate post-independence period.

iii. State as heir to the resistance

The period between 2000-2006 saw elite attempts to take charge of the production of symbols and discourses associated with the resistance. They did this by attempting to produce a distinction between state and population through representing the state as a natural heir of the resistance movement. The first part of the analysis below concentrates on attempts to portray the RDTL state as a successor of the resistance movement.

Elite attempts to assimilate and establish a monopoly on symbols and discourses of resistance were tested on a number of occasions beginning in 2000. Significant groups of ex-combatants that refused to be cantoned in Aileu and correspondingly were not recruited into F-FDTL, referred to themselves as '*Falintil-Bases de Apoio'*, (FBA) with deliberate resonances of the pre-1978 resistance movement's name for areas under its

[8] The F-FDTL commander Falur Rate Laek claimed that regionalism had not existed during the resistance period in the jungle. He was later accused of using regionalist epithets (see section III below) in the barracks of F-FDTL's first battalion.

control, and challenged the state[9]. The very fast process of ex-combatants' dismissal from Falintil in its transition made their complaints more acute TP, 12 and 13 June 2002). Aggrieved at not having been invited for consultations on demobilisation, prominent individuals from within the ranks of ex-combatants such as Mauk Moruk's brother, Leki Nahak Fohorai Boot, commonly known as 'L-7', and Samba Sembilan, retreated to Bobonaro and Zumalai in the West, and Laga in the East, among others. Rogerio Lobato, who had been appointed Minister for Internal Affairs, was patron of FBA groups. Both in exile and subsequently president of a disaffected veterans' group, Lobato had had negative relations with elements within what became the military. Observers worried that the FBA would use Lobato as a 'Trojan Horse' with which to win influence in government (TP, 12 and 13 June 2002).

In this context, two elements are key to understanding the seriousness with which state elites, the population, and UN peacekeepers perceived the FBA groups. First, shortly after independence in 2002, some located themselves along the border area with West Timor. Memories of militia activities were still fresh, and remnants of these militias, stationed a short distance over the border in Atambua, had made several incursions since their withdrawal in 1999. Second, the appearance of FBA groups – dressed in military fatigues – suggested, if not an appropriation of the state's authority and its new military, F-FDTL, then a deliberate disregard of it. Thus, when a group of men in military fatigues attacked a police station in Suai in July of that year, being only a short distance from the border with West Timor, rumours abounded of militia responsibility for the attack. In fact, a group of ex-combatants carried out the attack, who were

[9] The term '*Bases de Apoio*' or bases of support, harked back to the early post-invasion period when Fretilin established liberated areas beyond Indonesian control until 1978.

unwilling to be subordinated to the state's new security institutions[10]. The group had indeed recently returned from a *suco* directly bordering Atambua in West Timor (cf. Kammen, 2009). Surrendering to PNTL and UN Peacekeepers after a week, the group were brought to Dili, where 12 of them, including their leader, Labarik Maia, were conditionally released.

Given the dispersal of FBA groups, the location of the attack, and previous incidents, observers noted that identifying groups on the basis of their uniforms was difficult. Yet although the group's pronouncements that they had been ex-Falintil were discussed, media in Dili emphasised the *Indonesian-ness* of the uniforms (TP, 22 July 2002). During the resistance period most uniforms were captured from Indonesian soldiers, with Falintil badges then sewn on, but with the onset of independence this practice had become unacceptable. The conditions of their discharge from police custody were that they were required to report weekly to police in Dili, and that they were banned from wearing military fatigues. However, Maia asserted that the uniforms were 'earned during the [resistance] struggle' and 'won with the north and south kingdom's bones'(ibid). The controversy increased when he claimed that the group had been instructed to continue to wear its uniforms by Rogerio Lobato, who denied this, claiming that he had told the group that they should only wear uniforms on ex-combatants day (20 August) (TP, 31 July 2002).

Uniforms were not the only symbols from the resistance period that elites sought to monopolise, nor was demobilisation the only thing that had caused negative relations between some ex-combatants and the state. Struggles over the past were central to these

[10] The group showed 'insubordination' towards Commandante Ular, Ibid

relations. Prior to and after independence, the Committee for Popular Defence, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL) a group led by a former clandestine leader, Ai-Tahan Matak, refused to acknowledge the existence of the RDTL state. The group regarded itself not as a political party but as a branch of the earliest incarnation of the resistance movement, pledging allegiance, for example, to the 1975 constitution and flag from the same era, criticising the resistance movement's reorganisation in the interim, and refusing to recognise UNTAET (Ai-tahan Matak interview). In response, the government introduced laws setting out conditions for the formation of political parties[11]. In attempting to counter challenges to its authority, the main actors of the government – PM Mari Alkatiri and President of parliament Lu-Olo, and President Xanana Gusmao – also separately conducted campaigns of socialisation and dialogues in areas where support for FBA and CPD-RDTL cadres existed.

Entitled *Governasaun Aberta* ('Open Government'), the programme was not simply an exercise in instructing people on the parameters of laws, but also served to perform ownership of the resistance through both invoking a view of the past and socialising new symbols intended to render that view in the present. Thus, Xavier do Amaral, a local son, provided an entrée into Gusmao's dialogue with villagers in Suco Mindelo in Turiscai, by presiding over a flag-raising ceremony, where a movement calling itself *Antigo Combatentes Base Orsnaco* [Ex-Combatants' Orsnaco Base] (ACBO) had founded a 'city', that it claimed was beyond the jurisdiction of authorities in Dili. The excursion to Turiscai was intended to affirm the state's ownership of the national flag by assembling a current and former president in one location. The outcome was an

[11] Law 3 2004, 'Sobre Partidos Políticos', 13:1 specified that political parties had to 'be requested' by 1500 citizens, for example.

assertion that ACBO was not connected with CPD-RDTL. Although they aspired to live beyond the state's jurisdiction, they appeared not to want to appropriate its symbols.

By contrast, during Gusmao's visit to the 'isolated' CPD-RDTL outpost of Uaibobo in Viqueque, villagers repeatedly refused to accept the new constitution, and argued for a politics practiced according to the 1975 constitution. Gusmao tried three strategies of communicating the state's authority to counter this. The first owes much to the idea of a state as a 'modern' entity. He explained 'what independence was', and why Uaibobo village should assemble into a 'general community' of the nation-state. When this was rebuffed, he evoked precedence, recalling his memory of Uaibobo villagers fleeing to Mount Matebian in 1975 following the Indonesian invasion. Villagers again countered this display of authority not by showing submission to the former leader of the resistance, but by asserting practical concerns – the right to live separately and without harassment by state security forces (they protested against the confiscation of CPD-RDTL's radios by the PNTL in Baucau during the previous week). Finally, Gusmao asserted that the people's enemies were those that 'carried weapons' [*kaer kroat*] – an allusion that the state would view any group that didn't accept it as a threat. As if to counter the inference that his group presented a threat, Ai-Tahan Matak responded subsequently (he was not in Uaibobo for the visit) that CPD-RDTL had cadres numbering 200 people but they were unarmed. As will be seen in the following sections, this exchange was more meaningful in the light of circulating arms during 2006 than is at first apparent(TP, 1 September 2003a and 1 September 2003b).

Similarly, on a platform in Ainaro, Lu-Olo addressed 'threats' from groups 'such as Colimau[12] and CPD-RDTL' by comparing the authenticity of their claims to have been involved in resistance with Falintil's temporary recruits:

> [Falintil] appealed for people to fight alongside us, holding guns and killing the enemy, so that we could win the war. [Some came] and stayed for a night, but then, in the morning, they came to the *commandante* crying, asking if they could return home. Then after the war ended many came to Dili with long hair and uniforms, claiming to be veterans. 'He has long hair, but he speaks naively [*ibun rahun*]. He wasn't even alive then… he's not old enough to be a veteran' (TP 16 September 2003).

The symbols of resistance, including the long hair of guerrillas (*fuuk naruk*) who 'did not cut their hair while at war' (Joliffe, 2010:84), and uniforms, were being abused by 'imposters'. Yet despite these attempts to admit CPD-RDTL into the state, they continued to operate independently. In 2004, the group was accused of distributing 'illegal identity cards' to its members in Suco Memo, Bobonaro. The response of the district administrator to this incident indicates that the problem was not that CPD-RDTL was not a political party, (previous legislation circumscribed their activities on these grounds)[13] but that their identity cards showed that they were attempting to operate a parallel state:

> These identity cards are used for when its members work in the fields. No local authority can make them surrender the cards…The CPD-RDTL are not enemies, but there are differences in their political vision… RDTL became independent once; it already has a president, laws, courts, and other institutions for the whole territory. The RDTL flag hangs in the UN in New York. It is only through the RDTL government that bilateral and multilateral relations can be had with many nations throughout the world (TP, 12 February 2004).

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[12] A group or a series of groups that, in at least one incarnation, professed allegiance to the resistance movement. In 2003, the state alleged, 'Colimau' was carrying out 'militia' activities in Bobonaro district. The state reacted to 'Colimau''s alleged activities by sending F-FDTL to the area, the only occasion before the events of 2006 when the military left its barracks.

[13] Law 3/2004 'Sobre Partidos Políticos'

The administrator appealed to the group to accept the state by emphasising that a contested symbol, the flag, represented its modern character of having international relations. As in Uaibobo two years previously, the CPD-RDTL's coordinator remained resilient against these appeals[14]. As indicated, CPD-RDTL's previous rejection of Gusmao's overtures was strongly influenced by their grievances stemming from the past. This can be clearly seen from the state's attempts to offset potential for further discord with the group by allowing their campaign to have a 'constitutional readjustment' (*reajustamentu constitusional*) aired at a 'National Dialogue' in early 2003, prior to the Uaibobo visit (the 2001 constitution remained unchanged). During the dialogue, it became clear that the group held a common cause with L-7, with both wanting, above all, to discuss the 1983 internal conflict in Falintil, but had been frustrated by state elites' guiding discussion away from the topic (Direito, 2003b and 2003c).

A 'quality of resistance' was therefore constructed and laid claim to in numerous public fora by the state. In the eyes of many, however, the position of its elites in speaking with authority on such matters appeared to be laden with contradictions. As a newspaper editorial noted, in the same period, a police operation sanctioned by the government to arrest those from the Suai FBA group still wearing 'Indonesian military fatigues' was being led by PNTL, of whom almost 80% were former Indonesian police (PolRI). The population, it noted, were 'cynical' about the allegiances of former Indonesian police, believing that many had worked for Intel (TP, 23 July 2002). Paradoxically, too, Lobato commanded both the PNTL and had close relations with the Suai group. To this configuration was added the idea not only that resistance was a

[14] He responded by calling for 28 November 1975 to be recognised as independence day and accusing the UN of attempting to 'divide the Timorese people'.

quality that could be declared in discourse and reified in symbols, but that this was equally true of its supposed converse, 'collaboration' with Indonesia.

III. Collaborators

By 2005, while the state's leaders proceeded along this course, disquiet festered in the ranks of the F-FDTL. This was partly due to material conditions in barracks, borne out by the several occasions when Lere Anan Timor, one of Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak's two deputies, complained that the state needed to give more attention to alleviate the military's poor conditions (TP, 21 September 2003). While the state had banned 'FBA' ex-combatants from wearing military fatigues, western officers complained that they did not even have uniforms. This was exacerbated by a comparatively well-equipped police force, with several special units, raising questions about what Lobato's intentions were. It is often overlooked in these observations that F-FDTL's 'difficult conditions' related not merely to material hardships, but also to its institutional investiture by way of material symbols, which in turn shored up hierarchical differentiation. As Pierre Bourdieu has argued, the favourable reception of an institution will be more likely if there is a 'collective belief…made concrete through qualifications and symbols like stripes, uniforms and other attributes' (Bourdieu, 2012:126).

Therefore, if the state definitively commandeered the discursive and symbolic bases of the resistance, so the thinking went, multiple 'truths' among the population would not continue to circulate and remain subject to contestation along axes of those that remained loyal or collaborated. As noted above, a pre-existing discourse of regional

differences metastasised after 1999, touching off histories of alleged treachery during the period of resistance. This discourse found popular expression beyond F-FDTL, in the streets of Dili, where easterners and westerners intermarried, socialised and fought.

In F-FDTL, easterners accused westerners of collaboration with the Indonesians, and similarly accused PNTL of collaboration. From the earliest period of its cantonment after 1999, western Falintil veterans began to assemble a list of incidents of 'discrimination' by their eastern counterparts. Demobilisation and recruitment have already been noted above as being contentious issues and contributing to the activities of disgruntled ex-Falintil under the aegis of *Bases de Apoio*. However, the petitioners alleged that some prominent ex-combatants were told not to apply to F-FDTL on grounds that they were westerners (petition, 18). Eastern veterans, already having demobilised, and subject to assistance from the World Bank-sponsored Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) programme (chapter 4), were called back and awarded with relatively senior ranks in F-FDTL in January 2001, shortly before its formal inauguration. Some eastern veterans given these positions were allegedly too old, had poor eyesight, or were disabled, they alleged. By contrast, longstanding western veterans were not given similar invitations[15]. Other allegations that the petition made were that eastern recruits were accepted back into F-FDTL after having committed criminal offences, while western soldiers were summarily sacked for lesser offences; that long-term unexplained absences by soldiers from the east were willingly forgotten; and that contrary to treatment given to western female soldiers, the institution's leadership turned a blind eye to eastern female recruits that breached conditions that they should not become pregnant within three years of joining.

[15] These included Samba, Dudu, Mautino, Mauputo, Kakahe, Susar-Lemorai, and Hakiak, among others

Compared, however, with these alleged practices of exclusion, discrimination and favouritism, alleged casual pronouncements by eastern leaders that westerners had collaborated with Indonesia, sometimes accompanied by physical and verbal threats, were taken more seriously. Given both their prominence in the petition and follow-up letter to Taur Matan Ruak, it is likely that compared with other complaints, these accusations had potential to cause more anger and resentment among petitioning soldiers. The petition alleged that Eastern commanders told their western counterparts that they were worried by militia border incursions, but more worried about sending westerners to engage militias in case they ran away to join the militias and "make war against us again" (petition, 2006:7;13)[16]. In the period after the petition became publicised, in the barracks, eastern officers are reported to have ordered guns to be trained on the group of petitioners (Dirigi ba Taur)[17].

The perception of PNTL as staffed by ex-PolRI, fuelled by rumoured allegiances with Indonesia, helps explains why on several occasions, the police and military fought each other prior to 2006 (Petition, 14. 14. 5/02)[18] (TP, 20 February 2004). Lere Anan Timor, ex-Falintil commander in the *Ponta Leste* region*,* reportedly told western officers that if they did not want "[easterners] commanding [them], go and call Rogerio Lobato and Leandro Isaac to command you". After sending the petition, however, he reportedly told

[16] Reported to have been said on 8/2/05. '…Returning from the firing range [*carega de tiro*] [Falur] said, '[if] we mobilise the force to shoot at the border, and the Lorosae soldiers are killed or injured, we will suspect the *loromonu* soldiers of collaborating with the militias to make war against us again.'

[17] 'M-16 guns [*metralhadora*], were all simultaneously aimed towards where the petitioner forces were'

[18] 'Cap. Higino das Neves with Alf Juvenil Sergio Caetano Pinto brought an armed section of [F-FDTL] to assault the police station in Kaikoli Dili, there was condemnation, it was just forgotten about; but in 2003 Ten. Deker brought [F-FDTL that were] victims in order to find out about a case in which some of the police were condemned for the beating of the soldier Marcelo Caetano, for which he had to be tried and thrown out of the F-FDTL, although he hadn't committed a crime'.

western soldiers that F-FDTL would declare war on the PNTL if they joined[19] (dirigi ba Taur, 2006:17 February). For the purposes of this analysis, therefore, two overarching themes are apparent from the events in F-FDTL barracks prior to the departure of the petitioners. While declarations of F-FDTL's professionalism were being debated elsewhere, its leaders fundamentally saw continuity with the past. For example, Lere is alleged to have told westerners that fractiousness in Falintil 'began in the jungle with the Mauk Moruk group' (Ibid, 12 Feb). Secondly, competing discourses of treachery or nationalism were enlivened when concerned with representations of the past. This is especially obvious when concerning deceased resistance leaders. Westerners were alleged by easterner commanders to be responsible for the death of Konis Santana[20] (petition:3), which, according to the same document, westerners rebutted by asserting that he was their 'brother'[21] (Petition:5).

It has been shown that state elites' attempts to establish a monopoly over symbols and discourses of the resistance were intended to exclude rival claimants called 'collaborators' and 'imposters'. This was consistent not only with the fractiousness of the resistance movement since 1976, but also an attempt to index society and the state along the lines of this narrow view of history. As uniforms were symbols to shore up or contest this view, so too was weaponry. Moreover, the question of the unauthorised circulation of police and military weapons was a key part of the events of 2006-8, perceived at once to signal a breakdown of law and order and the dissolution of the

[19] "Don't think that you will be able to join the police, if you do that means we'll be at war with the police, just watch it happen, we're not scared'.

[20] Col. Lere is alleged to have said: you [westerners] did clandestine activity because of us, you became members of Falintil because of us…[but] because of you the late Konis Santana went to the west, because in Tutuala [in the east] there was no food; so he died in Ermera because of you westerners, not because he drank medicinal [*moruk*] coffee that made him drunk, but because you are westerners (petition:3)

[21] A petitioner, Neves, refers to "my brother [*maun*] Conis Santana…who died because of the war", i.e. not, it can be inferred, as a result of western treachery.

police and military. Below, the symbolic significance of these circulations is considered in terms of the immediate events of the period, then against the backdrop of the history described above. A brief exploration of events leading from the dispute between the petitioners and government provides the context of this.

As noted previously, petitioners' grievances were compounded following their dismissal by Taur Matan Ruak from F-FDTL in January 2006. This led to an impasse with the government that supported the decision to dismiss them, which was broken the following month when Xanana Gusmao made an address on television. This address has been the subject of much critical debate to the effect that it provided a pretext for the beginnings of communal violence in Dili, largely, but not exclusively directed at 'Easterners' (Proc.no.16/CO/07/TR:3). Two significant elements of the events that followed from this had been the mobilisation of protestors from western districts (especially from areas where the 'petitioners' enjoyed strong support) to topple the Alkatiri government, and the circulation of police and military weapons from the national munitions storeroom [*Paiol Nacional*].

In late April 2006, the petitioners held demonstrations in Dili at the Government Palace (*Palacio do Governo*) where they were joined by elements who committed acts of violence against public buildings and avowedly wanted to overthrow the government. During the ensuing month elements of the police and military deserted, and tens of thousands of people in Dili fled their homes, taking up residence in impromptu camps. The origins and mobilisation of support from protestors that accompanied the

petitioners in this period remains controversial[22]. Two sets of organised mobilisations are therefore focussed on, which transcend the immediate events in late-April 2006. These mobilisations had common objectives, i.e. the resignation of the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri. First, among deserters from F-FDTL, Konis Santana's former deputy and F-FDTL's Head of Communications, Tara, formed the 'National Front for Justice and Peace' (FNJP) in early May, with other veterans such as Riak Leman, a PSD MP (Riak Leman interview; Tara interview)[23]. As the rate of desertion in the police and military increased throughout May, so also more people fled from their homes, especially in Dili, anticipating, or having experienced sectarian-regionalist persecution. At the end of the month, the government permitted the JTF, a non-UN mandated force mostly comprised of the Australian military to 'restore order'.

Following the arrival of these forces, calls for Alkatiri's resignation increased from Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta, the two senior members of the government not part of Fretilin. Much has been made about the pressure exerted by these actors in forcing the resignation in late-June. Certainly, when Alkatiri finally resigned, it appeared to embolden deserting soldiers to surrender. The deserting head of the Military Police, Alfredo Reinado, disarmed and was cantoned, while the petitioners remained stationed in Gleno. F-FDTL soldiers associated with the FNJP, Tara and Marcos also surrendered their group's weapons. On the one hand, then, wary of being seen as insurgent against the state, the FNJP surrendered weapons and worked through established channels, becoming closely affiliated with Mario Carrascalao's PSD Party. Furthermore, their 'movement', the FNJP, became a vehicle for the mobilisation of

[22] Some have claimed that the 'protestors' that accompanied the petitioners were no more than opportunistic criminals, while some have used the events to claim that their violent nature 'proved' that East Timorese 'culture' is prone to violence.

[23] Tara said that he had deserted as a result of intimidation by Lere Anan Timor and Ular when both entered his house on 5 May.

'protestors', bussed in from 'the districts' to demand the dissolution of the government. The consequences of these tactics caused distress among a sizeable population living in makeshift camps across the capital (TP 9 July 2006)[24]. However, these older veterans had by then lost control of the FNJP, which had been renamed the National Movement for Unity and Justice (MUNJ) (Lucas da Costa interview)[25], by mainly non-veterans, some of whom were affiliated to the Democratic Party (PD). The MUNJ continued to mobilise protestors from western districts and aligned their cause with that of Reinado. After having surrendered, Reinado was imprisoned in Dili, but in August 2006 escaped.

Thus, Tara and Reinado, (neither of whom were 'petitioners'), surrendered their weapons in July 2006; yet Reinado subsequently continued an insurgency, with the MUNJ's mobilisations supporting his cause[26] (Augusto Trinidade Junior interview). He represented a popular strand of thought that distrusted state elites (especially those that lived outside East Timor during the Indonesian occupation, as seen from the photo below) (TP 8 July 2006). Eventually western politicians supportive of Reinado converged after having been courted by older state elites such as Ramos Horta during the 2007 elections (STL 20 April 2007)[27]. On the back of this support, Ramos Horta

[24] According to UNHCR, there were about 72,000 People living in camps in Dili in June 2006. Timor Post reported that IDPs 'were scared because the actions of the FNJP can create problems which refugees (sic) could become victims of'.

[25] Da Costa said that MUNJ "tried to accommodate", including people from the East on its inception. He prefaced an explanation of its activities with a promise that its membership was made up of "*Lorosa'e, Loromonu*, Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims…everyone".

[26] Ramos-Horta refused to capitulate to MUNJ's calls to negotiate with Alfredo that the Catholic Church had agreed to consider mediating, and blocked planned MUNJ demonstrations on security grounds causing its spokesperson Augusto Trinidade to suggest that Ramos-Horta was untrustworthy Of this, Augusto Trinidade said: "Many things that he talks about don't have any reality. Now he's talking again: 'send the [international forces] to prevent [us] having a demonstration'. Truly contradictory to what a Nobel Prize Winner should be saying."

[27] For example, in the presidential elections, after a poor showing in districts where candidates perceived to be sympathetic to Alfredo won, (Bobonaro, Ermera, Covalima and Oecusse won by the PD candidate Fernando Araujo) Ramos-Horta wasted no time shoring up support by announcing that he would tell the Australian military to stop hunting him: negotiation with Alfredo was thereafter the favoured strategy. Media coverage followed shortly after designed to convince doubtful voters and observers that Ramos-Horta enjoyed the support of 'the people of Manufahi'.

became president[28]. Yet he and other state elites did little to 'resolve' the standoff with Reinado directly as they had promised. They were more interested in those, like Tara, who had transitioned out of the role of insurgent, and who in late 2007 was used by the new AMP Government led by Xanana Gusmao, returned in July 2007, as an intermediary with a small group of deserting soldiers (who were not signatories of the January 2006 petition) when trying to resolve the continuing standoff[29]. Apparently regarding these attempts as outmanoeuvre rather than a gesture of reconciliation, Reinado accused Xanana Gusmao of initially supporting his cause and subsequently betraying him. On February 11 2008, Reinado was killed at Ramos Horta's house having ostensibly arrived with the aim of negotiating with Ramos Horta[30]. With this element of insurgency dampened, state elites then organised the surrender of the remaining petitioners later in the year following a joint police-military operation; their later cantonment on the edge of Dili, and their payoff with sums of between 1,500 and 8,000 USD (Decree Law 15/2008) seemed to signal the end of 'crisis'.

[28] For the politics of PD's capitulation to Ramos-Horta's overtures see Timor Post, 27 April 2007; compare the antipathy between Ramos-Horta and Fernando Araujo a year previously in Suara Timor Lorosa'e, 13 May 2006.

[29] The group included other soldiers such as Captain Cesar 'Piloto' Valente, one of F-FDTL's Chiefs of Staff, who indicated that he left F-FDTL not because of discrimination, but because he didn't want to be part of an army in which 'people had lost trust' (Interview, Cesar 'Piloto' Valente).

[30] A passage from an autopsy report of one of Reinado's accomplices implies that he was assassinated. Leopoldino Mendonca Exposto, Mortuary Report No.90, Guido Valadares Hospital, Dili, February 11 2008.

Figure 1 An MUNJ banner hanging on the national stadium with an image of Reinado, reading: 'Struggle for Justice, throw out CPLP judges', lusophone, UN-appointed legal staff, thought to have affinities with what the MUNJ dubbed the 'Mauputu [sic] group', Fretilin's formerly exiled leadership. To the right reads 'Parliament=Puppet'. Author's photo, Dili, February 2007.

An analysis of the surrender or taking up of arms reveals the positions of agents of these events, in particular whether they remained allied or opposed to the state. Such a focus on elite agency in the distribution of weapons resonates with the view that they represent the location of power in a single source - the state. This view also sees the surrender of weapons as a means to correct the problem of their distribution[31]. If circulating weaponry is taken to be a sign of anything, it is that there continues to be a 'weak rule of law'. This view overshadows the symbolic meaning of weaponry. Even before the onset of events leading to violence in 2006, weapons' symbolic significance had been written into state legislation. In April 2006, in the run-up to the events described above, the government passed a new law, a 'Statute for Combatants of National Liberation'. The preamble stated that the Statute fulfilled a constitutional guarantee (RDTL Constitution:article 11) to recognise the contribution of ex-combatants to national liberation, which it would do by awarding pensions and regalia. This attempt at incorporation also required exclusion, since the exclusion of 'imposters' was a strategy that was central to making symbols and discourses of resistance coterminous with those of the RDTL state. Later amendments to the Statute included the practice of publicising applicants for decorations and pensions, intended to root out

[31] In March 2006, the head of the PNTL, Paulo Martins, began to secretly channel arms from the *paiol nacional*, sending its contents to three western districts, Ermera, Aileu and Liquica (Proc.no.16/CO/07/TR:6). Martins was an appointee of Rogerio Lobato, who had the previous year distributed weapons to civilians in Atabae, Bobonaro. Lobato had also distributed arms during the crisis. Lobato had distributed arms from his own well-armed and equipped special police units built up under his supervision. His imprisonment in 2007 for seven years was a gesture against these acts, although he was subsequently released on health grounds. Others such as Taur Matan Ruak also distributed weapons having sought permission from the Minister of Defence.

false claimants, who, after independence, fabricated or exaggerated their role in the resistance movement[32].

However, as well as identifying false claimants the legislation sought to identify 'collaborators'. Closely related to this discourse was the symbolism of weaponry. As shown above, the state itself propagated notions of 'collaboration' and 'nationalism' that were widely understood, and became intrinsic to conflict in 2006-8. Yet in view of the widespread association of these terms with individual 'truths' of resistance, the imperative for the state was to take charge and incorporate these discourses by making them visible in its procedures and performances. Those 'proven' as having collaborated, would lose the 'right' to bear ex-combatant regalia (3/2006:2a,b). Furthermore, those 'not recognised as ex-Combatants' were people who 'voluntarily collaborated with the enemy'. However, a second provision of the statute – later removed – prevented recognition to 'those members of Falintil who voluntarily surrendered to the enemy *with their weapon*' (3/2006:4, emphasis added). This implicitly referred to those who, as Mauk Moruk had done, surrendered with weapons in 1983. Taur Matan Ruak, who claimed to have brokered unsuccessful negotiations between Xanana and Mauk before his surrender, said that among remaining Falintil: "The fact that Mauk surrendered with arms was harshly criticised at the time, but, after, everyone understood" (Carrascalao, 2012:144).

That there was anger when weapons were lost in this way reflects their scarcity, acquired with great risk by salvaging or purchasing them from the Indonesian military.

[32] For a discussion of similar claims to ex-combatants pensions in the Republic of Ireland, see Toibin, C. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/10/history-students-no-grand-narratives. Accessed: 30 August 2013

As indicated, weapons were also powerful symbols. In 2003, as noted, Xanana indicated that those that held weapons (‘*kaer kroat*’) were the ‘people’s enemies’. In early 2007, still as president, Xanana launched a campaign entitled ‘*Haloot Meik no Kroat*’ [assemble sharp objects and weapons], which involved travelling to the districts and symbolically placing, as suggested in the campaign title, weapons in their holders (Kammen 2009; Bovensiepen 2011; Tewelde 2012). Insofar as this was significant in representing an ‘end’ to conflict, it also resonated with wider symbolism of weaponry. Thus, despite a government campaign to retrieve police and military weapons in circulation among the population under the aegis of a ‘Joint Command Operation’ (*Komando Operasaun Konjunto*), this objective remained unrealised by the campaign deadline of 10 May 2008. Yet this failure appeared to have caused more concern (STL, 2 May 2008) among those that saw it as a sign of a ‘weak rule of law’. To East Timor’s state elites and arguably many in the population, its meaning was different. To differing degrees, of arguably greater concern was forging the state in the image of the resistance, particularly by incorporating the population of ex-combatants.

IV. Recasting the state in the image of the resistance

As argued above, the significance of political change that occurred across the period 2006-8 was that the state came to be recast as a repository of both official history, and incorporated the ex-combatant population. This differed from c.2000-2006 in that much of that period was spent trying, in the face of persistent contestation, to affirm that the power of a repertoire of unstable symbols and discourses would contribute to a ‘truthful’ narrative of historical experience, by becoming associated with the state. Thus, the period between c.2000-2006 was characterised by a barrage of competing

'truths' or 'claims' that coalesced around the themes of nationalism and collaboration, loyalty and treachery. The period after 2008 was characterised by state attempts to bring coherence and stability to these 'truths', by extracting them through incentive, airing them publicly to confirm their 'veracity' and archiving them, entrusting the Museum of Resistance and National Archive with this task (Law 3/2006:21)[33].

As noted above, the centrepiece of the 2006 Statute offered the provision of pensions to ex-combatants, or families of deceased 'ex-combatants'. To this effect, several categories were created to define ex-combatants. Founders ('*Fundadores*') of the resistance movement, those in leadership roles in Fretilin/ASDT before May 1976 were held in highest esteem. 'Veteran combatants', were those with 15 years' experience in an officially recognised organisation that included CNRM, CNRT and Fretilin. 'Combatants' qualified if they had eight years' experience in a resistance organisation, while those with less than eight years still qualified for recognition as 'Civilian cadres' if they were active in the *Bases de Apoio* until late 1978. 'Martyrs' were those that died between 1975 and 1999 while engaged in resistance. To be considered for a pension, an applicant had to prove that they had spent the entire period for which they wished to be considered engaged in resistance activities, excluding work or study, or incarcerated or in exile. There were four categories of pension: 'special reform' for those with more than 15 years' experience; subsistence for those with eight years; 'special subsistence' for those mentally or physically incapacitated by resistance activities; and 'survival' (*sobrevivência*). 'Martyrs' were automatically considered to have served 24 years. The last category was awarded to the closest family members of Martyrs, or awardees of other categories of pension.

[33] The Museum was charged with 'guard[ing] and conserv[ing]' records of ex-combatants going back to the President's registers of the early 2000s, and subsequent periods of registration.

There were complicated rules in particular for family members that were awarded survival pensions. Surviving spouses could not have remarried, elderly parents could not be more than 55 years old, and surviving siblings could receive it if they had been tortured, exiled or imprisoned for more than one year (Law 3/2006:26). Once the holder of the pension died, it could not be inherited. The legislation was altered in 2009 so that eligible recipients of Martyr pensions could be widowers as well as widows (originally it was only the latter), and adult children as well as younger children, and 'eldest' orphans, were eligible for an education scholarship up to the tertiary level. In addition to this, provisions of Law 3/2006 stood, that parents, or siblings who had been tortured, imprisoned for a year or exiled while engaged in resistance activities were eligible for the pension. Additionally, the 2009 legislation made provisions for one-off payments for those that had served between 4-7 years (equivalent to 12 months' minimum civil service salary), or where no immediate family of a Martyr was alive, those up to four degrees along the collateral kin line were entitled to a payment equivalent to a year's survival pension.

The Statute built on previous programmes for registering ex-combatants, adding ex-combatants from the clandestine front to guerrillas who until 2006 had been registered by the President's office. After 2006, the body that oversaw the registration process and decorations was a specially created 'Commission of Homage' (*Comissão de Homenagem*), which was composed of government, presidential and parliamentary appointees, representatives of veterans and F-FDTL, and operated under the secretary of state for ex-combatants. The registration involved a process of publicising the decorations and awards through television, radio, and the press; applications made were

then assembled and posted in prominent places in a locale where an applicant's place of birth, current residence, and 'militancy' (i.e. which branch and at what rank of the resistance they claimed to have belonged to) were displayed. In managing registration and decoration, the Commission could effectively determine whether or not an applicant would be awarded a pension, and its level. The Commission could also waive requirements that an applicant should have spent a certain period of time to qualify for a pension (Law 3/2006:7), by recommending higher amounts of pension to be awarded to 'prominent individuals', based on 'merit', for which no guidelines of amounts were made (Law 9/2009:26b). The Commission could therefore decide whether or not a person could be registered as an ex-combatant, and had the discretion of awarding a higher than normal sum.

The state revived, refashioned and created new regalia, which both underpinned awards of pensions, and connected state with resistance. This was most obviously seen in the adoption of 'national symbols' such as a crest bearing an image of an AK-47 rifle and Mount Ramelau (Law 2/2007:6, 1g and n). However, other symbols indicated their recipients' status by bearing *rank*, and in doing so, conferring relative *values* on the population of ex-combatants, making a permanent overlay of distinctions that shored up the esteem in which many were already held. Medals were 'compulsorily' required to bear 'visual or symbolic representation' precisely inscribing both the order to which the bearer belonged (of which five existed[34]), what 'level' within each order they belonged to[35], and the periods of time of their participation. These levels superimposed distinctions within the byzantine structures of the resistance onto state-approved

[34] Five orders exist: Guerilha, Nicolau Lobato, D. Boaventura, Funu Nain (posthumous) and Laran Luak (Decree Law 51/2006).
[35] Guerilha, Nicolau Lobato and Funu Nain each have 3 levels.

hierarchies. ID cards, diplomas of honour, uniforms and the right to use the title of 'Combatant', or 'Veteran Combatant' were all symbols that publicly demonstrated the sanctity of resistance history and the bearers place within it, guaranteed by the state.

As well as ordering the resistance within the state, sanctioned regalia also served to exclude those not entitled to such laurels. The possession of combatant ID cards created a situation where alternative claimants on the quality of resistance were rendered as imposters, such as the CPD-RDTL with its illegal ID cards and 'out-dated' constitution. The use of uniforms on public occasions, allegedly in short supply even among F-FDTL soldiers only a few years previously, immediately distinguished its bearers from those such as the FBA, with their 'Indonesian' fatigues that were now memorialised in the Museum of Resistance. These general and particular distinctions show how inclusions in and exclusions from the resistance – now not only enshrined in law but inscribed in the state – were to be represented. When the statute was first passed, it contained provisions relating to those who were recognised as 'founders' of the movement and those that were involved in leadership roles before May 1976, thus marking a cut-off point from the divisions that emerged during that month between military and political wings (3/2006:8). The importance of this group is that, even despite subsequent struggles, their status was defined according to a period that preceded struggle, placing them above conflict. The recognition of this group of sanctified 'founders' is seen above all in the elevation of one – President Xavier do Amaral – above the rest, when recognised as the 'proclaimer' of independence on 30 November 1975 (Nygaard-Christensen, 2012). This act, belatedly recognised before Xavier's death in 2012, elevated him above a swirl of conflict signified by his arrest in 1977 and capture by the

Indonesians shortly after, and served to institute in the state both him and the other founders as beyond struggle[36].

Constructing a state in the image of the resistance therefore also involved establishing a 'truthful' account of history in which the dead played a significant role. The state supported families of dead ex-combatants through survival pensions and invoked them in public spectacles. Since the Indonesian withdrawal, both Catholic Church and state commemorated the Santa Cruz massacre annually and had declared it one of the principal events of national history (TP, 12 November 2002), yet many of its dead remained unaccounted for. Efforts to locate mass grave(s) assumed to hold the bodies of some or all of the victims (TP, 4 March 2009) and recovering their remains continued in the period after 2008. The families of dead or missing armed or resistance members had also often appealed to the government to locate and bury the dead and missing. For example, Konis Santana's mother expressed her hope that the state would exhume and give a dignified burial to her son (Mattoso, 2005:37-8), which finally took place in December 2012. Each decoration was accompanied by a Diploma of Honour, which could be awarded posthumously. The dead had its own Order, *Funu Nain*, and subject to the president's approval, Martyrs – like all other Combatants, capitalised in legislation - could be buried in special cemeteries, such as the cemetery adjoining F-

[36] However, an official version of history that instituted founders as beyond struggle was still open to challenge. In 2013, Mauk Moruk returned from exile in the Netherlands to East Timor. In public pronouncements he addressed the 1983 conflict in Falintil, calling for a public debate on the reasons for his surrender and disappearances of other guerillas. In response, Xanana Gusmao addressed Mauk's attempts to 'distort or make history go a different way' [*halo historia ne'e sai oin seluk fali*] in order to 'deceive the people'. Xanana also accused Mauk of 'showing the [Indonesian military] how to attack [David Alex]' after Mauk's surrender. This combined two issues characteristic of struggle over history: collaboration, and the dead. A third issue was prompted by Mauk's importation of military uniforms 'from Indonesia', thus relating to resistance symbolism, to be used by his associates in Baucau. As CPD-RDTL had done previously, his invocations suggested that his allegiances lay not with the generation of resistance elites that instituted the state, but elsewhere. http://www.timorhauniandoben.com/2013/10/pm-xanana-mauk-moruk-labele-distorsia.html. Accessed 1 November 2013; http://www.timorhauniandoben.com/2013/11/alfandega-rekonese-la-kontrola-farda.html, Accessed 12 December 2013

FDTL's 1st Battalion in Metinaro. Several bodies of disappeared Falintil were located in the period after 2008. The remains of João Bosco Sarmento Quintão were found in 2011. A former soldier in the Portuguese military before 1975, Sarmento had been the commander of the resistance's Central North Sector (*Sector Centro Norte*), before being captured by the military and disappearing sometime in 1983. The Indonesian invasion had separated Sarmento from his wife Olandina, an operator on Radio Maubere, who was captured and imprisoned, giving birth to their child while in custody in Kupang. Sarmento's remains were placed in a special burial ground for fallen heroes (*heróis tombadas*), while being overseen by F-FDTL soldiers. Ex-combatants were therefore immortalised in orders, mortuary rituals, archives, and welfare for their bereaved families, and in being recast to incorporate the dead, the state availed itself of their image. It also simultaneously dispensed with the image of the period 2000-6, of a technocratic, distant, spiritless, abstract entity bequeathed by the UN and international community (cf. Verdery, 1999).

The burial of the remains of Falintil soldier João Bosco Sarmento Quintão in 2012, who disappeared in 1983. Photo: Nugroho Kacasungkana.

The 'valorisation' of ex-combatants in the state also took a more practical form. For instance, ex-combatants were proposed as instruments of public order, when in late 2006 continuing communal violence in Dili was attributed to young men, specifically 'martial arts gangs'. To counter this, the then Secretary of State for Ex-Combatants, David Dias Ximenes, proposed to activate a veterans' network that would 'monitor', and if necessary, counter violence in neighbourhoods through unspecified means. Ximenes claimed that this course of action would be most effective because anyone against veterans [i.e. violent youth] were 'the same as [pro-Indonesian] militias' (TP, 11 October 2006). To its proponents, this idea possessed an unchallengeable logic and would be reflexively understood by the wider population. If it seemed natural to position ex-combatants as a solution to countering communal violence, then the same could be said for F-FDTL. This was particularly evident when military service [*servico militar*] was initially suggested as a way to stop 'undisciplined' youth. Under the plans, all "Timorese citizens" between 18-30 would carry out service in F-FDTL for a period of 18 months (Law 3/2007:preamble;7). Many of military service's proponents believed that youths committed violence because of a 'lack of discipline' (Mirando Branco interview). Support for the scheme was particularly strong among men in their 50s that had undergone compulsory military service in the late Portuguese period, regarded as 'essential' to the 'formation' of youth. Developing 'mental strength' and 'facing professional life' were also envisaged as its benefits (João Goncalves interview; TP, 13 July 2006 and TP, 17 August 2006)[37].

[37] By 2013, the fruition of the idea of using the military as a disciplinary instrument could be seen. F-FDTL soldiers were compelled to renounce their membership of martial arts groups, by handing over their uniforms in a ceremony at the Ministry of Defence overseen by General Lere Anan Timor. Lusa, 4 October 2013.

The military service mooted between 2006-9 was explicitly connected by its advocates with 'formation' that could produce modern subjects. Military service was formally intended to cultivate 'civic virtue' among the population, thus conferring positive connotations on late-Portuguese colonial governmental practices. However, there was also an ambiguity to its historical meaning. Military service was originally implemented before 1975 when there was limited scope for recognising a citizenry. Moreover, in other parts of the Portuguese empire, military service had entailed coercive state practices[38] (Penvenne, 1996:445). Military service, then, refracted colonial policy prior to 1975 through the period of resistance. Its strongest advocates had experienced both Portuguese military service and were resistance leaders. Taur Matan Ruak announced his bid for the presidency near the site of Konis Santana's hideout and place of burial in Mirtutu, Ermera, and then again in Assailatula, near Venilale, 'a symbolic homage' to David Alex, who he was with when the latter was captured in June 1997 (Carrascalao, 2012:25). Taur combined the charisma derived from his leadership of the resistance movement with proposals to introduce military service, which he had advocated since 2007. Despite its apparent popularity, the policy was not taken up in 2009 when put to parliament and as President he did not try and compel its adoption. However, the resurgence of this idea some five years after its original discussion confirmed that it had been a long-held aspiration of some of the older generation of ex-combatants. It was also a convenient way that the idea of Falintil as a 'people's army', supposedly obscured in the transition to F-FDTL, could be retrieved and revived.

[38] As Penvenne notes, in Mozambique, although introduced during Republican rule with the aim of cultivating 'civic virtue', it has been described as a 'modern form of slavery', that 'made a mockery of Republican rule'. In East Timor, in the late 1940s, 106,000 people were registered as payers of the indigenous tax (imposto indigena), with 41,000 of this number eligible to pay the tax in kind through military service. 10,000 of the total registered as taxpayers 'could be contracted' ('*podem ser contratados'*) (BOCT 46, 12 November, 1949:427).

The period between 2006-9 saw attempts to recast the state by inscribing it with an official history of the resistance. As well as committing this history to museums and archives, this involved incorporating into the state ex-combatants that worked within official organisations and networks, and assigning each member with a value based on their rank, symbolised through newly produced official regalia. These ideas were made more concrete by processes of inclusion in the state by virtue of an individual's 'loyalty' and 'nationalism', and exclusion based on 'treachery' and 'collaboration'. These enshrined the notion of struggle as intrinsic to the nature of the resistance movement. Conferring or denying a value to the population based on such categories encountered certain difficulties in two ways, however. While the state exhumed and reburied some remains, it was criticised for not ensuring that sites where remains were located were not protected by legislation (Walsh, 2010). Second, there was an apparent paradox in the state's valorisation of the resistance, while pardoning imprisoned ex-militia leaders (Robinson, 2009). Other contradictions created by categories of recognition are explored in the next section.

i. Within and without state designations

> I'll tell you a story. Earlier I received an sms…from our Consul Geral in Kupang, Jose Caetano. In the past he was an ex-prisoner [who spent] seven years in Becora jail…[he said] all the East Timorese refugees in Kupang told him: 'we won't vote, but we support Ramos-Horta'…I won't forget our brothers in Atambua, in Kupang, in Kefamenanu, in Java. If I'm chosen as president, I will strengthen even further our relations with the Republic of Indonesia, the very big nation [*nasaun ida bot teb-tebes*], our neighbour…I received a call from president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono after I became prime minister in July 2006. He embraced me [as prime minister] and the people of East Timor and Xanana Gusmao.
> (Jose Ramos-Horta addressing a campaign rally, 4 April 2007)

In the knowledge that decoration brought pensions and one-off payments, throughout 2009, groups of ex-combatants began to organise themselves to petition the state to recognise their struggle. Under changes in Article 5 of Law 9/2009, smaller clandestine groups could be decorated as long as they were recognised by 'superior structures of the resistance' (Fretilin, CRRN, CNRM, CNRT). The resistance group Santo Antonio was one such organisation that sought to be recognised on the initiative of its former leaders, Ananias do Carmo Fuka and Aleixo Cobra, both of whom had previously served time in detention during the Indonesian period. The group was founded in the early 1980s by Ananias, while studying, then training as a teacher, at the Portuguese language Externato de São José (Chapter three). The school served as a staging post for the clandestine resistance, from where students ran messenging errands to and from Falintil[39]. After independence, Ananias won election to parliament as an MP for the PPT, but left parliament in 2004.

[39] Ananias used the resistance name Otaola. An acronym for '*Olan Timor Assuwain Oecusse Lifau'*. 'Olan' is a corruption of '*Holanda*', the Portuguese for the Netherlands, referring to West Timor, *Assuwain* means warrior; Oecusse, Ananias' home, is also one of the places with which Santo Antonio the saint is associated, and Lifau is an older name for the enclave. Ananias had been described by some of the group's members as having suffered serious psychological trauma, possibly as a result of detention in the 1980s and 1990s.

As I will argue, attempts by Santo Antonio to be recognised as a resistance group brought into focus contradictions in attempts to order 'ex-combatants' as 'loyalists' and others as either 'traitors' or simply unworthy of being recognised. The group is best known for its alleged attempts to organise an attack on the convoy of president Suharto in 1988 while in East Timor, which precipitated the arrest and imprisonment of its leaders. In the context of the arrest of more than 200 people around the time of the same visit, there was nothing that elevated Santo Antonio above any other group except perhaps for the apparent audacity of its plans (Taylor, 1991:164). The plans for the attack were allegedly betrayed from among its own members. As shown below, this made the group's claims difficult to reconcile with official categories permitted by the state.

The veneration of saints, ancestors, and children believed to be Jesus, is a theme evident in popular narratives about resistance against Indonesia and before. In some cases, these have been understood as a surrogate for or prelude to anticolonial sentiments[40]. Santo Antonio[41] became the name of the group in a period of East Timor's isolation from the

[40] Barros Duarte (1986/7) comments on the appearance of a 'boy Jesus' [*menino Jesus*], venerated by the local population in the Fatumeta area of Dili in the late 1960s; this may have been the same as a child recalled by a local *suco* chief, in about the same period (interview Luis dos Santos). Santos remembered the appearance of what people at the time called 'Maromak Aileu'. There were several people in the neighbourhood however that didn't want to kneel before the infant. Many were also suspicious of the fact that they had to give money after praying to 'Jesus'. On arriving in Dili, the followers of the boy assembled at the house of what in 2009 was the HQ of the political party Kota (in the late 1960s there was only one house in the area). A further story has it that in the mid-1950s, a 'young Jesus' carrying a bowl had asked traders in the market in Dili for food. They 'knew he was Jesus' because he 'had red hair and his manners were different – he asked patiently for food'. The market was only usually a place where adults congregated. He was venerated for two Sundays before reportedly being taken by the authorities to an orphanage, possibly in the Balide area. (Interview, Felix Ataide)

[41] 'Santo Antonio' is commonly associated with the first Bishop to reside for a prolonged period in Portuguese Timor, who was also the Bishop of Malacca. Father Manuel de Santo Antonio was famous for challenging the authority of the crown, in the 1720s successfully rejecting a governor sent from Goa, from where East Timor was then governed. Beyond this, the name was most clearly associated with the patron saint of (among others) lost things, and was very influential among native Christians, especially in Manatuto. In 1960, Jorge Barros Duarte reported a 'typical' exchange with a native Christian, suggesting they believed that Santo Antonio was Jesus' father. D: 'Who is the father of our Lord Jesus Christ?' / It's

outside world before 1989. As conversion to Catholicism had exponentially increased after 1980, so statues, icons and other representations connected with popular Christian-inspired narratives provided succour and a way to channel ancestors that protected against capture by the Indonesian authorities[42]. Yet the divergence from doctrine that many of these practices involved, including the use of unapproved objects, led to a mixed reception by the Church:

> The Catholic Church's theology had a problem with the mediums of spirituality that these things represented…However, Santo Antonio had a Christian 'method' that we tried to construct. If a priest accepted us, I think this priest could have received criticism from Rome. The priests might have accepted us, but they didn't formalise us. And some priests declared Santo Antonio illegal (Amaral interview).

Groups with a similar outlook had Catholic priests as their patrons. During the 1980s, two priests oversaw the laying of the first stone of the Colimau group's Dili grotto (Romisio Fernandes interview)[43]. The group Sagrada Familia, founded by Mauk's brother L-7, met with Bishop Belo who along with Jose Ramos-Horta were patrons

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Santo Antonio / D: Santo Antonio? Why?! - He is the one who is holding [Christ] in his lap…[*traz ao colo*]' see 'Na Safra' SEARA, April 1960.

[42] Amulets and protective charms known as '*birus*' were used by Taur Matan Ruak and others in Falintil (A.M. Carrascalao, 2012:159); Mattoso (2005:258) attributes the death of Commandante Sahen and three others in 1995 to the belief that they were invincible, having received amulets from a double agent before fatally launching an attack on the Indonesian military near Ainaro.

[43] However the overtures of the Colimau group to the Church were reportedly spurned at first. In 1988, the same year that its founder, Martinho Vidal, had a dream predicting East Timor's independence in the year 2000, Martinho and his brother Philippe approached a priest, Father Rafael dos Santos, in their aldeia of Uelaluhu in Manufahi district, asking for prayers that they had written on sheets of paper to be 'made official' (*diresmikan*) and in an effort to gain the Church's support. According to Philippe, Father dos Santos "probably threw them away" (Phillipe Vidal, interview), though Father dos Santos claimed to have had no memory of having received their prayers (Rafael dos Santos interview). Martinho was a professional healer who, according to his wife, often treated "friends that came down from the jungle", i.e. members of Falintil and its messengers with "prayer, clean hands and medicine that came from God" (Joanata Vidal, interview). In his dream, Jesus Christ told Vidal that independence for East Timor would come in 2000, and that Martinho should tell trusted people (who would then become adherents) to wait for the year 2000, during which time they should avoid their traditional beliefs in the power of inanimate objects such as rocks (*fatuk*) and tree bark (*ai-kulit*). Vidal built up a steady retinue of followers so that it was claimed, by 1999, about 30,000 people were involved in a clandestine capacity in the movement (de Jesus interview). He is said to have accurately predicted his own death in 1999. The group aspired at some level to channel resistance through the Catholic Church as well as loosely structuring its practices around doctrinal orthodoxies (rejecting animist beliefs and sin).

(Cornelio Gama interview; TP 1 May 2002). Similarly, Ananias claimed that Father Martinho da Costa Lopes had given his approval to Santo Antonio (Ananias Fuka interview).

Ananias was regarded as spiritually powerful and several members of the group reported having seen him walk on water in Dili harbour. The group used an initiation ritual, known as the *julgamentu* [trial] to give them courage and 'equip' them to carry out their work:

> Even if one of us was murdered, we would use the patience that this [ritual] gave us. When we did the judgement with a crucifix we were filled with Jesus's spirit. In the past our *avos* [ancestors] used trees to find witches [*buan*]. But [in the Indonesian period] we used the same things as our *avos* to defend independence…they would accompany us during our work (Balbino de Araujo interview).

Another claimed that the powers developed through these rituals gave them premonitions of imminent danger (Antonio Alves Fahik, interview). Yet this power did not serve the group when it allegedly planned to attack Suharto during his 1988 visit to East Timor. As far as can be ascertained, the plan may have involved throwing grenades at Suharto's convoy while en route from Tibar, to the west of Dili, where he watched a performance by the Pramuka (scouts). Some in the group, although confirming that such a plan had been made, denied that they had had the willingness to carry it out. Furthermore, it is not known if this plan was given assent by anyone more senior in the resistance movement, but it failed because, allegedly, two would-be attackers informed on the group to Intel, who promptly made several arrests, imprisoning Ananias in Becora prison. Sent to trial on 25 January 1989, he was 'accused of being the founder of clandestine organization Santo Antonio in East Timor', after which he was again

imprisoned (CAVR i.). This marked the end of the group's activities, at least with its original leadership, and some continued to be monitored.

Figure 3. Ananias Fuka (centre) during interview in Manufahi, author's photo, 18 April 2009.

When the group canvassed the government for recognition in 2009, it made few references to events that it had been involved in before 1999. The secretary of state for ex-combatants, Marito Reis, himself a former resistance leader, seemed to promise receptivity to the group's application for recognition based only on the group's ability to organise and account for itself in the present:

> [Resistance organisations] bring people together to live according to what we think and want…how do these organisations work? They must have their principles. They must have their rules. They must have their laws, their order…we can see that there are [many organisations similar to this one]…[one is] L-7's organisation, Sagrada Familia, which is scattered. Santo Antonio is also scattered…because of this I say that when you come here so that the state can give recognition, you must first improve your structure, you must have statutes, so that the organisation can work [*la'o*]. Because in our constitution we have a [section] that valorises the role of those that participated in our resistance. CRRN…and CNRT, they had written statutes (Marito Reis address).

In this context, state recognition depended not on constructing a narrative of involvement in the resistance, but on presenting data related to its membership and organisational structure that the state would validate. The alleged planned attack and betrayal of the group therefore remained unexplained.

Curiously, however, while difficult to verify the incident, these processes of recognition can provide a sense of how the events were elided. During the process of collecting data that would lead to the decoration of ex-combatants, the ex-leader of the Ai-Tarak militia group formed in 1999, Eurico Guterres, a former member of Santo Antonio, appeared on the front page of a magazine edited by an Indonesian priest that worked in East Timor, pictured holding medals. In 1999, he had openly incited violence against pro-independence supporters. Four months before the vote for independence, in April 1999,

he led militias on a rampage around Dili resulting in the deaths of 13 people including 12 inside the house of brother of former governor Carrascalao, Manuel Carrascalao, where pro-independence supporters had sought refuge. Guterres organised post-referendum violence with General Tono Suratman and Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, which in the event of a pro-independence vote would result in Dili being turned into, in Guterres' infamous words, a 'sea of fire'. Since 1999, he and other Militia members had lived in Kupang, West Timor and in 2002 he was indicted alongside members of the Indonesian military from whom he received instructions and material support, by the UN Serious Crimes Unit (SCU). He had been long regarded as the source of Santo Antonio's betrayal with another member living in Indonesia, Lafaek, and the bizarre sight of him bearing resistance medals caused outrage and curiosity in East Timor. The spectacle was of obvious public interest and the magazine went through successive re-prints. Published shortly before the group's Manufahi meeting in April 2009, the caption of the magazine reads 'the time has come for Timor people to speak out'.

Figure 4

Magazine cover showing Eurico Guterres holding medals.

Guterres' intervention in East Timor politics from his home in Kupang, West Timor coincided with his campaign as a candidate in Indonesia's legislative elections (Pemileg) for Amien Reis's National Mandate Party (PAN). In the article, Guterres chastised the East Timor government for objecting to his bearing the medals, implying that he was left no choice but to favour Indonesia by asking 'do the [Timor-Leste] government tend to see me, its son, as someone that chose to join Indonesia?…' Other sources, however, claimed that Gutterres had never been a 'political' player but "more a street fighter who followed the money than a political player"[44] that had come under the influence of the military. Gutterres claimed that the contribution of pro-Indonesia East Timorese to the former province's development had been 'as great as the resistance movements', saying '[Falintil] developed the jungle, while we developed the towns' (Eurico Gutteres interview).

The Commission of Homage's first reaction was to declare that the medals were fakes (TP 6 March 2009). In fact, the medals were genuine, but belonged not to Guterres but to his father and younger brother. The ensuing controversy centred on the government's vetting procedures for the award of medals. A group representing ex-resistance and prisoners wrote to the Commission of Homage asking if it was right that the Commission should have to retrieve medals that had been 'wrongly' awarded, and questioned what evidence there was for Guterres' family members' contribution to the resistance movement. The group also demanded that the Foreign Minister contact East Timor's Consul General in Kupang to demand the return of the medals. Guterres duly complied, and in a small ceremony returned the medals to Jose Caetano, East Timor's

[44] http://yayasanhak.minihub.org/mot/cons92z%20-%20Eurico%20Guterres.htm accessed 2 September 2013

consul general in Kupang (TP, 4 March 2009). After the medals had been handed back, it emerged that Ananias had gone to Kupang to consult Guterres before resurrecting Santo Antonio. Guterres said that the purpose of Ananias' trip had been to get Guterres' agreement for Santo Antonio to seek recognition from the state. This episode, and Ramos-Horta's address to an audience in Dili suggesting an embrace of anti-independence East Timorese and Indonesia itself, suggests a difficulty on the part of the state to conferring a quality of resistance. In any case, the exclusionary limits of this value were immediately tested. As shown in the following chapters, its limits were not only tested around state designations of collaborator or loyalist.

V. Conclusion

Instituting a state required reconciling an official history with the present, this chapter has argued. This could be seen as much through a series of practices, as at the level of official declarations and documents. In contrast to other analyses that have focussed on how 'statebuilding' took place through the adoption of modern procedures and the rule of law, that represented clear attempts to break with the past, a struggle over history was inseparable from a struggle to establish a state. This meant more than simply commandeering an official narrative of the past, but making it work in the service of government. Government required establishing and reflecting commonly intuited – though not necessarily agreed upon - ideas about the past in the service of making subjects recognise the state and interact with it in a concerted way. Hence, the conferral of value was crucial to this enterprise. Recognising ex-combatants at once instituted the state in the image of the resistance, and attempted to crystallise ex-combatants' positions relative to each other.

Yet, as has been shown, harmonious state rituals belied not only the hardship of war, but also fraught struggles of postcolonial politics that could not be easily glossed over. As these struggles were indexed by appearance - ID cards and weapons, clothes and hair, flags and anniversaries – they also served to bring past into present. As such, the political dynamics of the postcolonial period played out with reference to the resistance period. The illegal circulation of weaponry, for example, was significant not only because of the source or agents of its distribution, or for the moment of its surrender to the state; it had broader meaning unrelated to its materiality. Similarly, the mobilisation of people to Dili from the districts provided a spectacle that promised to call into question the image of the state. Between 2006-'8 insurgents and their supporters saw the state as representing regionalist-sectarian (as well as former-exile and crypto-communist) interests. One of the main sites of power and sources of insurgent discontent was the military, which had been somewhat undermined by a largely foreign-dominated inauguration, but which also highlighted antagonisms within the resistance movement. Yet while this and later material paucity explain much about problems in F-FDTL, fundamentally, contestations over history drove grievances and regionalist identifications that resonated in and beyond the military. The military was not the centre of these grievances, but its split illuminated many parallel contests rooted in diverging histories based on land, kin, association or possession. The state's overarching narrative, by 2006 still not established, only later attempted to accommodate these histories by incorporating ex-combatants into the state. Laying the dead to rest was not only symbolic of this attempt at convergence, but also showed the practical thrust of instituting the state: the provision of pensions accompanied searches for the dead and reburials.

A significant aspect of the process of instituting the state involved incorporating ex-combatants into the state. The award of medals and pensions represented the refinement of an official history to which the state laid claim. On the other hand, as the above examples shows, the increasing hardening of these claims into material things like medals and uniforms, created relative values for the population that could 'prove' their historical 'worth' and simultaneously bring under control its often competing truths. Yet like the FBAs of the earlier period that donned military uniforms despite F-FDTL's official monopoly on resistance symbolism, the representation through official regalia and categories also had the potential to be subverted. Thus, this chapter has argued that the state was instituted by the propagation of historical tropes that served not only to honour constitutional guarantees, but more importantly conferred relative value on those that it recognised. The powerfulness of this process was twofold: it came from assigning permanently inscribed order, hierarchy and rank, but also exclusion of those deemed unworthy of recognition, of which the limits of this exclusion quickly became contested. Other exclusions from such schemes of recognition are explored in the following chapter.

3. The meaning of 'witchcraft' for occupation, resistance and after

I. Introduction

Now nothing that is done to save life can be matter for accusation

Apuleius, Apologia 40 (A Discourse on Magic)

As the previous chapter argued, the process of conferring awards and 'taking charge' of history showed the state to be neither exclusively 'modern' nor 'traditional' nor viewed as such by the population. This chapter argues that further difficulties to the idea of a uniform quality of resistance to recognise and organise population and state in the present may be seen from an analysis of 'witchcraft' and 'witchfindings'. Such events are shown not to represent an indigenous culture untouched by a modern state, but figure strongly in power relations forged during military occupations. Second, the first engagements that the postcolonial state has had with 'witches' are often after arresting and trying those accused of their persecution either by injury or death. Given sensitivities surrounding discussion of 'witches' in contemporary East Timor, furthermore, it is almost inconceivable that anyone openly identified as such could be formally recognised, much less honoured by the state[1]. The chapter therefore shows how narrowly defined limits of recognition are informed by historical power relations, but moreover, that the categories these relations produce may similarly be used to define those that fall beyond them.

[1] However, the term 'witch', discussed below, does not have exclusively negative connotations. See also Hicks, 1976:110.

In particular, by showing how power relations in the colonial era catalysed witchfindings, two elements of it are revealed. First, case studies show how witches are produced in the context of power relations that emerge during military occupation. In many instances, individuals and their kin identified as witches were scapegoated as causing sickness or misfortune to local communities. However, in such cases, witches are shown to be not so much a peculiar product of the imagination of local communities but as a result of the engagements of these communities with colonial authorities. In this regard, the chapter considers the postcolonial treatments of cases where witchfindings resulted in witchslayings, in the process identifying by what means witchcraft is framed as 'superstition', and identifies instances where these understandings resurfaced as a feature of the postcolonial judicial system. In such settings, witchcraft is held to be practised by people from 'the districts'. The chapter reveals distinctions of knowledge in which witchcraft is both counterposed with the modern conduct of the city, and (depending on the time period) may be grouped together with religion and magic.

Observers, politicians, and scholars have often struggled to understand sorcery or magic, and some have seen it as part of a cultural system defined in the most rudimentary terms. Observers have condemned sorcery as a superstitious belief that stands in opposition to modernization (Nixon, 2011). In contrast, others believe that it is an attempt to stem malevolent forces that cause inequality, personified in and conducted by the rich or the elderly in societies transitioning to democracy (Eyoh, 1998:341-2; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Ashforth, 2005). Such arguments would appear to be relevant to East Timor, the postcolonial history of which is often characterised as a negotiation of modernity. A third position holds that witchcraft and witchfindings – often taken as the outcome of magic or sorcery - may

only be negotiated if its obscure meanings and causes are better understood (Herriman, 2009). This chapter is directed towards this last objective, in particular by showing how the historical dimensions of these events can transcend colonial rule.

Examining ideas about witches in East Timor on first appearance may seem to have little to do with the Indonesian occupation. The chapter shows that witches were perceived to cause misfortune, particularly through sickness or death, by assisting either the resistance movement or occupying militaries. However, as argued below, the term 'witch' was/is not merely a metaphor for traitor. Rather, four aspects of witchfinding are identified: deliberation, kin, territory, and history. Most or all aspects are common in the case studies. Such a schema is intended as a flexible method of understanding elements of witchcraft and cannot explain every case where accusations against 'witches' are made. Instead, I have opted here to try and explain the dynamics of power relations at the local level that cause the identification of malevolent witches, and responses to these cases in the judicial system.

II. Colonial designations: 'bifurcated' law and power over life

In the wake of the Indonesian departure in 1999, scholarly and popular accounts of East Timor took a new direction. Under Indonesian occupation, research was usually conducted at a distance, in the service of publicising abuses against the East Timorese population and sometimes in cooperation with the resistance movement. After 1999, by contrast, a body of knowledge produced about the country became concerned in many instances with 'state-building' predominantly involving the identification of 'problems' with East Timor's society that prevented 'development', with research often, but not

always, funded by large aid agencies attached to foreign national governments, NGOs, or multilateral institutions. A lack of development was sometimes regarded as caused by 'traditions' intrinsic to East Timor's culture, which had remained unchanged during the Indonesian period. While the East Timorese state has at one level embraced a revival of 'tradition', reflecting a trend among the population at large (McWilliam and Traube 2011), others have argued that elements of East Timorese culture are impediments to the cause of development and can only be eradicated with the onset of modernization. In such a scenario, modernization, characterised by rationalisation and disenchantment, was seen as countering magic and superstition.

A recent study has posited that a value system is at work in traditional societies that serves to mutually reinforce its various elements (Nixon, 2011). The study discusses *barlaki (Portuguese: barlaque)*, whereby payments are given by families that take a bride, to families that give a bride. These payments were one element of bridal exchange which cemented alliances between *sucos* or *reinos*. The study suggests that the exchange be seen in transactional terms, as 'compensation' for a human being, and therefore continues to hinder East Timor's development. It is contended that *barlaki* supports other traditional practices in which payments serve as recompense. Thus, as victims of sex crimes are given payments under 'traditional justice', so the study argues, *barlaki* becomes equivalent with these crimes, because 'payments for some sexual crimes approximate the payment of the bride price' (Nixon, 2011:167). However, this reasoning fails to substantiate that the payment of similar sums of money in the diverse examples somehow establishes their equivalence in a cultural system. The study seeks to further connect these parts by making reference to an overarching system of traditional law, which has several characteristics. First, traditional law is based on

'traditional thought' characterised by superstitious beliefs. Practices such as sorcery are upheld through the 'supernatural mandate' that *suco* chiefs use to 'maintain order and dispense justice' (179). Fundamentally, in this view, one system is given coherence by a culture of top-down local authority, while another system, represented by a state held to account by civil society, (Nixon, 2011:2) may support modernization through '…education, primary healthcare, strong state justice and administration', which are 'natural enemies of superstition and traditional thought' (Nixon: 179). There is expected to be a synergy between the two, as part of which the modernizing forces of the state and civil society can end undesirable superstitious practices. Second, traditional law permits redress for crimes through violence. Underpinning this view is that 'the Timorese people' [sic] have an inherent and largely inexplicable tendency to commit violence, 'transform[ing] from the most humble people to barbarians and back to the most humble people again' (Nixon, 2011: 174). In holding that this alleged tendency is traceable from at least the 1880s to the present, the study quotes colonial-era accounts, taken to be unproblematic reflections of reality. Although it is claimed that the Portuguese authorities largely succeeded in stamping out the worst excesses of this violence as the result of 'pacification' (after the 1912 Boaventura rebellion), the study alleges that it has re-emerged in the postcolonial period, through being left unchecked. Indeed, such alleged proclivities towards violence were seen during the 'crisis' of 2006. Third, subsistence societies 'are notoriously predisposed towards superstitious beliefs and the persecution of alleged sorcerers' (Nixon, 2011:170). Sorcery's victims may be subject to one of two poles of traditional law also intrinsic to traditional culture, compensation or violence.

Based on a critical analysis of colonial and contemporary sources, violence no more connects *barlaki* and sorcery than payment does. Different readings of the Papua New Guinea context with which the above study compares East Timor, show, for example, clear differences in compensation for death caused by sorcery, and marital exchange (Strathern and Stewart, 2004:69-83). Indeed, the origins of the practice and prohibitions on either are markedly different. Catholic missionaries in East Timor forbade *barlaki* and promoted Christian marriage to consolidate colonial sovereignty. Thus, not only was *barlaki* forbidden because it was perceived as involving payment and permitting polygamy but Christian marriage could prevent alliances forming against the colonial authorities[2]. Missionaries attempted to convert women, who were to be the anchors of Christian families (chapter four). Missionary injunctions against compensation for loss of life were derived from Christian notions of the indivisibility of the human being. The view that the individual could not be subject to compensation marked societies with a 'higher stage of development' (Simmel, 2004 [1900]). In the Indonesian period, authorities and modernist elites viewed *barlaki* within a wider constellation of practices that identified its practitioners as 'idlers and spendthrifts' (Martins, 2001[1989]:11)[3]. Such views have much in common with the position outlined in the study of East Timor above, which assumes that violence and superstition could be successfully countered by attempts to spread 'civilisation', conspiring in the view of missionaries and colonial

[2] Araújo (2012:83-88) defended *barlaque* in the pages of *A Provincia de Timor*, the military's journal and one of only three published in East Timor in 1969. He reports that its detractors, prominent members of the colonial establishment, claimed that it involved the sale of women. Araújo saw it as 'equal exchange' and integral to Timorese culture. To avoid allegations of anti-colonialism, he couched his argument in terms acceptable to the 'official doctrine of the New State', that East Timor was an indivisible part of Portugal. Araújo claimed that Nicolau Lobato visited him to express support before making his own contribution to the debate in the same journal.

[3] In a study of East Timor under Indonesian occupation in the late 1980s, Maria de Lourdes Martins ('Mana Lou') an East Timorese nun, remarked of the economic situation and cultural practices of people in Liquica: 'Money from the sale of produce is mostly used for *adat* ceremonies such as commemorating a dead tribal elder [*tetua suku*], the memory of someone's death, inaugurating a grave, to pay dowry (*barlaque*) to a family that gave a bride, and so on…[people that carry out these practices] are easily viewed as 'idlers and spendthrifts''.

authorities themselves. On this point, a more careful consideration of colonial practice is required rather than connecting diverse indigenous practices through an evaluation of final sums. It is suggested that two things therefore need to be addressed: the meaning of exchange, and power relations in their historical context.

In terms of power relations, the above account fails properly to explain not only the fluctuating existence and application of two legal systems under colonial rule, and more importantly, the endurance and legacies of this arrangement. One system was comprised of the statutes of a written penal code, and operated under areas of colonial influence (i.e. mainly in Dili); and the other, customary law, of customs and practices, or '*estylos*', which were not formally codified. Although there existed official injunctions on 'superstitious beliefs' under written law, under customary arrangements, someone found guilty of 'sorcery' could be condemned. While colonial authorities formally disapproved of 'superstition', they condoned a bifurcated arrangement that allowed 'sorcerers' to be persecuted by indigenous authorities (Roque, 2010:59). Only later, after the Second World War, were more serious attempts made to impose written law more uniformly. By that stage, the existence of two systems had become well established. Even prior to this belated reversal of policy, however, indigenous authorities could demand the application of either system, making this bifurcated arrangement a source of confusion as well as of expedience for colonial authorities. Thus, for example, *barlaki* was not always subject to customary law:

> The man that makes a family and doesn't honour the contract (*barlaque*) can, if he is from a different kingdom, abandon [the *barlaque* arrangement], but cannot take the women and children. This gives rise to troublesome claims caused by the disturbance of customs, [attributed to] our laws and the catechism. The indigenous chiefs mischievously complain to increase their vassals and contributors, and therefore come to [the Portuguese authorities to] request the

> application of customary law, [but] other chiefs ask for civil and canonical law to be applied. The marriages and *barlaques* among members of families of chiefs represent offensive and defensive alliances (*vassau uman*) among themselves and *reinos* to which they belong and sometimes are of great political inconvenience. The fathers of women always defend their grandchildren even when a *barlaque* agreement is not realised, and which results in an anticipated sexual union, because the importance of families depends on its number of members… [and] also [the importance of the chief] depends on the number that compose the *povoação*, *suco* or *reino* [that he leads] (O Dia de Timor, 31-2).

The two systems were not as categorically and mutually opposed as might be assumed. Yet the intent in the above account is clear: the operation of parallel systems should be seen as an attempt to designate the limits of colonial and indigenous authority. In common with contemporary views that see diverse practices as being comprehensible only through sums involved in payment, the account also interestingly sees exchange in terms of its transactional, accumulative and utilitarian aspects. As a recent study has suggested, this bifurcation may still be evident in the postcolonial period. For instance, the view of elites in Dili is that 'the districts' represents all that is traditional, backwards and in need of modernization (Silva and Simiao, 2012:167). Such a view is redolent not only of Portuguese colonial influence, but also the Indonesian period, when official state policy sanctioned ideas about developed (*dimajukan*) and backward populations (*terbelekang*).

An epistemological analysis also helps to explain the endurance of practices associated with the colonial period in the present. In brief, colonial authorities' grouping together of witchcraft and other diverse practices as superstitions reflects the forms of knowledge used to apprehend and understand them. One view has it that disaggregating categories to retrieve pre-colonial meaning is imperative:

> It is very important, though extraordinarily difficult, to make distinctions when one is writing about 'magic' 'witchcraft' and 'religion'. It is important because colonial administrators and missionaries lumped together every supernatural manifestation – and many natural ones – as 'witchcraft', combining activities and ideas which originally had been not only separate but opposed…we have to split these activities and ideas up again. This is very difficult to do today because it is now not only missionaries and colonialists who lump everything together (Ranger, 2006:351-2)

This account evidently regards the 'lumping together' of indigenous practices as having a postcolonial life. A second view has it by contrast that a concern to establish 'proper' boundaries between religion and science is a result of western formations of knowledge. Even the contemporary category of 'religion', for example, can be seen to have resulted from the early Christian separation of 'true' and 'false' religion; the positioning of Christianity as a totalising system of organising life applicable as much to worshippers as the Church hierarchy; and the 'intellectualist and impersonal schematization' of religion in enlightenment thought. Similarly, the opposition between science and religion only came about over time, while they were originally united (Tambiah, 1990:5-11).

Thus, three patterns emerge from the above. First, 'tradition' (i.e. practices at the *aldeia*/*suco* level) has been connected and assumed to be coherent through nominated (rather than nominal) values, especially sums of money. In this view, *barlaki* is comparable with magic such as sorcery or other practices, because its value is seen in terms of its ultimate ends. Second, such associations risk oversimplifying complex historical legacies, not least those involving colonial-indigenous power relations. Furthermore, by attributing violence to East Timor's culture, such a view dissociates violence from broader social engagements. Third, both the endurance of arrangements from the colonial era and the persistence of the belief in categorical oppositions among

magic, science and religion, can be understood by examining the production and organisation of knowledge.

In this regard, as previous work has sought to decouple different forms of *barlaki* (Hicks, 2012) so the terms used for 'sorcery' and 'witchcraft' require closer examination. This is a complex field, and the following will be restricted to providing some general remarks on terminological usages. In Portuguese colonial accounts, the Malay/Indonesian *suangice*, or *suangi (swanggi)*, is often reported as the 'indigenous' name for witchcraft or witches respectively, while the Portuguese term *feiticeira* could cover both malevolent witches and 'sorcerors'. Occasionally, distinctions are made between 'witch doctors', who are able to both cure sicknesses, envision or have an effect on the outcome of future events, and identify malevolent 'witches' (for example Tetum: *Matandoc* Fataluku: *Ina-haranu*); and malevolent 'witches' (Tetum: *Buan*; Fataluku: *Acharu*). Although often grouped together, however, the latter are seldom opposed to the former. Indeed, in practice, someone originally administering curatives with good intentions may be accused of practising harmful witchcraft (cf. Beatty, 1999:52). The accounts of missionaries sometimes covered these distinctions in more detail, but was hardly more sympathetic to them because their work was concerned with conversion and eliminating non-Christian beliefs. Thus, designation of all indigenous beliefs as superstitious required them to be grouped together as superstitions but at the same time separated. In other words, in colonial accounts, few distinctions exist between 'magic' or sorcery used for curative purposes and 'witchcraft'. However, the point is more than semantic and the designation of malevolent witchcraft and sorcery as practices associated with the districts is explored below.

III. Four aspects of witchfinding

This section demonstrates some patterns of witch slayings and responses to them in the postcolonial period. It suggests that although the perceived threat to kin (usually, but not exclusively in the form of illness) resulted in attempts to identify witches (witchfindings), especially against women, this is not the whole story. Instead, a combination of genealogical and territorial reasons are involved in these processes. A historical aspect is identified in order to examine the perception in trials of witchslayings to contrast the districts with the city as a legacy of the colonial period. The analysis serves to concentrate focus on witchfindings as conditions of (especially local) power relations rather than as the result of violence as a cultural phenomenon. The case below will be used to highlight the reasons that some witchfindings take place, emphasising three of its aspects: a 'deliberative' aspect where killers identify 'witches' through a process of rumour and conferral; a genealogical aspect where perceived threats to kin are countered with the persecution of 'witches' whose immediate family are also implicated; and a closely related territorial aspect where threats may be seen as issuing from sources beyond an immediate locale. A fourth aspect is introduced towards the end of the case study proposing that the deliberative aspect may take place over a longer period than is initially obvious. This point establishes the basis for the ensuing discussion based on historical cases from the Indonesian period, and bears out the argument that local and personal legacies transcended the colonial period and the official narratives that accompanied transition to the postcolonial period. To protect identities, I have made the names of villages anonymous and changed the names of individuals, including interviewees.

On 7th January 2007, three women were slain in Maubara subdistrict, Liquica district. The mountainous region is 70 kilometres to the west of Dili where inhabitants' smallholdings and plantations are used to grow coffee. The three women were three generations of the same family. Ten men were put on trial for their slaying. A version of events is provided in a narrative extracted from court documents below. These accounts were recorded both in the killing's immediate aftermath in the form of police interviews of the defendants, two witnesses, and court proceedings six months later. Within the village, according to testimonies of the killers in these documents, the second eldest victim, Constancia, was known for her curative abilities, and had been called to administer traditional medicine to a sick child, Simão, early on 5th January. In court, the defendants said that Constancia had prepared a curative to give to Simão[4]. One of the defendants also alleged that Simão had called the name of Constancia after her visit - taken as 'evidence' that she had deliberately caused his sickness[5]. The following day, the men each visited Simão in his father, Eugenio's house, becoming convinced of Constancia's culpability. Believing that witches have matrilineal family lines, they implicated her mother and daughter too. Eugenio believed his son's soul was being eaten, manifested by sickness and inertia. At around 9 p.m. on the following day, a group of men walked the short distance to the women's house where Bernardo, the husband of the youngest woman Regina, also lived. Steeled to commit the attacks from drinking locally produced palm wine procured by Eugenio that day, the Xefe de Aldeia shouted to Bernardo on arriving outside the house that the three women were witches and that they had come to kill them. Bernardo threatened to confront them with his *katana* (machete), but was told that if he too didn't want to be killed, he should leave

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[4] Constancia allegedly also placing her hands on his chest and stomach. Court proceedings: Acta da audiença de Julgamento, 25-7-07, in Processo no. 72/ORD/TDD/2007:500

[5] Documents recount that when asked for help, Constancia responded in a way 'that was not concrete' (*Acta de Quesitos*:672).

(PNTL interview:351).[6] The other women were slain before the house was set alight, with only Bernardo and the child spared.

Several explanations for the killings emerged both in and out of court. By examining how these reasons are regarded by all involved, four aspects identified above can be clearly seen. First, the 10 men accused of the killings established a collective narrative made up of stories about the women's malevolence. The stories appear to have snowballed as visitors – nearly all of whom participated in the killings - arrived to see Simão's sickness throughout the day of 6th January[7]. The 55-year old ex-village chief who led the attacks, Joachim, said that a more definitive story regarding the cause of the sickness only emerged after he and other village men had conferred for some more hours[8]. Second, in court, while the prosecution counsel focused on substantiating the criminality of the acts, the state-appointed public defender attempted to invoke an overarching reason for the killings. In keeping with the killers claims, who never denied murder, the defence claimed that in East Timor, "in contrast to what happens in many other countries, that is to say westernised countries, when a person is considered to be a witch, and is killed…the supposed sick person recovers immediately (Ibid:640)[9]." After the killings, Joachim immediately addressed the supposed purgative qualities of the slayings when he told Eugenio that the three women had left the soul of his son

[6] Constancia encouraged Bernardo to leave and to take their nine-month old baby with him. The group entered the house, where, Bernardo told police, Joaquim sexually assaulted Constancia. While still holding their child, according to his own testimony, Bernardo claims that he tried to shield her from the blows that Joaquim delivered with a length of wood [*ai-pedasuk*], killing her.

[7] Another person not implicated in the killings but present among the men that day told the group that on some unspecified day in the previous two weeks, "between midday and 1 p.m.", the 'witches' had "called a chicken, a cat and a dog", a sign of witchcraft according to the assertions of Joachim (PNTL interview, Joachim).

[8] For example, one of them said that the three women had previously abducted him at night. He reported that they tied him up, bringing him to a coffee plantation at midnight.

[9] Public defender's statement

(Ibid:510). The line of reasoning that guided the defence's argument was that witchhunts were a cultural phenomenon associated with 'the districts'. In other trials of witchslayings, different lawyers also argued along similar lines. In 2008 in neighbouring Ermera district, for example, two men killed two generations of unmarried women who lived together. The defence counsel for the killers explained that each of the men, who exercised a constitutional right to silence, was used to living "according to his own culture". One was a "simple man, born and brought up in the mountains". In police interviews that preceded the trial, however, the two men saw their actions differently, claiming that 'the state no longer needed [the women], because they were old' (Processo no. 90/C.Ord/TDD/2010:235). The two men also claimed that the killings were carried out in 'defence' of their communities, specifically by providing protection to youths that the women had bewitched (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999). References to the defendants' 'little education' and illiteracy (six defendants were unable to sign their own testimonies) are not in question; rather the subject of interest is explanations that locate action originating in a different culture of 'the mountains'.

In either case, and in others, a genealogical, and to a less clear extent, generational element is evident. Moreover, the homes from which the victims came and in which they were killed were either solely occupied by or had women as a majority of occupants. The response to 'witchcraft' involved the use of physical force by men to counter the supposed 'supernatural' powers of females. The persecution of females is a mainstay of witch slaying, and in numerous cases, the same patterns are observable. It appears, however, that kin - its protection or elimination – is a common element of witchfindings beyond these two cases. As gender played a part, it was one, if extremely important, element among divergent reasons of which kin and territory were also important. In Maubara, the killings were carried out against a family of women in

'defence' of the child of a killer; in Ermera the same happened. Joaquim recounted a conversation to police that he claimed he had had with Bernardo, the husband of Constancia about three months before the killings in which Joaquim said that he had told Bernardo that he committed an error by 'marrying a witch' and that Bernardo agreed, saying that he would "arrange a solution" (Processo no. 72/ORD/TDD/2007:511). In each case agnatic protection was used to justify violence against those with enatic association.

Third, a connection existed between kin and territory. The women, for example, were outsiders (they were from the neighbouring village and had married in to the village via Bernardo). This was cited by their killers as a reason that they fell under suspicion and appears to have underscored their vulnerability (testimony:350;417). In initial meetings among the group of killers, a 21-year old suspect who was subsequently acquitted reported that Eugenio told younger members that 'many people are dead in Dili, my son and I can't die, if you don't go and kill [the women], you are not a man' (testimony, 356)[10]. In other words, violent defence of territory and kin were an affirmation of masculinity in combination with other elements (Ibid, 351)[11]. As seen below in other cases, however, men could also be targeted as malevolent practitioners of magic. The protection of the village was perceived by participants as related in some way to the events that began in 2006. It was also still close enough to the events of the previous year to warrant a reference to it by an international media outlet that reported it. On the manner in which the victims were killed, for example, it was reported that: 'there were spates of arson attacks during unrest in 2006 but this is believed to be the first such case

[10] Six suspects were under 30 years old

[11] A woman that lived in close proximity reported that she had been 'woken by screaming, and ran scared from my house into the forest' She looked for the Xefe de Suco, but he had also run into the forest for fear. The more senior Xefe de Suco had not conspired with the Xefe de Aldeia, Joachim, nor did he have any authority over or prior knowledge of the planned events.

involving witchcraft accusations *in the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country* (ABC, 2007)' (emphasis added). If the incident was comparable with a wider series of events in 2006 in terms of the kind of violence carried out, further comparison stopped when magic and religion were (together) considered.

Finally, court documents in certain senses present a limited way of exploring the historical dimensions of these events. Partly, this is due to the focus on events and not their antecedents; due to the reticence of some defendants to speak openly; and because of preconceived ideas court personnel and others had about differences between the districts and Dili. Rarely are attempts made in proceedings to evince information on the history of communities that might help explain the context of killings. However, some information relevant to context is (often inadvertently) acquired during the investigative stage. In the Ermera case (above), for instance, one of the older suspects, 35-year old Rogerio, reportedly declared that during the Indonesian occupation, the women had 'already been lucky', because he had 'saved' them, without which help they would have already been dead (testimony, 350). Both Liquica and Ermera *sucos* were attacked in 1999, when the Besi Merah Putih militia, an organisation formed and armed by the Indonesian military, burned villages and caused people to seek refuge in Ermera district (Estafeta, 1999). These fragments of information are hardly conclusive, but are at least indicative of the need to seek explanations originating in broader contexts. They suggest the inadequacy of ahistorical, culturally determined explanations invoked as a way to bridge a presumed divide between Dili and the districts, or culture and nature. They also provide a basis for further exploration of the historical dimensions of witchslayings, alongside the territorial and genealogical dimensions considered so far.

IV. Eastern East Timor, 1980-2001: the fissures between resistance and occupation?

Foreign occupation in East Timor famously showed the population's resilience and struggle. At the same time, however, it magnified grievances among the population, leading to scapegoating, whether by providing opportunities to settle personal scores, or through catalysing beliefs that supernatural elements caused misfortune. These cases also show something more unexpected: some foreign occupiers may have either believed in the power of witchcraft, or used it as an instrument of persecution[12]. For example, after the Japanese defeat, two men were tried for the killing of a male 'witch' in Ermera in 1943. The court thought that the killer's reasons for carrying out the slayings was attributed to his 'backward civilisation' and that he was able to exert his will on others that had 'an imperfect understanding of the seriousness of the crime', (his sons - 11 and 19 years old), to carry out the slayings. It was also inferred that the killings took place on the instructions of the Japanese authorities, which 'could not be proven'. The equivocation on this issue suggests not only a lack of proof, but also related objectives of the Portuguese authorities of searching for collaborators with the Japanese. This apparent overlap, in which witchcraft appears as a pretext for killing and a metaphor for collaboration, shows the complexity of retrieving and making sense of power relations during foreign occupations. Despite this complexity, aspects of the dynamics of power at work in such periods are also evident during the Indonesian period, examples of which are explored below.

[12] In 1949, the colonial government sought to 'establish the facts' surrounding persistent rumours that a government interpreter, Francisco Ximenes Belo, 'caused the death of many East Timorese that he disliked by accusing them of witchcraft in front of the Japanese'. Furthermore, Belo, 'through his intrigues', is alleged to have had many Timorese shipped to Atauro island, a de facto concentration camp established for collaborators with the Japanese after the war. (BOCT 40, 7 October 1950:345)

The starting point for an analysis of the issue of witchcraft in the Indonesian period must begin with challenging the idea of uniform experiences among the population at large. As noted in chapter one, the resistance movement was subject to schisms, disagreements and betrayals. However, what official narratives of nationalism and collaboration fail to capture are the everyday antipathies between groups and individuals that remain undetected in analyses of avowed political ideologies. Furthermore, these everyday experiences cannot be separated from the politics of 'resistance', insofar as the occupation that generated resistance sometimes also created or ignited pre-existing jealousies and rivalries. Within concentration camps established by the Indonesian military in the eastern district of Lautem, for example, as well as solidarity and resilience against terrible privations, inhabitants also threatened and persecuted each other (Mattoso, 2005:62)[13].

A brief historical overview of colonial engagements with Lautem, the most easterly district of East Timor, reveals some distinguishing characteristics of the area. Among many other features, a significant part of what defined the north eastern coast in the 19th century and early 20th centuries was its remoteness from colonial power located in Dili. Although this was hardly unusual, it has been suggested that the area was able to maintain a relative autonomy beyond this period due to interisland trade, even as other revenues from the slave trade decreased. Governor Celestino da Silva sent a ship to Lautem port in 1902, which led to the establishment of a more permanent colonial presence in the area, via the favour of the Portuguese-educated aristocracy, the Konu Ratu (Rodrigues, 1962: 16n1). The Portuguese may have tried thereafter to ensure a

[13] A prisoner at the Fuiloro camp in February 1976 reported that "some of the songs that were sung by young people were insults and threats to my parents and to us"

foothold in the area through this relationship as well as encouraging the cultivation of crops, especially copra (McWilliam, 2007:18-21).

While the district capital of Lautem town provided the initial entry-point for a lasting colonial presence in the early 20th century (prior to this, and even after, authority could not be sustained far beyond the colonial fort), it did so again more than seven decades later. Having invaded the capital Dili on December 7th 1975, the Indonesian military waited almost two months before making an assault on the northeast coast, landing in Lautem port and the adjacent town of Liarafa at 2 am on February 2nd 1976. Residents of these and surrounding villages spotted reconnaissance planes circling the area on the previous day, and on the morning of the attack those that had not already done so fled to the interior (CAVR c. 2003). The populations of the villages of Pitileti, Etepiti and Ira-ona, to the east of Lautem, were among this number. Having survived at a base (Caicava-Moko) for more than a year, the population of these areas were told by the local Fretilin commander at the end of 1977, that those that wished to surrender to the Indonesian military were free to do so because Fretilin was no longer able to protect them. Those that surrendered were taken to a concentration camp in Moro, together with the local *Camat* (village head), Edmundo da Conceição, with some allocated to the village of Poioco, just to Moro's east. Subjected to hunger, sickness and arbitrary beatings by their military guards, they spent five months in the camp, before being moved in October 1978 to Sikara, west along the coast from Com, because Moro was too small to hold thousands of people. Conditions in Sikara proved to be no better, and in the four months in which they were held there, 35 people died.

It was only in March 1979 that the population of the three villages was allowed to return

home. After having been resettled, they were harassed, beaten and kidnapped, and subjected to other inhumane treatments by the military. In 1979, for example, Battalion 745 – of whom a substantial number still consisted of East Timorese soldiers - kidnapped four local men from Pitileti and Ira-onu, with villagers told that they would be returned after they had acted as 'guides' for the military, though they were never seen again. The same battalion later brought 19 people to a plantation, Apaloahi, where they were tortured for a day. The unit brought these villagers back and raped four women from the village. A gift of a buffalo the next year to the battalion commander in the district capital, Los Palos, from the village, caused violence and threats against the population from the battalion to be reduced, even as all adult males of the area were used in the military operation *Operasi kikis* in 1981 (CAVR c., 2003).

Even while 745's killings and subterfuge temporarily desisted, Com and surrounding villages fell under scrutiny from the local command of Battalion 201, stationed in the area. This was accompanied by military attempts to move populations of all surrounding villages to a long settlement along the coast at Com. Resettlement of villagers revealed the stifling power that the military could exert through this process[14]. Everyday life was marked by the organisation of habitats, and the symbolism of military rule was seen through its patronage of the Church and educational system in the form of providing buildings and personnel[15]. However, these military strategies also revealed the intensity of resistance against them. On the anniversary of the TNI's birthday, for instance, 18 October 1982, a party was held at the local military compound, attended by all military personnel. During the course of the evening and unbeknown to the military,

[14] In 1980, Battalion 201 told occupants of *ruku keluarga* [clusters of houses] to group their resources together to provide buffaloes for special occasions, such as the Indonesian national day on August 17. The villagers duly did this, but the military subsequently shot a further four buffaloes.

[15] In 1984, Battalion 408, based near Com, as well as introducing a regime more heavily restricting villagers movements, built a statue of Jesus for the chapel, and sent personnel to teach in the local school.

dozens of local people were rapidly assembled by Falintil along Com's pier. In an apparent demonstration of the fate that would befall collaborators, two local men were 'tried' on the waterfront, with one swiftly exonerated, while the other was executed in full view of the crowd that was gathered only 15 metres away. Falintil continued to target rumoured collaborators into the next year when they burnt four houses. There is some indication that tensions abated after the construction of a large port in 1987-88, allowing increased commercial and military maritime traffic with Dili, but also with nearby Kisar and Kupang, and even as far afield as Maluku. This piece of infrastructure, paving the way towards a so-called policy of 'opening' East Timor in the late 1980s, was also a departure point for military and militias and pro-Indonesian families fleeing in 1999 (CAVRc. 2003:4; McWilliam, 2007)

It is in this context that local events can be considered, particularly given a background of violent attempts at subjugation and displacement and the inevitable complexity of resistance and collaboration. Valerio Ramos was sentenced to 10 years and 7 months in Dili's Becora prison in January 2002 for the murder of Antonio Magalhaes. The case, involving witchcraft allegations, involved genealogical, and historical elements outlined above. Antonio, a 50-year old farmer from the same village as Valerio, was also his brother-in-law. Ostensibly, Antonio's killing was preceded by a series of events beginning with an episode in July 2001. Valerio's daughter, Dominggas, received a letter from her then fiancé, a trainee police officer in Dili, telling her that he was breaking off their engagement. He explained obscurely that he had received 'background information' about Dominggas's family and that if they married, people would 'tell stories' about their family in the future. The following day on the way to bathe with her sister, Dominggas overheard that a woman from the village, Filomena,

had told people not to accompany Dominggas if she visited her sick son, Joao. Like visits to Eugenio's son in Maubara, it would not be unusual that villagers would visit the sick in their house as a group, especially as there was a family connection. Together with her sister, Dominggas decided to try and find out why Filomena was issuing warnings against her, and went to her house. Confronted by Dominggas, Filomena denied everything, but Joao's wife, Cristina, interrupted her denials, insisting that Filomena had advised people not to visit Joao's son.

Dominggas moved out to live with her uncle in Sawarica in early July. At her new address, Joao visited her, angrily accusing her of insulting his mother and informing Dominggas that a female relative had told their neighbours that Dominggas was descended from a family of witches. Later, Dominggas was again tracked down by Joao who beat her, making her right eye swollen and making her urinate in her clothes. As he was beating her, he accused her of being a witch, and dragged her by the arm towards his house, before others intervened, preventing the beating from continuing before reaching his house. Dominggas went to see her father, Valerio, who thought that the 'problem could not be resolved in the traditional way' of mediation, because he had already been accused of being descended from witches by Joao. This was the first occasion on which Dominggas had heard this from her father.

Despite doubts, Valerio attempted mediation and arranged with his neighbours, relatives of Joao, to facilitate this, yet Joao did not come when called. The following morning, Valerio went to pray at his father's grave, about an hour's walk from his house. While praying, Antonio, a relative of Joao's, walked past Valerio, saying aloud that because Dominggas had urinated during the attack by Joao, it 'proved' that she was a witch.

Valerio then jumped from his father's grave, as he removed his machete from its sheath and attacked Antonio, striking him repeatedly on the head and shoulder for three minutes until sure he was dead (Valerio's movements were so quick that Antonio did not have time to draw his machete). After killing Antonio, Valerio immediately went to report the incident to villagers before returning to his family home, where he told Dominggas and his wife, advising them to go into hiding to avoid reprisals from Antonio's family (UNPOL interview)[16]. He then went to the UNPOL station in nearby Parlamento, surrendering his machete, and wearing the same blood stained clothes used in the attack, confessed to the killing. Sentenced in January 2002, he was considered eligible for parole at the earliest in 2008, although a report of his good behaviour in 2006 meant that he was free after having served half of his sentence.

The details of the court case only touch briefly on the background and extent of the witchcraft allegations against Valerio and his family, which had begun in 1983, not 2001. The family began to be scapegoated for unfortunate events, set out below, during the Indonesian period. In a police interview, Valerio reported that in 1983, there had been a bad harvest that Antonio claimed Valerio's mother had caused by using witchcraft. Antonio also blamed Valerio and his family for causing the death of Antonio's mother in 1997 by using witchcraft. As indicated, the wider significance of these allegations can be seen in the context of high political tensions, especially during 1982-3. Across those years, not only was a ceasefire first established then broken, but the military's frustration in dealing with the armed insurgency in the east in particular was plain from its attempts to extract information about Falintil through intimidating villages that were known to be key in its support.

[16] Proc. no.26/PID.B/2001/PD.BCU:9

Such a scenario played out in 1983, in the same year as military actions and Falintil reprisals took place. The military reportedly thought that Falintil had been assisted by local 'witches' to evade capture, ordering villagers to 'surrender' them. Under pressure, some villagers allegedly identified Valerio, who was arrested by soldiers before being taken into military custody (interviewee A). A priest, reportedly Father Luis Bonaparte, visited Valerio in Indonesian custody, giving him a blessing and returning to the *suco* where he angrily chastised villagers, telling them that there was no such thing as witchcraft. Therefore, the military demanded that villagers produce 'witches', by trying to turn this belief to their advantage and in the process causing disunity. The repercussions of witchcraft accusations against Valerio, his mother and daughter over the years, culminating in the killing of Antonio Magalhaes, meant that he and his family were still marginalised following his release from prison. Other villagers didn't want to take food that they had grown, and during 2006, the family became worried that people would use the context of the events of that year to exact revenge on them. I was told that Valerio's son wanted to train as a priest but that, acutely sensitive to perceptions of the 'good standing' of priests in communities where they work, the Church authorities in Los Palos blocked his application (interviewees B and C). This stands in contrast to the Church's earlier defence of Valerio's family against witchcraft allegations in 1983, which showed a familiar missionary injunction against superstitious beliefs, but also an awareness that in the politics of the period, the population's unity could be easily compromised both from within and without.

Elsewhere during the Indonesian period, the appearance of witchcraft allegations corresponded with local politics in which populations identified 'witches' in their midst.

In 1980, Cosme dos Santos was a military operations' assistant (TBO) in Battalion 745's dormitory (*asrama*) in Fatumaca, in Baucau district, some 80 miles west of the northeast coast of Lautem. On leave from work, he returned to his village. On the night he arrived, a party was underway in the local village administrative office (*balai desa*), which Cosme attended. In the doorway of the administrative office, a local woman, Isabela lay down to sleep during the party. On their way out, an Indonesian government employee, Jupri and some military colleagues, deliberately trampled on the head and stomach of Isabela. A day later, Isabela died from injuries sustained in the attack. Shortly after her death, Isabela's father, Felipe da Costa, the local catechist, called Cosme's mother Fatima and uncle Edio to his house in the belief that both could use magic to resurrect his daughter. Fatima was asked to hold [*kous*] Isabela's dead body, while Edio was to use sorcery to bring her back to life. Edio told Felipe that Isabela was dead and that he didn't know how to bring her back to life. The catechist beat them both, insulting them [*tolok aat*] and telling his younger brother and sons to join in the beating. Cosme observed in testimony to CAVR that following these events and after Isabela's burial, Felipe tried to gain the *liurai* and military's agreement to punish Fatima and Edio. The military then went to Edio and Fatima's house and without explanation subjected them to severe beatings, before holding them captive and torturing them for a week. Fatima died from her injuries, while Edio survived the ordeal (CAVR.d).

Conditions of war and occupation therefore provided stimuli or pretexts in which witches were identified and on occasions, persecuted with devastating consequences. Exploring these contexts may help to shift focus onto elements present in many cases, such as the protection of kin from illness or misfortune. Moreover, it may show that in some cases, being a witch may be thought of (or perhaps: revealed) as a genealogical

condition subject to inheritance. The same cases also demonstrate how being accused of being a malevolent 'witch' was subject to the collective deliberations, through gossip, of the communities from which the accused came. This stands in contrast to the statements of colonial authors that compared witches with slaves. They asserted that the condition of being a slave would be forgotten after a few generations (Castro 1869). As shown in the above case of Valerio, the reputation of being a malevolent witch would perhaps not dissolve as surely in the longer term. It could be argued that what both 'states' have in common are the conditions that allowed their creation (i.e. war). Being called a 'witch' or 'slave' was also reportedly the worst insult that one person could direct at another (Pinto-Correia, 1934:43fn). Accusing an individual and their family of witchcraft involved the use of powerful discourses against enemies, readily understood as bringing misfortune, and significantly heightened by conditions of conflict.

To conclude from this, however, that to be called a witch was simply a metaphor for 'traitor', as the case from the Japanese occupation at the beginning of this section implies, fails to recognise the power relations at work in the above cases. Foreign militaries could also regard people as witches. Whether they did so for instrumental reasons or from a genuine belief in their magical powers is interesting, but not greatly significant. Instead, the wider point to be made is that these cases show that the politics of occupation and resistance cannot be easily reduced to categorical oppositions. As Lan (1985) and others have argued, the apparent complicity of peasantries in resistance movements was multifarious, as frequently invoking magic as the modernity of political ideologies. Santo Antonio's magic – a prophet that walked on water, procedures that guaranteed invincibility – shows this (chapter one). If seen in terms of modernity and magic, each easily co-existed during the Indonesian occupation. Their co-existence does

little to disturb the popular image often called forth to describe resistance - a ‘mass of civilians’ who were ‘the ultimate guarantors of [Falintil’s] security on Mao Tzedung’s maxim of ‘living among the people as a fish swims in water’ (Joliffe, 2012:75). As others have pointed out, however, the same image reproduced in other wars was an official portrayal. Kwon has argued that this metaphor was ‘far more complex and turbulent than the idyllic image of fish swimming peacefully…’ in a population’s pond can capture (2008:14). As shown in the above, the meaning of power in East Timor’s occupation and resistance cannot be reduced to water and fish, nor for that matter, modernity and magic.

V. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to provide a basis for understanding witchfindings, by identifying four aspects outlined in the introduction, several or all of which are common to the cases considered. The most important of these has been the historical aspect. It has been shown that, consistent with previous arguments, power relations that preceded witchfindings (sometimes by many years) are often significant to their understanding, but are rarely explored in court proceedings, or elsewhere. In contrast to accounts that cast modernization as able to expunge ‘traditional’ thought, it is argued that before denouncing these practices and recommending ‘solutions’, they must first be better understood. As such, the meaning of these practices derives in significant part (and insofar as they come to light at all) from the nature of colonial and postcolonial institutions that receive, understand and cast judgement on them.

Yet police and judicial institutions in colonial and postcolonial scenarios, as shown,

have also evidently not moved to widen their ‘scope of surveillance’, nor cause those involved in witchfindings to be subject to disciplinary institutions to alter errant conduct. Indeed, diverse and enduring forms of power relations have produced, rather, a distinct form of engagement with subjects. I have therefore proposed an alternative form of power that characterises these engagements identifying four aspects. Above all else, these aspects show the limitations of submitting practices of witchfinding or sorcery to modernization theory, by emphasising instead the complexity of their historical backgrounds and the imperative of disaggregating their meanings. In this regard, the production and consolidation of categories of knowledge related to witchcraft, such as magic, science and religion, have ensured that the way it is understood in general terms has endured. More specifically, state views on witchfindings in institutions have been actively sustained through judicial practices that render it through the lens of colonial understandings.

As such, the local dynamics of power at work in these events and processes during the postcolonial period are given greater complexity when judicial trials are considered. In such scenarios, the state exercises a form of understanding on these events and ultimately passes judgement on their meaning. In these circumstances, as argued above, the practices and mentalities of colonial government are still evident. Tracing these legacies turns attention towards the historical aspect of witchfindings. To acknowledge the significance of this aspect is to look beyond police interviews, and deliberations and denunciations in judicial procedures. Power is always at work, with collective and individual experience ensuring that memories of past events are retained as legacies. As shown, these legacies go above and beyond either the official histories of resistance, or simplistic assertions that magic can be expunged by modernization. Yet neither are local

politics divorced from seemingly remote events taking place elsewhere, for example in Dili. Taking this temporally and spatially wider context into consideration refocuses attention away from the argument that sorcery is always part of a 'traditional' system of culture, comparable with other practices on the basis of equivalent extrinsic, measurable values, or the inevitable outcome of culturally-determined violence. This chapter has tried to show a wider context: a) that value cannot be reduced to its transactional costs alone and b) particular practices assumed to be similar (i.e. those regarded as superstitions) must be considered in light of how their meaning emerges through power relations.

This framework of understanding shows other inconsistencies between assigning value through the designation of categories of the postcolonial state's making, and of more longstanding origin, such as the modern and traditional. A comparison with resistance movements in other scenarios that have drawn as much for sustenance on spirit mediums as political ideology, for example, usefully shows how resistance operates in everyday contexts. It also shows how considerable overlap exists between practices such as sorcery and 'political' practice, sometimes considered to be diametrically opposed. Throughout the thesis, moreover, different forms of power are explored, with the state's provision of pensions to ex-combatants compared with subjecthood or Christian conversion, or, as in the third chapter taxes and work, life and death.

4. Evaluating life through work

I. Introduction - state formation and alternative forms of power

This chapter shows the extent that 'bio-power' can be regarded as having shaped relations between the state and population from the early 20th century. It is argued that the state evaluated its subjects according to their work, corresponding to a process by which the state introduced taxes, marshalled labour and further circulated money, three interlocking processes. By exploring case studies of mineral extraction in Baucau district in successive periods, it is shown that social relations mediated the local population's claims to the same resources. The basis for these claims appeared to contrast with rational schemes of the postcolonial state. However, the chapter suggests that the extent and limits of these colonial-era processes also depended on the changing meanings of valuable symbols and objects that were the subject of exchange between state and indigenous authorities. Thus, colonial authorities attempted to change the meaning of symbols and objects (establishing their relative value) through consecration, desecration and representation. Yet meaning could also change between people and objects as a result of work. Objects had inseparable meanings from contextual histories of power and work (Asad, 1993:53). While work was evaluated principally through forced labour, I argue that this must be situated in broader state attempts to evaluate life. For example, the taxation of funerary rites and payment of compensation for killing were commensurate with state formation, albeit in ways that unexpectedly transcended boundaries between colonial and indigenous administrative, ritual and legal 'domains'.

This analysis relates to politics in the present in the following ways. In the postcolonial

period, local populations have made claims to minerals by invoking collective histories (including experiences of forced labour) from successive colonial periods. Such claims and histories have coalesced around suco, kin, or resistance affiliations. Thus, on first appearance, power from the 'subaltern' level generates claims based on experience and precedence. It is suggested that state formation is of equal significance. As the state attempted to organise, evaluate and make use of life in the colonial period, so its institution more recently has involved similar processes, albeit with different meanings, trajectories and outcomes. Themes of postcolonial politics such as martyrdom, loyalty and resistance affiliation are shown to overlap with local practices, at the points at which claims over minerals and state recognition meet.

II. People, objects and symbols: changing meanings

State formation in the early 20th century was indicated by taxation and correspondingly, money's wider circulation. However, this was underpinned at a second level: the meaning of objects and symbols subject to exchange or used in ceremony could be changed through representation (consecration, desecration), and work. Symbols and objects subject to exchange between colonial and indigenous authorities were endowed with meaning and value. The colonial government used monetary values, but throughout the 19th century, money was not in wide circulation. Colonial interpretations of money's meaning in indigenous eyes are evident from a report of a visit to the colony of the Mission Superior from Macao, in the year before the introduction of a head tax. The visit of Bishop João Paulino d'Azevedo e Castro, who arrived at the port of Liquica in 1905 from Dili, was an opportunity to 'unite the Christians of Maubara and Fatomassi', including regulo converts. The Bishop gave the Eucharist in a chapel in

Liquica town, built by a Portuguese soldier that had died in the revolt of Manufahi in 1895 (BGEDM, Dec 1905:141), before the joint military missionary expedition went inland and upland. Arriving at Governor Celestino da Silva's Pahata plantation, the Bishop was introduced to a 'dethroned queen' who:

> approaching his excellency, completely possessed of respect and humility, prostrated herself on the ground, grasping between her withered hands those of our venerated prelate…with all of her soul [she] printed a kiss on [his] sacred ring, putting in his hands a coin…a florin! It is fitting to note that, in general, the Timorese do not know the value of money. All of their trade is made and paid in kind [*em generos*]" (BGEDM January 1906:170)

This exchange can either be interpreted as missionaries invite us to, as showing that East Timorese did not 'know' the value of money, or in other ways. For example, it was offered as an object of veneration for a visiting dignitary. Although it is not clear from the account, the Queen could have been Dona Maria, Queen of Maubara, who 'lacked the necessary authority to gain obedience from all the nobles" (Pelissier, 1996:75). In 1894, the same nobles (*suco* chiefs) started the Maubara revolt[1]. Whether it was the Queen of Maubara or otherwise, it could therefore be viewed as a token of esteem rendered in a currency comprehensible to the colonial authorities, or even a defence of the Queen's prestige by conferring something that was known to be valuable to the visitors[2]. Furthermore, florins were usually made partly or wholly from gold, and thus for Portuguese, the gift could have been valued in light of this much sought after substance, prospected for in Timor 15 years previously[3]. By contrast, gold played a part

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1 During the early 1890s the reino Liquica also had a rainha, Dona Ursula da Costa. (França, 1891:24)

2 Equally, the opposite may be the case: given that Maubara had been a Dutch coastal trading post until 1879, the money may have been Dutch, rather than Portuguese. This raises the possibility that the Queen was conferring a gift regarded as antithetical to the visitors.

3 According to Gomes Silva's account of a gold search in 1891 (chapter six), gold from Portuguese Timor had a 'much heightened extrinsic value' when produced for the view of his gold-prospecting team (Gomes Silva, 1891)

as a ritual adornment of East Timorese chiefs and was exchanged in marriage prestations. Its intrinsic worth came from its point of origin being known and its use in these exchanges, rather than either the production or measurement of its worth. Differences in value in the above exchange may therefore be seen as coming from imputed extrinsic and intrinsic values. The florin's value in missionary eyes was understood as being located within a quantifiable, relative value system, while gold could be valuable within indigenous social life in different ways.

If money's meaning was "not known" in late 1905, this situation changed in the ensuing years as the result of the imposition of a head tax (*imposto de capitação*). Even while this did not precede a dramatic increase in the circulation of money, the head tax eventually replaced the finta, tribute paid by regulos to the government, and bypassed their authority. As coffee was cultivated to make the colony self-sufficient, so too was the head tax intended to contribute to the same ends. The introduction of taxes to fund road-building programmes, wars, or other infrastructure, was not unusual in colonial contexts in the same period (cf. Mosko, 1999:52). On the face of it, therefore, the most obvious effect was to create a demand for money. While the value of money to those that were required to pay the head tax cannot be seen in the above exchange, which was implemented later the same year, it is clearer in the circumstances surrounding the Boaventura rebellion in 1912. There is no consensus on the cause of the rebellion which officially broke out on Christmas eve 1911, lasting until late October 1912, which some sources estimate cost 3,500 East Timorese (Pinto and Jardine, 1997:6) and 300 Portuguese lives (Pélissier, 1996:319-320). In Baucau district, a feature of the rebellion's later stages were raids on European-owned plantations, while rumours circulated among the Portuguese military stationed in Baucau town that an assault was

being prepared from nearby Seical, by ‘rebels’ in ‘search of money’ to pay the head tax (Inso, 1939:140-45).

It has also been proposed that its causes lay in the imposition of the head tax in combination with military campaigns since 1895 that increased the size of the state’s domain. This accompanied other changes in the early period after the Republican revolution of 1910-11 that signified an ‘alteration of fundamental aspects of centuries old relations between colonial and indigenous authorities’ (Figueiredo, 2004:519-21). Among such ‘fundamental aspects’ were valuable symbols and objects that signified specific kinds of power relations between colonisers and East Timorese. These have been seen as existing within a symbolic constellation of relations shored up by the observance of vassalage and ceremony, and the waging of war by the colonial authorities when their ‘prestige’ had been sullied by perceived infractions. As for valuable objects such as flags, their recognition by colonial authorities as possessing magical power, was a significant part of their observance of an indigenous domain (Roque, 2010:51-65). Thus, for example, supplementing regalia of the Portuguese crown after the Republican revolution such as the old Portuguese flag was by no means only a formality. The powerfulness of flags had been evident long before, in a revolt against Dutch sovereignty in Larantuka on nearby Flores Island in 1859. This stemmed from a decision by the Portuguese governor to surrender Larantuka to the Netherlands as part of a negotiated border agreement. The lowering of the Portuguese flag and the raising of the Dutch flag caused outrage among Larantuka’s chiefs, who had been loyal to the Portuguese (Castro 1869, 155-181).

If the power of symbols derived from colonial and indigenous observances, however,

their meaning could also be changed on the basis of abandoning or altering observances. Furthermore, a displacement of meaning could also take place by creating a relative value of meaning. Missionaries' consecrations of land could impact perceptions of its powerfulness. Similarly, desecration was intended to downgrade value of sacred objects and symbols by rendering their meanings as superstitious. On the same joint military-missionary expedition to Liquica referred to above, after Bishop Azevedo e Castro's Church service, the military commander, Commandante Borges, cut down a tree regarded by locals as *lulik*. Although the population that worshipped it 'would not even cut one branch of it', it was reported that 'Snr Commandante Borges was laudably resolved to end the superstition and prohibit all kinds of worship with the tree. [The people] understood the result, that the tree could be cut at will without sacrilege' (BGEDM, Dec 1905). These practices of 'ending superstitions' were likewise present in missionary accounts. The Salesian priest Father Rodrigues recorded how he drank from a sacred water source despite being advised by the master [*dono*] of the land that doing so could cause death. Later in the account, missionaries at Fuiloro killed an alligator, considered to be a threat to the mission's cattle but also considered by locals to be a reincarnation of ancestors[4]. Of course, in Borges actions might be seen a performance of Christian piety in front of the visiting Bishop. However, it was also in front of *regulos* and *suco* chiefs, and was no less ceremonial than other observances.

Seen in context moreover, while consecration and ceremony could be used to signify respect for indigenous customs, desecration was also readily used to change meaning.

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[4] 'The Timorese acknowledge the transmigration of souls from ancestors to the alligator, where it continues to live, and they call the animal grandfather. Near the mission of Fuiloro there are various ponds [charcos] where alligators appear. One day one of these beasts seized a goat of the mission and the boy that watched [the goats] came to tell us. It was a death sentence for the alligator…the amphibian's days were over. With tears in their eyes, the workers took his skin and explained, to give solace, that 'Grandfather was killed because he committed a sin' (Rodrigues, 1962:129:n1)

Objects could be subject to changing meanings insofar as their sacredness was compared unfavourably with objects with Christian meanings, or regarded as superstitious. The conditions for which the meaning and value of an object or symbol might change could therefore be dependent on how an object or symbol's meaning changed in 'a larger system of meaning' (Schieffelin, 1976:2). Changes beyond the symbolic were also dependent on the historically contingent, practical associations between people and objects formed by work. As proposed below, this also led to a corresponding displacement of meanings. Like gold, money was also only one, if distinctive, form of currency among others that could be exchanged. It could only be made unique by its recognition as such, and the ways that this was made possible can be illustrated by highlighting the similarities and differences between money and other currencies. If money's value changed by being sought after and substituted for labour under the head tax, its meaning was also informed by its equivalence for life. The question of money as compensation for life is central to Simmel's analysis, who showed a historical process of 'man being compensated for by money' (2004:359), in slavery and 'blood money' (for example, Weregild). Whereas in ancient law, monetary fines were compensatory, under modern law they were punitive, intended to 'affect the subject himself' (2004:364;cf.355) who would be sent to prison in the event of insolvency. Christianity was crucial to these processes, in which Simmel saw the emergence of 'individualism' in 18th century Europe caused by the spread of the Christian doctrine of the indivisibility of the human being. This gave rise to 'human rights' and 'human dignity' that made either the sale of human beings or 'atonement for their death by money impossible' (2004:362-3). The emergence of these liberal norms indicated, according to Simmel, a more advanced 'stage of culture', seen in the development of punishment in modern law, which still bore traces of a fundamental aim

to satisfy the desire for protection and revenge.

Foucault located money's meanings 'in the ancient world', seen as a way to 'stabilise' society, which through proto-systems of taxation and redistribution (2013:135), were intended to avoid against either excessive poverty or riches. This redistributive system originated in religious ritual, and was prefigured by sacrifice. The circulation of money furthermore could be seen as commensurate with two fundamental things: taxation and written law (nomos). The advent and inseparability of taxation, money and written law is significant to Foucault for two reasons. First, these processes articulated political power in relation to the individual (thus prefiguring Simmel's connection between Christianity and individualism). Specifically, political power in the ancient world regulated death by establishing monetary equivalents for murder in written law, thus, 'replacing' like-for-like blood feuds, previously carried out by bereft families in the name of restoring equilibrium. By placing a value on homicide, and imposing values on other forms of death, such as taxing funerary rites and inheritance, Foucault believed, was to 'regulat[e] the event and consequences of death' which 'delineat[ed] the form of individuality' (Foucault, 2013:175). Money was not a sign, but a substitution for an object, a 'simulacrum', creating 'fixation, not representation' (2013:141). In other words, money was qualitatively different from other goods that were subject to exchange, in that it had to represent something that it was not (Foster, 1999:226).

Despite the insistence that the acts which money brought into focus superseded its effects (forming the individual), money's significance is to be found both in its meaning and causality. In this respect, although unique for assigning values rather than representing objects of exchange, its effects are the same. Aside from money, other

valuable objects have created effects of 'fixation' and 'stability'. The equitable distribution of harvest proceeds are perennial rites of pre-monetary societies or where money is in limited circulation, instances of which can be seen in East Timor[5]. However, the action of distribution in itself cannot always account for what meaning objects have. Addressing this, Keane points towards the effects of the colonial encounter on value. Missionary action 'stabilized' objects by 'assigning values' to them, thus disaggregating meaning from them in their indigenous contexts. Informed by semiotic ideologies that underpinned missionary work, this was part of a process of reprogramming objects with different (Christian) meanings, or 'purification' (Keane, 2008: 224). For Keane, the changing meanings of objects are the barometers of changes in 'regimes of value' a phrase Keane borrows from Appadurai (Keane, 2008:284) triggered by purification. Money, itself an object with which missionaries, traders, and Christian converts intended to stabilise values of other objects, 'in practice takes its place in a political economy of social signs and usable things' (Keane, 2008:274). Thus money itself may stabilise the meaning of objects, and the origins of this action rest in missionary ideology, rather than its use as an equivalent with human life.

In summary, two broad perspectives exist. In the first, the use of money accompanies state formation and formation of 'the individual', Changes in its meaning depended on its setting in the ancient world or Christian Europe. However, currencies beyond money

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[5] The civil war (1975) frequently belied divisions within villages between chiefs that supported UDT while the rank and file supported Fretilin. In Suco Maulau in Northern Manufahi (CAVR g.), the village chief instructed people to choose UDT, because he believed the help of foreigners [*malae mutin*] was required until people were capable [*matenek*] of ruling themselves. Fretilin's local representative disagreed and animosities became obvious during an annual ritual known as *kedei aifun*, where each household divided and distributed profits from coffee growing equally among the suco, sacrificing animals and offering them to an ancestor called Lokbere. Although the community had become divided by modern political parties formed barely a year previously, the fact that another ceremony (*Fadmar*) ended in recrimination and threats [*sadik malu*] indicated that the ritual of distributing coffee profits would not have worked.

existed in East Timor and elsewhere, where a similar mechanism of exchange to guarantee 'stability' operated. As small communities maintained internal equilibrium through redistribution, the colonial state sought to emplace the indigenous population (cf. Robbins, 2004) and in this process monetization was one part. Paying taxes in-kind with labour was especially aimed towards this objective. The second perspective, where missionaries and colonial authorities displaced the meaning of valuable objects ties in with the first: objects could be imbued with meaning, while the circulation of a state sponsored currency ensured not just the common recognition of its value, but also the action of creating 'fixation' or 'stability' of both people and objects. The same could be argued for people's relations with objects changing according to the context of power and work. The two perspectives are further examined together below.

III. Caibada's manganese: power, work and meaning

Shortly after the introduction of the head tax, in 1908, a student at a mission school in Oecusse, Jose Jeronymo, brought a knife to school and killed a missionary who taught there, Father Miranda e Brito, for unclear motives. Jeronymo was from Laga, a 'reino where salt existed that the state exploited, making the natives work, on the orders of the military commander' (Correia, 1909). Governor Celestino da Silva's response to the incident, knowing that the area was relatively rich, was to fine the *reino* 500 patacas. The imposition of fines may be interpreted as evidence of the accumulative instincts of the government (or, as the source in question suggested, Celestino da Silva himself). Colonial authorities did not directly approve the imposition of fines under indigenous custom, except, when it involved someone, such as a missionary, subject to colonial law. Simmel indicated that neither murder nor slavery was permissible to be

compensated. While the above case seems to show that the state cooperated in levying compensation for murder, the imposition of value on human beings has already been seen in other ways, via their work in lieu of taxes for example. The following two historical examples from Baucau district address further examples by suggesting that in practice, people and objects shape the meaning of the other through common experience. The below examines how far this meaning could be affected through historically contingent representations in colonial accounts.

Besides the changes effected in taxation by the colonial government in the early 20th century, by the 1920s, the colony's Republican government had started to court foreign capital. Numerous accounts have attested to the use of forced labour throughout the Portuguese empire, although there are few analyses of the ways and extent of the practice in East Timor. Furthermore, while certain patterns may be detected in Portuguese Africa, each colony was different, and as recent accounts have emphasised, forced labour practices changed over time (Ball, 2003). In East Timor, as seen below, foreigners invested in a number of small projects in the 1920s and 1930s, exploiting the colony's natural resources. Foreign capital required indigenous labour for which *suco* chiefs were to be intermediaries, facilitated by the Portuguese authorities.



Map 2

Location of Laga and Caibada within Baucau district.

During the period after the Boaventura rebellion and prior to the Japanese occupation in the Second World War (1912-1943), a number of licenses were granted to foreigners to exploit East Timor's natural resources. By the mid-1930s, for example, a Dutch Mining Engineer from the University of Delft, owned concession rights to a deposit of Manganese in Uatocarbau in Viqueque district (Allied Mining Company, 1937:30). Between approximately this area in the southeast and Betano in the south centre, twelve concessions of land were awarded to foreigners, mainly for agricultural use. This followed a nine-month surveillance of the entire territory by the colonial government in preparation for the exploitation, during which some areas of land are recorded as having been 'cleared' of inhabitants, for example, the first concession, a piece of land between Betano and Alas (Allied Mining Company, 1937:75).

A memoir of Baucau's administrator during the 1920s, Armando Pinto Correia, focused instead on another concession granted some years previously on the north coast, which he had supervised (1944). One of the concessions was located on the plain of Caibada, in Seiçal, nine kilometres to the east of Baucau town, and in Mount Birak, in Vemasse subdistrict. In March 1925, Franz van Klinkenberg, a naturalised Dutch citizen, originally from Aachen in Germany, arrived in Baucau from Surabaya, Java. A year previously he had been awarded two concessions to search for manganese deposits. Van Klinkenberg was duly shown some examples of deposits by a representative of the Governor, from which he extracted and sent back 50 tonnes to Surabaya, with the hope of securing financing for his planned venture. Pinto Correia meticulously documented van Klinkenberg's actions, scorning what he perceived as his overly ambitious view of how much manganese could be acquired.

To realise his plans van Klinkenberg managed to enlist the support of half a dozen financiers from Surabaya in Java, who gave funding to van Klinkenberg's Baucau Mijnbouw Sindicaat (Baucau Mining Syndicate). The money was used for the construction of two bridges over rivers next to Vemasse and Seiçal, and the laying of electric cables from Baucau town to Caibada, to generate electricity for offices and accommodation for at least 3000 Timorese workers, and their wages. Pinto Correia complained that van Klinkenberg's requests for miners increased between March and April 1925 from 136 to 222, while no houses were constructed for them, and they were not paid on time. He contended that these delays were because the planned shipments of 2000 tonnes of manganese was missed by 200 tonnes. Although this shipment satisfied the Sindicaat's financiers, between this and the next shipment, van Klinkenberg drastically reduced the workforce, dismissing four deportados[1], who were permanently replaced in their roles as overseers [*olheiros*] with 'Timorese and Arabs'. By September of the same year, following a hurried departure to negotiate more financing, van Klinkenberg returned to begin work on further mining, promising 3500 tonnes to financiers by October[2]. By this time, accommodation had been prepared at Caibada for the workers, and a water tank installed. However the ship dispatched to collect the Manganese, finally arriving in November, was again provided with half the minerals promised, and was delayed from sailing, costing the Sindicaat 600 florins per day according to terms with financiers. The concession was

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[1] Native Portuguese that had been deported to East Timor, often for reasons of political opposition during the Republican, then New State period.

[2] A sizable amount of the capital that van Klinkenberg found came from offices of Japanese trading houses and state owned companies. Over a period of some years, representatives visited from the Naga Trading Company, Tokyo; the Mitsui Bank, and the Government Steel Iron Works, Kobe. The Portuguese military officer, Antonio Oliveira Liberato thought that 'the Japanese infiltration began in the colony in 1936, with the Japanese acquisition of almost 50% of SAPT, which permitted them to unjustifiably maintain a number of employees, [who were] periodically substituted, without ever giving notice of the reasons for those substitutions…' (Liberato, ca.1947:17)

transferred from van Klinkenberg to the Sindicaat, and was later passed on to another German miner, and the three mining projects were eventually abandoned in the early 1930s.

Pinto Correia emphasised the bad planning and feuds in the Sindicaat to explain its failure, but also a tawdry search for profit. van Klinkenberg 'scented money' after his first research visit, which after his return to Java saw him 'hammering on the doors' of Surabaya's financiers. Among the many characters that populate Pinto-Correia's account, van Klinkenberg received singular disapproval, particularly his attempts to appear as a 'big and busy industrialist for whom time is money'. To this description is added his 'vulgar attitude and gesticulations' and 'charlatanism'; having deceived investors with unrealisable 'grand plans'; and escaping the taint of his nationality by hiding his previous career from financiers as a Captain in the German navy. His lie was allegedly betrayed by a 'negligently rolled up shirtsleeve' during a siesta one afternoon that revealed 'complicated tattoos' showing his wartime loyalties.
While Pinto Correia's account shows other characters (German mining engineers, British lawyers), notably absent in any substantive form is the population itself. During the last large shipment, the population is anonymous victims of brutal treatment at the hands of Europeans. According to Pinto Correia, this included the expulsion of a German miner, Hirschell, for 'exercising violence on Timorese' in the period leading up to the November 1925 shipment. Cumulatively, in the same period, 59 miners died:

The heat of Seiçal, combined with the proximity of the rainy season, became roasting, especially in the mines' trenches, now bored more deeply. At night the

plain was swept by high winds like the upper deck of a ship on the high seas. Moreover, the water of Seiçal continued to be transported in gasoline cans [and] was insufficient and undrinkable…The mine had to close. It was already a slaughterhouse. The labourer who on the 23rd December died in hospital in Baucau had been the last of this tragic group of 59 Timorese, to whom I need to add those who, speaking out against the bad conditions of the mines, died there, ignored by the authorities, deep in their povoações, and sacrificed to the industrial mystification of a renegade German (Correa, 1943: 145).

Interwoven into this is Pinto Correia's uncomfortable qualification that he tried to limit the number of labourers that he supplied to the Sindicaat, and testified to a Governor's investigation in Dili into bad conditions, which caused extra rations to be provided to the labourers. Despite publicising his attempts to limit state neglect and the Syndicate's abuses, however, he was compelled to provide what was at best indentured labour[3].

After hearing a Suco chief's complaint that labourers that he supplied had not been paid on time, he wrote that he recommended to the chief that the labourers should have been subject to a debenture bond signed with the Sindicaat. Recourse to contracts in commissioning labour was a common practice of colonial officials throughout the Portuguese empire when seeking to avoid accusations of its enslavement. Hence, Pinto Correia wanted the supply of labour to be understood as part of a lawful system of exchange, one that guaranteed protection and payment in

[3] For an example see Pinto Correa's recommendation (1943:140) to a Xefe de Suco to make the provision of labourers subject to a debenture bond, because the Sindicaat frequently did not pay salaries

exchange for bodies. To breach a contract, or to avoid signing one, had involved ‘sacrifices’ to ‘industrial mystification’.

The prevailing perspectives of Pinto Correia and the period in which he wrote inform the account. To this end, the relationship of those that worked in the mines with the manganese can be best understood in the context of their ‘sacrifice’ to it. Pinto Correia argued that colonial authorities took an indifferent attitude to these workers. This may have been informed by his view that the reforms of the early twentieth century disrupted proper relations with the Timorese ‘hierarchy’ (regulos), that as a result had lost its ‘prestige…fortune, and authority” (1934:272), through abolishing a ‘total system of exchange’ and therefore undermining the indigenous aristocracy’s autonomy (Davidson, 1994:129). Furthermore, by the 1920s the government had abandoned other older ‘conventions’ in its dealings with local indigenous authorities. At the time of the account’s publication in 1943, Republican policies of attracting foreign investment had long been discarded in favour of New State policies of nationalisation and economic integration within empire (Castelo, 1999 27-33).

The relative anonymity of the dead East Timorese presents a strange contrast with the rest of Pinto Correia’s account, in which the population is vividly described in its ‘proper’ ethnographic context. Except through the value of their work and lives, the dead’s connection with the manganese deposits is not expressed. The following sections show how people articulated relations with other mineral deposits elsewhere in Baucau district, focussing on the practical, ritual and epistemological bases of meaning attributed to objects, focusing on divergences between colonial

representations and indigenous autonomy.

IV. Laga's salt: power, work and meaning.

Laga was a small military post with access to the sea, to the east of Seical and Caibada. As seen in the killing of Father Miranda e Brito above, Laga's salt deposits were of interest to the authorities by the early 20th century, but had been extracted since the mid- 19th century on the orders of the local military command in the Samalalu/Saelari area (Belo, 2012:143). However, since pre-colonial times salt had been exchanged between Laga and the uplands (Metzner, 1977:37). Salt harvesting was key in bridging gaps in food production in the interior 'when harvests were poor' (Davidson, 1994:225). This confirmed a pattern existing elsewhere: the population of Liquica district in the west produced salt that was transported to the interior by Chinese traders, and Chinese traders were also involved in salt's exchange in Dutch-controlled West Timor (Ormelling, 1957:140). From Laga, Chinese traders may have transported salt to market in Baucau town, but were apparently less involved in trading salt with upland areas. The government attempted to regulate production with quantities large enough to export to Macau from at least the late 19th century. The harvesting of sites such as that of the 'salt rock' (fatuk masin) in Laga was declared subject to the purchase of government concessions, and 'the public treasury reserved the right to mine the salt' (Davidson, 1994:225) by the early twentieth century[4]. The meaning of Laga's salt is explored below in the context of three events: an

[4] In 1906, missionaries noted possible locations for salt production in Manatuto, the district immediately to the west of Baucau in rice paddies next to the sea (BGEDM, March 1906:234). Baucau with its greater humidity and elevation was more suited to rice production and was accordingly used for that purpose by the authorities, producing more than a third of the colony's rice (1,840,160kgs of 4,422,297kgs) by the mid-20th century. In the same period, meanwhile, Manatuto was producing 2100 tonnes of salt a year.

ethnographic analysis from the 1950s; the harvesting of salt under Indonesian rule in the 1980s, and further extractions after 1999.

Colonisation involved the production of certain cultural products taken to be paradigmatic of a colonising nation's 'ideological construction of itself' such as Camoes' poem the Lusiads (Helgerson, 1992:28), or through figures that resonate in the national consciousness, for example, plantation owners (chapter five). Another trope of colonisation, of renewed emphasis by the 1930s, was evangelising, which was 'the result of a long and complex process of mythification of the place of Portugal in the World and of [its] relations with other peoples' (Castelo 1998:131-2). For some, 'mythification' was an ideological ruse to conceal the prime motivation for having an empire, i.e. profit (Helgerson, 1992). However, for others, such as missionaries, profit was accommodated alongside other motives inseparable from the aim of gaining Christian converts and 'civilisation':

> For…the Portuguese, the discovery of the maritime route to India will be always remembered as the event that was, for Europe, the beginning of a new phase of commercial life, that opened to science new fields of investigation and to faith found theatres of new conquests, that very powerfully contributed to access to new peoples and races. Similarly, the death or birth of Camoes will never be erased from our memories, for his work represents the importance to Portugal of demonstrated social contact with civilised peoples (BGEDM July 1920:13).

Scientific discovery, propagating Christianity as well as making profit encapsulated an idealised vision of empire. As part of this construction, East Timor was distinguished among other colonies by the reputed manner of its conquest. Christian conversion, rather than violence, so the story had it, had influenced indigenous leaders by way of baptisms and other Christian practices over the course of centuries, making them susceptible to colonial influence. Salt was an important symbol in this narrative.

Missionary and other accounts recorded the story of a regulo that was said to have defiantly told a Portuguese military expedition in the period after the first Portuguese arrivals, that the population had been conquered 'for the Portuguese crown only by water and salt' (BEDM Dec 1924:305).

Whether this process is regarded either as ideological overlay or 'purification', the meaning of salt in these accounts depended on colonial representations. Salt was 'a symbol of wisdom… [that] prevented the growth of the bad passions of the soul'. It was '…a symbol of alliance between God and the novice [neofito]' (BEDM 1942; cf. Mintz 1986[5]). With its innately beneficial properties, salt was 'today in some parts of the Orient still offered to improve peace and friendship'. East Timor's antiquity was therefore explained by its aristocracy's conversion to Christianity, with salt a symbol of this 'peaceful' conquest. Looked back on from the early-mid 20th century, this idea was meant to assure the uniqueness of East Timor as Portugal's 'oldest colony' in which the missionary work of vanquishing heathenism was made easier by the indigenous population's embrace of Portuguese culture, seen, for example, through the hoarding of paraphernalia associated with the 'conquest', regarded as *lulik* or sacred.

Salt was therefore imbued with a cultural logic that atomised relations between Portuguese and East Timorese when wedded to a narrative of conquest. However, During the 1950s, an anthropological mission examined the Fatuk Masin in Laga. The chief of mission, Antonio de Almeida, was interested in the novel method of salt

[5] Sidney Mintz's study of sugar (1986), by contrast, showed that its gradual introduction to western markets was subtly mediated by the representation of its desirability, transforming it from a luxurious condiment connected with temptation to a mainstay of British diets.

extraction, with salt-bearing water placed over a fire so that salt could be drawn out as the water evaporated (Almeida, 1960:8; Metzner, 1977:237,fn.96). Every year during the dry season a 'lake of salt' appeared which was a mainstay of the social lives of the area's inhabitants and its economy. Given the importance of the source of salt, stories were recounted by different sucos that accounted for the salt's origins. The team's interpretation of these stories is significant for several reasons. It interpreted and accommodated the stories of Nunira and Saelari into an overarching narrative of Timor's place within empire, described above. Its interpretation also later became of importance when the ownership of the salt was contested in the postcolonial period, in which claims over it had altered in the intervening years of the Indonesian period. A comparison of the two periods shows how different representations of the salt's value were operative in either case. Almeida's team noted that the first story of the salt's origins recounted by the population of the suco of Saelari, was much simpler than the second story, which the population of the suco of Nunira took up (though it was not associated exclusively with them). In the Saelari story, their ancestors were undertaking a death rite called *na'abasu* in Macassae, which involved sacrificing a buffalo. The buffalo escaped, running to several locations with the villagers in pursuit. In each of the locations the buffalo slept before being awoken by its pursuers. Finally it arrived at a location called Lema Isi Dandagu where it vanished into the water, making the water turn to salt (TP 4 February 2004). The Nunira account by contrast made explicit the kin connections of the population of Laga with Larantuka, an ex-Portuguese settlement in east Flores. In the Nunira account, a princess, an only child, lived with her father who closely guarded her. One night a young bachelor descended in a blue beam from heaven and slept with the princess, entering her room through an opening in the roof of the family house. This happened for two further nights until the

third night when her father confronted the princess and young bachelor.

Both the young bachelor and princess declared their intention to marry. After eventually calming himself, the father eventually agreed to the marriage on the condition that the young bachelor brought horses and buffalo from Macassar[6] and gold and silver jewellery. The young bachelor gestured towards the site of what later became the salt lake, declaring that although he had never brought such things from heaven before, he would bring them to that place tomorrow (cf. Forman 1980:153). The princess' father duly arrived at the site of the salt lake on the day, bringing with him two slaves and hunting dogs, but the young bachelor did not appear. After hours of waiting the slaves picked up two pieces of strange yellow 'fruit' that sprouted from the parched ground to eat on the journey home, and the group returned to Laga where the old man was met by the apologetic young bachelor, who asked if they had brought anything. 'Only this piece of fruit' replied the old man dejectedly, realising that one had been lost during the journey. The young bachelor planted the fruit in the ground and to his astonishment, the next morning the fruit had been transformed into many kinds of gold jewellery. The young bachelor encouraged the old man to return to the location of the fruit the next day where he forecast that he would find a lake full of salt. The old man sure enough returned the next day to find a lake of salt water. He returned to Laga and confirming his discovery, gave his permission for the marriage with his daughter to go ahead.

The narrative reveals themes common to narratives associated with the ethnic group

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[6] Another area of eastern Indonesia that features prominently in among others, origin narratives in East Timor

that populate the area, the Makassae, among whom marriage involves the exchange of work animals for women and food, seen when the princess's father demands 'horses and buffaloes from Makassar' (in Sulawesi, in contemporary Eastern Indonesia) from the bachelor. In Makassae ritual, this exchange of animals for food and women is a metaphor for the life cycle (Forman 1980:160)[7]. The food is transformed when placed in the fertile land, seen in the above account when the yellow fruit becomes gold jewellery.

However, and in common with Pinto Correia's account, another level of meaning is to be found in the account's production. Almeida's interpretation of the tale appears to reveal an analysis in keeping with the ideological orientation of the mid-20th century New State. For example, by focussing on the similarities between the story of how the *Fatuk Masin* came to be, and the Bible, Almeida confirmed East Timor as being subject to a Portuguese colonisation that distinguished itself from other European forms of colonisation by being 'sociologically Christocentric' rather than 'ethnocentric' (Castelo, 1998:131-2). The Samalari story of the Buffalo's escape and immersion in the salt water, for example, 'evokes the story of Genesis'. The Nunira account also bears a resemblance to another section of the Old Testament:

> …Loth's wife was transformed into a statue of salt for having looked back, [*olhado para trás*] disobeying the angels' insistent recommendations, [and] destroying the cities of Sodom and Gomorra, ignited by a combustion of sulphur, kindled by a beam that fell out of the sky, like the groom of the princess! (Almeida, 1960:12)

Almeida also detected other similarities between the Nunira story and biblical

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[7] Forman comments: 'This exchange is a statement about the extension of life through agricultural production and sexual reproduction'

references to salt which serve to highlight what he perceived as mimesis:

> …The Christian liturgy also considers salt an element of extraordinary spiritual value: the salt of the earth called Jesus Christ to the apostles; it enters into the composition of holy water and of Gregorian water with which churches and altars are consecrated, it figures in exorcisms and in the ritual of baptism – the Timorese boast [vangloriam-se] of being Portuguese, not through conquest of war, but through water and through salt! (Almeida, 1960:12)

Thus, Almeida's account constituted a kind of 'purification' insofar as it superimposed Christian meanings on Laga's salt. Moreover, the observation of indigenous adoption ('boasting') of Portuguese Christian culture may have been informed by structuralist paradigms within anthropology at the time, in which indigenous populations accommodated foreigners as their leaders. This view was also amenable to the view of the Portuguese as being especially and uniquely attuned to a fraternal relationship with its subject peoples. Colonial sovereignty could be more easily explained and justified if it was accepted that colonial subjects were not only complicit in the presence of foreigners, but actively imitated their colonisers[8]. A distinction must be made between such representations of East Timor through the image of salt and other ways of ascertaining meaning. For Mitchell, (1988) representation was itself indicative of modernity. To '[hold] the world in front of oneself and [make] it the object of representation shows its historical character and reveals itself as characteristic of modern times' (Han, 2003:57).

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[8] In other contexts, the exchange of salt preceded closer colonial engagements. Robbins (2004:52) notes that initially, the Urapmin in Papua New Guinea accepted Australian salt in exchange for goods of relatively high value to the Australians. This became a basis for increasingly unequal exchanges so that Urapmin eventually received little in return, before the Australians introduced a monetized form of exchange. Each change in the exchange relationship corresponded to encroachments by Australians or accommodations by Urapmin, with these exchanges a precursor to the introduction of written colonial law.

By contrast, meaning could be practically constituted through work. Almeida did not mention that the colonial authorities had compelled the local population to extract the salt (this inclusion would have made his account very unlikely to have been published).

Indeed, Almeida omitted more than this: as a participant in debates regarding the Organic Law of the Overseas in 1953, (Lei Organico do Ultramar), Ultramar being the new name for colonies, he successfully advocated that East Timor should be exempt from the indigenato forced labour regime (Castelo, 1998:59). Despite this, by the 1950s and 1960s, adult males were made to work at collecting the salt (raut masin) for one month every year (Francisco da Costa Belo interview). As will be seen in the final section, claims over the Fatuk Masin were articulated in narratives of the kind recorded by Almeida, but were also based on experiences of collecting from it. This again shows that while narratives of the salt's origins were intrinsic to the social lives of the residents of Nunira and Saelari, their experiences of being made to extract it were equally features of this sociality. From the salt's different meanings, different values can be seen: as exchange, profit, a representation of unchanging colonial-indigenous relations, competing narratives. The next section explores whether its meaning changed under radically different social circumstances. This corresponded with the differing experiences of those that collected it, which occurred during the Indonesian period.

V. The Indonesian and postcolonial periods: a transformation in power and meaning? 1975-2009

By 1975, the local (male) population's collection of the salt rock to fulfil the state's obligations was a well-established practice. The Indonesian invasion and occupation thereafter precipitated a long period of displacement of the population of Laga subdistrict until 1978-9. As seen throughout the eastern part of the territory, during this year, many of the population surrendered to the Indonesian military. Those from Laga, as well as the populations of several sucos from Quelicai and Laivai, were moved to a concentration camp[9] called Mulia where they were watched over by the Indonesian military. This period (c.1976-82) created two abiding legacies in the present. One was connected with displacement. This issue has been analysed in a study of 'settlers' from upland Waitame in Quelicai and 'hosts' who lived in Wai'aka, the location of the Mulia camp. In this context, rituals such as the reconstruction of *uma luliks* were taken to reinforce land claims which prevailed in the absence of legislation on land ownership (Thu, 2008:144-50). The second legacy of the period concerned rival claims over the *fatuk masin* in Binagua. This section therefore concentrates on the second of these claims by tracing changes in meaning as a result of the Indonesian period. In contrast to the previous section, where meaning of the salt was represented in the context of tropes used to justify colonisation, claims to the salt were generated through narratives of the salt's origin and the idea of resistance. Just as the issue of resettlement of land involved claim making, so the salt also involved similar struggles over value and meaning.

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[9] The suco of Guruca in Quelicai for example saw 500 people surrender in 1979 (CAVR e.:3-4) and installed in Laga's camps shortly after. The military sometimes moved people to other locations before bringing them to the coast. Some were initially transported to Baguia, (CAVR a.:5) which gradually gave way to the formation of the camp in Laga.

Laga's history as a coastal colonial base, combined with the military's intentions to settle upland populations on the coast, made it an obvious choice for establishing the Mulia camp in 1979. It was also a port that served as a point of departure for detainees that were shipped to the prison island of Atauro (Taylor, 104). Atrocious conditions in the camp saw many of its detainees die from a form of diarrhoea (*muntaber*) and other preventable diseases. The military dispensed infrequent consignments of dried fish, rice and corn porridge (*bubuk*) (CAVR, e.), with the Laga church providing supplies of food and clothing. As Thu notes, under detention in the camp, the population were prevented from cultivating root crops that were a mainstay of subsistence (Thu 2008:144). The only way the camp's residents could leave to try and find additional food was with an official document permitting movement (*surat jalan*) or if accompanied by a member of the civil guard (Hansip). Nevertheless, while the perimeter of the camp was policed, it remained open in parts so that residents could enter and depart while evading detection by the military. This allowed people who were separated from normal sources of subsistence and confined to the town to scavenge for discarded food, and hunt in the forests (CAVR b.).

Map 3

Map of Laga subdistrict showing *suco* and subdistrict boundaries. The location of Binagua (the *suco* which is 'nearest' to the disputed *Fatuk Masin*) is approximate.

During or after these foraging and hunting expeditions, some inhabitants of Beliwali in Sagadati *suco* were shot dead by the military (CAVR b:4) that suspected their involvement with Falintil. Such an occurrence took place in 1980. According to their families and other locals, three people had gone to extract salt on the night of 14th
August 1980. That evening, the three, Dominggas da Costa, Dominggos Gusmao and Martina Pereira were ambushed and killed by the Indonesian military[1] (Aureliano de Jesus interview). The son of Dominggas, Marcal, in Laga at the time of the killing, learned about his mother's death while in school the following day. Three days later, he and others buried his mother, Martina Pereira, and Dominggos Gusmao at Binagua.
Martina Pereira was then reburied in 1987 in her family's aldeia, Alasafa, without the military's knowledge (Marcal Cardoso da Costa, interview)[2]. The extent of deaths still occurring in 1981 can be seen through the military's digging of several mass graves (*kuburan massal*) in this period in Ulabuti, also in Sagadati, and another area near Laga town (CAVR.b:4). As noted previously, salt was exchanged with upland populations when harvests diminished or failed. With the prohibitions on movement described above and the starvation and disease faced by many in the camp, the value of this exchange became more pronounced. There was a black market for food, farming tools and precious metals. In the knowledge that this was happening, the local subdistrict administrator decreed in 1981 that harvesting and trading of salt should be permitted so that it could be sold in Baucau (Atanasio da Costa Pereira interview)[3]. This episode marks another juncture at which the value of salt became inseparable from the experiences of those that harvested it. As argued below, these

[1] According to more than one source, Battalion 731 had been responsible for the killings at the fatuk masin, of which a majority of its soldiers were reportedly from Maluku. Other sources mentioned Battalion 141, reportedly also stationed in the area during the period.
[2] Dominggas Gusmao and Dominggos da Costa were from the aldeia of Sirebuu in Sagadati suco.
[3] Later in the 1980s, the Indonesian authorities established a salt factory in Laga on the sea front.

experiences later informed claim making over the salt connected with each suco's experience between 1975-99.

After independence, in 2009, the administrator of Laga, Francisco da Costa Belo described 'two big public polemics' in Laga subdistrict, in a public meeting with the Ministry of Justice regarding proposed legislation on land and property. One was the question of Mulia or Wai'aka, and the other was the *Fatuk Masin*. Both issues involved claims over land, yet there was no written law on land and property while records of land titles from the Indonesian era had been destroyed or removed in 1999. Therefore customary tenure claims were used to assert ownership of land. In the case of the *Fatuk Masin*, the inhabitants of Nunira and Saelari recounted its origins in order to claim it, but the meaning of the Indonesian period encroached on previous claims to the salt[4]. Although the events of 2006 were not as acutely felt in Laga as in Dili or Baucau town, claims over the salt became contentious during this year, when it began to be collected [*raut masin*] and sold by the ex-Falintil commander and native of Laga, L-7 (chapter two). L-7 was the brother of Mauk Moruk, also known as Paulino Gama, a contentious figure unable to be accommodated in official histories of the resistance movement. Villagers from Nunira were unhappy that L-7 and another brother, Tomas Gama, had begun to mine the salt without their knowledge. Implicitly, the mining by L-7, they said, privileged the Samalari/Saelari narrative of the salt's origins.

Moreover, they claimed, L-7 had not distributed proceeds from the salt, except to his kin

[4] Others made attempts to revive administrative arrangements from the Portuguese period. The *aldeia* of Ueru Mata in Binagua, the location of the *Fatuk*, petitioned CNRT's office in Laga in 2000, then the Fretilin government in early 2003, to be considered as a *suco*. It had been 'demoted' from being a *suco* 'in the Portuguese period', after which it was incorporated into the *suco* of Samalari as an *aldeia* (Petition to government, 2003).

group in Saelari. The situation came to a head when Nunira villagers intended to confront L-7 at a public meeting in February 2009, which he did not attend. They had also been aggravated by L-7's claims that he was entitled to the salt because he had 'liberated the people' (Antonio de Castro interview). L-7 referred to salt's use as a mainstay of exchange, for when 'the rain stops and the corn and rice die, and the people fish in the sea. The salt is not just for me, but for people to work on and sustain their families' (TP, 21 March 2009). Rather than being exchanged for produce from fertile upland areas, however, it was stored in Tomas Gama's silo and reportedly exported, via an Indonesian company called 'Hercules'[5], possibly with the knowledge of the Ministry of Tourism Trade and Industry (MTCI) (TS, 27-4-09). During the following month, government officials from the MTCI made an early morning visit to the *Fatuk Masin* as part of an assessment of the feasibility of establishing a factory to process the salt. They were confronted by a group who reportedly demanded that the government facilitate dialogue between Nunira and Saelari. Later, L-7 complained that while bringing a machine to sift salt to the site, he had been confronted by a group 'not representative of the people, but organised by the administrator [Francisco da Costa Belo]…who used harsh words to me, L-7, and committed criminal acts by stoning my car [*tuda fatuk*]' (TP, 21 March 2009). Villagers from Nunira calling themselves the Council of the elders, Suco Nunira, Laga (*Konselhu Lia Nain Komunidade Suku Nunira, Sub-distritu Laga*) then petitioned Xanana Gusmao, who ordered that mining should immediately stop (Francisco da Costa Belo interview).

Other mineral deposits existed further along the coast at Laivai in Lautem district. L-7 had also either investigated or prospected for manganese in the area, locals claimed,

[5] People that I spoke to in Laga were unsure if the owner of this company was Hercules Rozario Marcal, who had been associated with state-supported paramilitary groups during the Indonesian period.

and they had no problem with this, as long as it was first subject to an agreement and not taken covertly at night [*tula nonook dadeer nakukun kalan*] (Alcino Ramisa, interview). Manganese had already been extracted in 1974 in the *suco* of Euquisi. Like the Caibada manganese, its extraction had been funded by Japanese investment[6] (Duarte dos Anjos Marques, interview). At an annual meeting, people were resistant to any prospecting unless it involved consultation with them beforehand and agreement about its distribution. As noted above, the area of Vemasse, along with Caibada and Seiçal, contained deposits of manganese. It also contained magnesium. After the exploitation of Laga's salt had stopped, L-7 asked parliament for permission to mine this magnesium. In justifying this, he reiterated the claim that as he had liberated the people, he could also liberate them from poverty, adding that he had a 'responsibility' to 'check the quality of the magnesium so that the government can handle it' (TP, 1 April 2009) Nunira residents' disquiet continued, causing political realignments to be reconsidered. Nunira's representative of UNDERTIM, L-7's political party, resigned in 2009 and pledged allegiance to Xanana Gusmao's political party, CNRT (Atanasio da Costa Pereira, interview). Local support for L-7's party throughout Baucau had ensured that it was among the most popular in the district during parliamentary elections in 2007 (Grainger, 2007). Yet, UNDERTIM had been "obliterated" [*rahun*] in Laga following conflict over the *Fatuk* (Antonio de Castro interview)[7]. There were also

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[6] According to Duarte dos Anjos Marques, a guide to the Japanese that prospected for deposits, the Katuas of Euqisi had to pray [hamulak] and sacrifice sheep and goats before work started in order to guarantee an abundance of the deposits, but more importantly, to guarantee that there would be more in the future. The project was marred by controversy when the 45 workers from the area that extracted the deposits were promised 30 Escudos a day, but paid only 20 by the Portuguese Captain that was entrusted with making the payments. After a month, the workers were given 10 escudos extra directly by the Japanese prospectors. Marques said that 60 tonnes of the manganese was transported to the local posto in SAPT vehicles in order to be used in the construction of a bridge.

[7] Castro, Laga's liurai, said: 'there is still a problem with [L-7's] brothers. They are absent. Perhaps they feel embarrassed [by the conflict]. Recently we heard that they were sad. Perhaps they want to look for a way to come back to the community again [buka fali meius atu besik fali]… we still recognize [L-7's] suffering but these problems have made things worse. He wants to become rich quickly'.

increasingly vocal protests in Laga itself, a place that lacked many basic facilities, reportedly only having been connected to running water in 2004. L-7's residence partly occupied a former primary school, leaving the town lacking in this regard. Some villagers claimed that L-7 had forgotten where he was from, and showed 'arrogance'. His actions were indicative of remoteness[8], they said, that became more than symbolic following his ascent to parliament in Dili in 2005.

At the same time as tensions between leaders of Saelari and Nunira continued, others held different views. Under legislation to support the families of those that died while involved in resistance, Marcal Cardoso da Costa, the son of Martina Pereira who had been killed at the Fatuk Masin in 1980, applied as next of kin to have his mother
recognised as a Martyr, and consequently to receive a survival pension from the RDTL state. At the time that we spoke, he was waiting for the outcome of his application, the 1305th considered by the Secretary of State for Veterans (Marcal Cardoso da Costa interview). In the light of events in 1980, da Costa wanted exploitation of salt at the *Fatuk Masin* to stop altogether. Coming from a different suco in Laga, Sagadati, he had not been involved in Nunira or Saelari's claims.

This section has shown that salt's meaning was practically instituted through work on it during the Indonesian period. In contrast to representations of manganese and salt by colonial administrators and anthropologists, the value of the Fatuk Masin was contested on the basis of the local population's experiences of collecting it across the Portuguese and Indonesian

[8] Dook, or 'far' can mean aloofness as well as physical distance. It is seen as important to remain close to one's kin group and the land that they are connected to, partly because returning regularly to appease ancestors is believed to prevent against sickness or misfortune. For example, families of Falintil guerillas that were in the jungles, sometimes held 'séances' before meals to commune with ancestors, apologizing for the absence of guerillas from these events (Felix Magalhaes interview).

periods. These experiences were fused with local narratives of the salt's origins to form the basis of claims made to it after independence. Such claims highlighted divergent understandings of what quality 'resistance' has, as L-7 and his Saelari kin group, or Nunira, used different understandings to justify claims to the salt (cf. Traube, 2008). Conversely, others made claims that did not connect the salt to ownership of a particular suco or kin group, by applying to the state's pension schemes. On the face of it, as mentioned in chapter four, despite the state's rationalisation of the resistance, it was shown how ex-combatant families used the proceeds of pensions to construct buildings that were affective or performative symbols to the dead. Yet at the same time, there is another dimension to considering how the state is viewed in such circumstances. On the one hand, the state's levying of fines and taxes for life and death through the head tax, taxes on funerary rites, and forced labour, was consistent with the process of expansion of its 'domain' since at least the early 20th century. On the other, for Baucau's most numerous ethno-linguistic group, the Makassae, death represents not a time for the dissolution of ties forged through marital alliance, but for their renewal.

As Forman explains: The death of an individual is celebrated in a series of rituals in which his descent group, acting as intermediaries between its own wife-givers and wifetakers, coordinates exchanges between them and effects significant death 'payments' to the deceased's closest matrilineal kin…The emergence of the descent group at centre stage in the immediate, obligatory, and relatively large mortuary exchanges is an overt statement that the system is supraindividual and that the bonds of unity remain strong. Descent is but the offspring of alliance, expressed in the idiom of exchange (Forman, 1980:153, emphasis added)

It is not impossible to imagine that the state is seen as occupying the same status as the descent group's intermediary status in making death payments. Thus, rather than only usurping traditional rituals through regulating death, the postcolonial state may be interpreted as a locus of power through which 'modern' and 'traditional' forms of sociality intersect. This can also be seen from a visit by Xanana Gusmao to Laga in 2003, when local people appealed to the then president to be connected to clean water, but also to quickly locate and repatriate the remains of David Alex (TP, 29 September 2003) so that appropriate funerary rites could be observed. As noted in chapter one, the state instituted itself as much by honouring the dead as implementing a rational system of its evaluation.

VI. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that state formation in the early 20th century can, on one level, be characterised by attendant processes of monetization and taxation. At another level, these processes themselves show the extent of the state's evaluation of life and death. Rather than demonstrating a direct linear progression between 'bio-power' in colonial and postcolonial contexts, marked divergences between these periods are evident. Partly, this is due to the way in which the postcolonial state has instituted itself through history, which has involved taking charge of the population's claims. Just as rational calculation has been but one element characterising the postcolonial state, so the population has similarly not seen the state according to this characterisation.

More particularly, in order to trace how divergences with postcolonial contexts can be explained I have sought to account for power relations at work in the course of the

colonial state's modest expansion. At the level of objects and symbols, this involved tracing how their meaning changed in different contexts and across time. It has been coherently argued elsewhere that the colonial-indigenous relationship relied on the observance of rites and symbols key to its sustenance (Roque, 2010). I have argued that changes in meaning could also result from the practical engagements of work. In different temporal contexts, meanings changed according to subjects' work on objects that they lived in the midst of. For example, the manganese extraction venture at
Caibada illustrated the monetary value of the manganese, a system of value in the form of contracts (debenture bonds), and ultimately meaning as the value of 'sacrifices' of the lives of local manganese miners to the venture. This account and Almeida's account of salt extraction in 1950s Laga show very different representations of two kinds of objects according to value: one as a commodity; the other as symbol and object in an ethnographic account. This brought to the fore a wide divergence between representation and practice, as well as historical contingency. That practice was more important in forging meaning beyond colonial texts is evident from the meaning ascribed to Laga's salt both in terms of local narratives of its origins, and claims on the basis of work collecting it until 1975, then in very different circumstances during the Indonesian period. Thus, work has had profound bearings on changes in meaning, of which distinctions exist between its representations and practices.

Other accounts have contended that 'monetization' is a central part of state formation. According to Norbert Elias, money made people, industries, and force coalesce around those that gained revenues from its use as a system of exchange (1994[1939]). Others by contrast viewed money as an instrument to create social stability and fixity of populations, much as indigenous redistribution of profits or produce was intended to. As a currency, however,

money, unlike barter, meant and represented something that it was not and thus the meaning of the thing to be exchanged was displaced. This displacement raises other elemental issues about exchange and meaning. For example, to a significant extent, colonial state formation in early 20th century East Timor involved taxation. This saw the meaning of money, with an extrinsic (relative, denominational) value become more widely recognised, if still in limited circulation. As I have argued, tax became associated with money, and usually, as a substitute in money's absence, associated with work. Unsurprisingly, therefore, state formation can be seen as being dependent on the lives and work of the population. On the other hand, the state used similar monetary equivalences to regulate death. The origins of money's use in the levying of compensation for murder was shown to have accompanied the state's expansion, and intended to regulate exchange. Taken at face value, the state could change the meaning of things through imposing a system of exchange by instilling in objects extrinsic values, whether through regulating life or death.

Yet while a systematisation of exchange that stabilised the fundaments of life and death appears to point towards increasing 'rationalisation' of the colonial state, if this was ever the case, a progression to a 'modern biopolitical regime' has not simply eventuated in a postcolonial context. The conferral of awards and pensions on families of the dead disrupts assumptions of a linear process of increasing rationality in two ways. First, after 1999, locals claimed ownership of Laga's salt by invoking historical practices of work, as well as origin narratives. The struggle over resistance and sacrifice (or invocations of suffering, according to other accounts) was therefore as much a part of asserting a truthful version of history at the local level as it was in instituting the state. Second, both the state's regulation of death through both survival pensions and handling the search, exhumation and reburial of the dead

and disappeared, and local views of the state's role in the process, shows considerable overlap. On the one hand, the state evaluates, and makes awards on the basis of martyrdom. On the other (from the perspective of bereaved families, for example) the state appropriately regulates death through compensation and ceremony. These themes related to life and death and their divergent trajectories in colonial and postcolonial periods are further explored in the next chapter.

5. Plantation, house and family: from missionary modernity to postcolonial bio-power?

I. Introduction

The previous chapter showed how evaluations of death were evident in processes of state formation, such as taxing funerary rites, compensation, forced labour and debenture bonds. This chapter identifies and illuminates elements of missionary power, showing how they cultivated various aspects of life, in particular, suggesting that missionaries believed that 'modern' habitats and family were key ways through which populations could be made sedentary and converted. It therefore elaborates on the proposition made in the introduction to the thesis, that emplacement was central to the colonial project. It concludes that the merely partial 'effectiveness' of instilling 'modern' forms of habitat and family can be traced to the nature of these attempts over the course of the 20th century. While this project was limited, the chapter also shows ways in which, latterly, the population has autonomously reproduced modern habitats as symbols of value connected with their affective and performative meanings.

However, interwoven through this configuration is a series of paradoxes relating to the nature of missionary power and complicity and resistance to it. First, although from the early 20th century missionaries purported to 'civilise', and banish 'paganism', they continued to be perceived by populations where they worked as though wielding spiritual powers. Correspondingly, missionaries exploited these powers, seemingly at odds with their avowed objectives of eliminating superstitious belief and practice. In other words, missionary pretensions to spread modernity often contrasted with their

own continued use of established, older strategies of power. Second, missionaries focussed their conversion efforts on forming Christian families. With women as guardians of the family's propriety, so the thinking went, civilised norms situated within modern habitats would take root throughout the Christian population and influence 'heathens' to submit to Christianity. This did not happen on the scale anticipated, but instead, other legacies of this approach are shown - such as the care of children – that continue to inform missionary power in the present. Furthermore, motifs of contemporary politics, such as martyrdom, are legacies of missionary work explored in a case study of an aristocratic family of Christian converts. Lastly, while the 'modern' dimensions of plantation agriculture are explored - enumerating workers, establishing discipline, making profit – it is concluded that their significance lay at least as much in their interplay with a mythologised, idealised and antiquated image of plantations. This saw the promotion, under late colonialism, of agriculture together with the use of technology. As will be explored in chapter five, the promotion of agricultural and technical education was premised and promoted on the basis that they were 'apolitical'. Yet, as will be shown, despite the sponsorship of avowedly apolitical missionaries during the Indonesian period, technology and agriculture could be politically powerful. This is evident in diverse ways. For example, houses built with materials provided by mission schools represented the population's autonomy from the Indonesian state. These arguments are elaborated and shown to have relevance for postcolonial politics. For example, in chapter two, while the state was shown to have instituted itself through establishing a system of value by making awards to ex-combatants, the final section of the chapter shows how value might alternatively be perceived through the symbolic and affective meanings of material objects. This connects the previous explorations of habitats and families with its postcolonial renderings.

The terms used throughout this chapter, particularly emplacement, habitat and family, are used in specific ways, but as will become clear, are neither associated with 'modernity' nor 'tradition'. This is significant because I use emplacement, for example, primarily to describe strategies of settling populations, but this does not correspond to contemporary terms taken from the vocabulary of 'development' such as 'reintegration' or 'relocation', which imply a technical process and is sometimes contrasted with displacement as a result of violence. There are other conceptual difficulties with regarding emplacement as 'modern', because of evidence suggesting that indigenous strategies of countering unpopular colonial or indigenous rule have been traced to the earliest colonial contact with Timor (Hagerdal, 2012). For example, while colonial and missionary attempts to 'emplace' have 'modern' connotations, its converse of fleeing is not. 'Emplacement' is also used differently from the term 'emplaced tradition', used in recent scholarship to describe communities' return to settlements from where they were displaced during the Indonesian period (McWilliam and Traube 2011). Notwithstanding the value of these studies, their explicit identification of the role of tradition in emplacement risks overlooking the agency of missions or the state except when concerned with displacement.

Similarly, the meaning of habitat has been interpreted in a number of ways. Anthropologists of a structuralist bent have seen habitat, and indigenous houses in particular, as generative of their subjects' social lives through which relations among kin are mediated and meaning instilled in relationships (Hicks, 1976; Traube, 1986) For the purpose of this study, a distinction exists between these analyses and habitats promoted by colonial authorities, or (re)produced with such aesthetic similarities in

mind. As such, the performative dimensions of colonial buildings and their associations with colonial knowledge need to be considered. Colonial buildings did not merely house people or materials, but as Stoler has put it, were 'edifices of…stone' and 'monuments to the asserted know-how of colonial rule' (Stoler, 2009:2). Buildings, or other spaces designating territory as belonging to colonial authority such as plantations, were intended to order space, but as argued previously, also to sedentarise the population. Implicit in colonial designs for the built environment in other contexts, for example, were ideas of solidity, contrasted with the supposed fluidity of the tropics (Mrazek, 2001:43). Colonial buildings are viewed less as affecting structures therefore, and more as objects and symbols that were intended to display conformity, resistance, wealth, or some other relative value.

Lastly, family is understood as missionaries understood its form – 'modern' and 'nuclear' – and prioritised the conversion of its members, with women and children first. This allows a focus on how 'modern' families were understood as preferable for reasons of morality, but also as transmission points for colonial influence. It therefore follows other studies with similar perspectives (Taylor, 2009[1983]; Stoler, 2002). Other dynamics, also common to such accounts, such as East Timorese-Portuguese unions in marriage, have been dealt with extensively in other studies (Roque, 2012). Making the broader population receptive to the influence of these families, missionaries believed, was only possible in the context of wider evangelising that primarily targeted women and children, because missionaries experienced problems converting men. Women and children's reputed diligence in maintaining Christian norms within families would, so the thinking had it, make population subject to missionary attentions. Missionaries perceived women especially as conveying modern ways of living to

prospective Christians, more so, so the thinking went, if their exemplars held higher social status. Qualities such as martyrdom and loyalty, part of the colonial-missionary lexicon, often associated with aristocrats like the Corte-Reals, outlived the Portuguese period (Alvarez, 1951). Through prioritising these groups, missionaries intended to ensure a durable basis for Christianity among natives, a strategy still evident on the cusp of decolonisation in 1975 (Sousa, 2003:8), just as it was in the early 1900s, as highlighted below.

II. Missionising families

As the anthropologist Shepard Forman proposed, missionary marriages among East Timor's aristocracy were carried out with the objective of disrupting *barlaki* (Portuguese: *barlaque*) kin alliances, which the government and missions saw as compromising colonial security (Forman 1978:105). A sense of this objective is conveyed from accounts of marriages among the indigenous aristocracy in the late 19th century. Furthermore, marriages were rituals that reified a joint, public display of indigenous-aristocratic and missionary power. Public Christian ceremonies were not only a way of attempting to keep *regulos* in the fold, but performed in front of their people, missionaries thought that *regulo* prestige and authority could be enhanced (Teixeira, 1974: 219).

At the same time, these ceremonies foreshadowed wider evangelisation in the early 20th century among the population at large, resulting in initially gradual but later steadier increases in conversions. Evangelising was intended to cement missionary influence among families. This became obvious when the missionary net was cast wider to take in

non-aristocratic families. There were particular difficulties with converting men, and thus efforts to surmount this were made by first converting children. An account from 1905 attests to efforts to first convert children: 'With a French horn…[the priest] played improvised airs. In a little time, he had been surrounded with children, small and large, in whom the sound of the instrument awoke first amazement, then curiosity and then, surrounding the player, complete hilarity and confidence. When he saw that the audience was already large, he stopped the concert and began the catechism' (Teixeira, 1974: 237; cf. Simbulan 2005:18). This strategy was intended to lead to children being entrusted to the mission, but also as a point of entry for conversion of families evident from an account from Manatuto a few years later:

> It started with one girl who was the first Christian in that area. A short time after, I admitted some four children from the majority of the *povoações*. Then the fathers started to come to our house, and seeing the children dressed by the European and well treated, lost their fear. Later came the mothers: here, led by other women, living closer to us, [they] visited the nuns and, being well received, lost the fear that had appeared in front of the *malai* [foreigner] (BGEDM 1908:193)

The missionising strategy was above all however attuned to women, considered to be the lynchpin of families. Making a case for this in the few years before the Republican revolution in 1910, a missionary source records "a notable difference in that section of the people that have received the beneficial [influence] derived from the schools, especially [those] of the feminine sex" (BGEDM, 1906:234). This strategy was not without detractors, among them the province's governor in the late 1920s, Teofilo Duarte. He believed that missions should concentrate on the rational, measurable results to be had from technical education. Explicitly criticising the missionary focus on cultivating Christian women, he wrote:

> There are numerous girls educated in *internatos*, who after some years of learning and education, leave [and are] suited to make a civilised life. But accompany them for some years and it will be seen that they give in to European lovers, or in the case of those that marry, they regress to a kaffir-like [*caffreal*] state, rather than civilizing their husbands; there are exceptions to be sure, but in general, things happen like this (Duarte, 1928:367).

To some extent this reflected typically but not exclusively Republican preoccupations after 1910, when the missionary role in education was temporarily suspended, only to be reinstated within a few years for want of alternatives. Indeed, missions later welcomed responsibilities that included technical education following the advent of the New State in the 1930s. Authorities and missions promoted the 'correct' internal dynamics of the family, providing the basis for continuing to pursue the strategy of putting women and children at the forefront of conversion, reflected in assorted pieces of legislation[1] (Duarte, 1987:40). The emphasis on these particular dynamics of Christian families may have found more converts, but did not lead to the destruction of *barlaki* in all its various forms (Hicks, 2012: 124-5). This could already be seen in 1927 when missionaries recorded that they carried out 233 weddings, of which the majority were not 'fresh' marriages but "between Christians that lived *barlaqueados*, that is, married in an indigenous way and living a life of perfect heathens" (BEDM, July Aug Sept 1927:391)[2]. As Roque (2012) has posited, differing views on marriage between mission and military in the late 19th century may have impeded missionary objectives. Yet, another aspect of missionary practice remained largely unchanged, with wider evangelisation leading to sovereignty over the family deriving from the care of children.

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[1] A 1926 decree had 'domestic education' as one of its aims understood to mean '…[making] of the indigenous woman a careful housewife [*dona da casa*] and good mother of the family'.

[2] As the same source indicates, other things indicated more evangelising, such as a steep rise in the dispensation of the Eucharist. In 1924, 18,000 were dispensed, in 1925, 59,000 and in 1926, 93,000.

As well as winning influence in families, missionaries attempted to define space and territory. With accounts that emphasise the 'modernity' of missionary action, however, are parallel processes that are potentially problematic for such interpretations. Indigenous beliefs that missionaries could consecrate or damn land and its buildings still existed. Missionaries made use of this power. Accompanying an account of attempts to win converts in Soibada in 1908, for example, a priest wrote that he had been sought out to make land free of danger by destroying 'superstitious places', but also 'undoing sorcery' [*dezfazendo feitiças*] (BGEDM, Jan 1908:194). In another case in Soibada, a disgruntled missionary, Father Ananias, put a curse on recalcitrant locals 'centuries before'. Only in 1933 did the mission superior agree to lift the curse in a ceremony (Alvarez, 1951: 18; Teixeira, 1974: 500-1). These practices of claim-making over space, continuing in parallel with much-heralded attempts to win converts from the early 20th century under the aegis of modernity, were to some extent hollow, however. While missionaries appeased indigenous perceptions of their power, in the longer term this did not lead to the profusion of 'civilised' norms with which missionaries invested their work.

In the thirty years between 1945 and decolonisation in 1975, the colony became gradually subject to more material attention as the regime in Lisbon sought to justify its rule, especially after encountering increasing opposition in Africa. In the 1960s in East Timor, there are indications of the use of long-established varieties of missionary power behind modern technologies of rule. Father Jorge Barros Duarte, then Governor of the Diocese of Dili, recommended the creation of rural schools to the Directorate of Education in Dili and proposed that these be the centrepieces of *aldeamentos* [village settlements] constructed by the state afresh, or as extensions to existing settlements,

which would be built around a school's outskirts. Duarte promoted Church social programmes, including a literacy and house construction programme, directed by Father Apolinario Guterres, a young Timorese priest in the sub-district of Ai-Assa in Bobonaro district. The programme was intended to encourage new houses to be built with 'more hygienic materials', with chiefs leading the way. (Duarte, 1987:113)

When villagers from Oeleu village expressed worry that a school had been built on land that was occupied by spirits [*rai manas*], Guterres assured them that it was 'no longer under the influence of the demon'. Duarte hailed Gutterres' 'rare intuition of the Timorese soul' in attempting to banish superstition and compared him with a 'modernising' Portuguese priest who, centuries before, in Goa, had similarly encouraged the construction of native dwellings close to schools, a hospital, and piped water (Duarte, 1987: 127). Given the time period, furthermore, Duarte's plan has resonances with the counterinsurgency strategy employed in Mozambique[3] (Hall and Young, 1997:26-35). The East Timorese *aldeamentos* did not signal, as far as is known, state and mission attempts to stop anticolonial activities. Yet considerations of security were never distant. In the late 19th century, Ai-Assa was considered a perennially rebellious area. After Governor Forjaz concluded a military campaign in the area in 1891 it was reported that 'the terror that took hold of all that people was so great …that if the Governor would today send a force calling them to obedience, vassalage would immediately be rendered' (Uma Guerra no Destricto de Timor: 46). The Ai-Assa case showed moreover that missionaries could promote putatively modern habitats through demonstrating varieties of pre-20th century missionary power.

[3] Special *aldeamentos* were built to separate Frelimo, or *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* [Mozambique Liberation Front] from its peasant base of support.

Expanding conversion efforts to a broader audience saw missionaries accommodate this paradox, however, and the idea of emplacing the population persisted. A significant, if unexplored origin of these ideas can be found in plantation agriculture in the early 20th century, further examined below. In particular, plantations provided ideal testing grounds for emplacing Christian families, where the reticence of potential converts and the implications for 'security' were not obstacles. Successive governors made this possible, some more vigorously than others, by following a parallel strategy to make the colony profitable. The attempts to produce Christian families in these spaces are suggestive of their importance as a strategy of rule, as explored in the next section.

III. Emplacing Christian families

Plantation agriculture was entwined with the prosecution of wars by the colonial government from the mid-19th century. Military stewardship of plantations was partly a necessity of the state's meagre presence, and partly as a consequence of Governor Afonso de Castro's original plans in the mid-19th century that permitted forcible land clearances and fencing off of cultivation areas, with produce sold to the government at a fixed price (Lains e Silva, 1956:33). Some plantations controlled by Governor Celestino da Silva's plantation company, SAPT, *Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho* [Society of Agriculture, Homeland and Work] were emblematic of military victories, such as that of the sacred land at Talo in 1894 (Davidson, 1994:198), and defeated populations were conscripted to work on da Silva's plantations. Historically, moreover, those accused by indigenous chiefs of criminality could be supplied as indentured labourers on plantations (Hagerdal, 2012), a way for fines levied by the state to be paid (Pinto

Correa, 1934:43). Although plantation agriculture continued to be pursued in spite of its unprofitability (Lains e Silva, 1956), plantations were also significant because they were places where the first steps were taken to assemble information on the population through censuses of the plantation workforce (Lains e Silva, 1956:31-35). Thus Portuguese strategies in East Timor, while clearly operating on a more modest scale, had this much in common with other southeast Asian colonial regimes that used 'increasingly sophisticated administrative means to enumerate populations, including the women and children (whom the ancient rulers had always ignored)' (Anderson, 2006:168)

The interest of missionaries in plantations was not restricted to evangelising. According to one source, they attempted to 'mitigate the worst effects of the forced labour introduced by…da Silva' on the population (Carey, 1999:79). Missionaries also turned their attentions to the cultivation of coffee and other crops, seen as a way to be weaned off dependence on contributions from the China-based missions. Father Joachim Medeiros, Mission Superior, first introduced cacao in the 1870s (Rocha, 1914:4)[4]. His successor introduced Liberia coffee to the plantation at Dare and wrote guides on coffee cultivation in his spare time (Teixeira, 1974:208). Already having affirmed victories by establishing plantations on (sometimes sacred) land, Silva realised the value of missionary patronage and assisted the Jesuits with the construction of the Soibada school in 1899, (opened in 1904). Having established the SAPT company, moreover, he invited the missions to evangelise at its plantations. These close relations between mission and governor provoked the ridicule of da Silva's detractors who suggested that

[4] Pélissier (1996:94) presents circumstantial evidence in claiming that Medeiros' interest in plantations was so great that he may have had the *Regulo* of Lacluta, Dom Custodio Valente Gaio, arrested and deported to Mozambique in order to take over his coffee plantation.

he had employed the missions on plantations to arrange marriages between workers and 'pupils' from an adjoining missionary-run 'asylum' for girls, benefitting both the mission and Celestino, so that '…such weddings and consequent baptisms served to increase the statistics of the missions, demonstrating the progress of Catholicism among the natives' (Correia, 1909:57-59).

Da Silva was also alleged to have forced marriage on pupils that he disliked. Inflected with a scurrilous tone, it was implied furthermore that orphanages served a sinister purpose, with a second, alcoholic Jesuit priest drafted in 'to care for the Micas, Luzias, and Inezes that Celestino guards in his harem [*seralho*].' (Correia, 1909: 57-59) Despite their polemical nature, the claims are partly corroborated by a missionary source:

> …In a very picturesque setting of the extensive plantation there is a house that serves as an asylum for girls, orphans or children of prisoners of war that are sustained there, fed, clothed and educated at the cost of the governor. Ordinarily, those young women, reaching the competent age, are married to employees or workers of the plantation. It is in truth meritorious work, especially as those living in the asylum are made Christians through baptism and education…The Governor is godfather to all of the plantation workers (BGEDM Dec 1905:144).

It is tempting to see these marriages merely as 'acts of salvation' that resonated with older tropes about rescuing the indigenous population (Alexandre, 2000:221). Later descriptions also reinforce the idea that life on SAPT plantations was better than living under the 'yolk of the ferocious regulo' (O dia de Timor, 1934:22). Yet equally, Silva's God-parenthood might be understood in its original formulation, as symbolically establishing kin relations to the exclusion of natural parents (Bossy, 2010:15-16). This points to two implications in the longer term. First, the 'exclusion' of natural parents is

in a sense reflected in practices in the contemporary politics of parents entrusting children to Catholic Church orphanages, due to one or both parents' deaths, but also if they were 'divorced or too poor' (Josepha Marques Boavida, interview). Secondly, retaining children of prisoners of war, or orphans, was a practice that persisted beyond the early 20th century, being a feature of the Indonesian occupation. For example, following the invasion, during the late 1970s, the Indonesian military used 'orphanages' in Dili to lure parents out of hiding from the interior (CAVR, h.:10; van Klinken, 2012). Thus missionary (and later Church) care of East Timorese children during the Indonesian period, whether orphaned or not, saw a profound intensification of this base of missionary power in competition with the Indonesian authorities.

Beyond plantations, however, evangelising the aftermath of wars was not always feasible. An entire village took flight in 1906 because of the violent conduct, for unspecified reasons, of a detachment of local *moradores,* [indigenous colonial military auxiliaries] compromising missionary efforts (BGEDM, July 1906) Fleeing was still regularly practised by the 1930s. A military detachment sent to the Oecusse enclave to try to apprehend rebels involved two decades previously in the Boaventura rebellion, made the rebels - and the entire community - flee to Dutch-controlled Timor (BEDM, October 1933). By the mid-1920s Governor Teofilo Duarte stated his intention to 'group dispersed populations' (Martinho, 1943:94). Plans to construct *aldeamentos* by the mid-1930s seem clearer in the light of these sentiments. House construction and village layout, it was thought, could mitigate the possibility of the spread of infectious diseases. Their location on the periphery of towns made them more costly to construct but ensured, in the thinking of their designer, that they could be subject to surveillance and serve as quarantine zones. Antonio Jacinto Magro, the same engineer that designed

a tuberculosis and infectious disease quarantine facility in Dili, selected the location of *Aldeia* Sapata, newly constructed in 1939 outside Aileu town (Fontoura, 1942:26-27).

In the 1930s, the New State promoted missionary activity as a way to civilise far-flung populations throughout the empire. In a convergence of practice, the missions endorsed the organisation of *aldeias* according to whether they contained Christian or Heathen inhabitants. Missionaries suggested that a government decree for Mozambique and Angola[5] was 'largely adaptable to the conditions of Timor', (BEDM April 1935). 'Christian villages' were planned only to be composed of married couples that had been educated by the missions. Although the plans remained unrealised, they show the seriousness with which missionaries saw new opportunities to determine the ordering of space.

By the 1930s, too, descriptions of SAPT plantations had changed. Workers' huts were arranged as streets or in small clusters of houses. Men and boys of ten years of age went to the factory where they were distributed to various tasks 'according to aptitude and work in progress' (O dia de Timor, 1934:21), while women collected rations from silos for the family. References to the children of prisoners of war and orphans who worked on the plantation appeared only once, their care demonstrated not through Christian marriage, but through the special workers assigned to 'cook and distribute food to them' (O dia de Timor, 1934: 21). References to the monopoly of Catholic missionaries on marriage were absent[6].

[5] Entitled 'the Basis for a New Social-economic organisation of the Population having the aim of fixation and development'.

[6] A 'long-established arrangement' of supplying contract workers from Suai, Viqueque and Vemasse (O dia de Timor, 1934:22), where the *regulos* were said to have instructed their subjects to seek work further afield, may have originated with the sale of slaves from those areas.

These laudatory accounts of modern plantation regimes, written by an unknown author, have to be reconciled with three things. First, they were probably attempts to counter claims that slavery was widely practised throughout the Portuguese empire. Second, moreover, they promoted and justified the place of the plantation within colonial imagery. Thus, allied with aspirations to modernity were mythologised images of antiquity. European planters personified the ideals of hard work and courage and willingness to tame the jungle in order to establish plantations, and possessed of fortitude that protected them against the 'sensuousness and perversions' of the tropics that led the majority of their less strong-willed compatriots towards a 'parasitic and debauched' existence (Braga, 1936; cf.Comaroff and Comaroff, 1997: 121). In other words, similar to Silva, these men were conceived of as fathers of plantations, except that Silva presided over the reproduction of a brood of Christian converts.

Third, as already noted, plantation regimes represented modernity as well as an agrarian idyll. As an aspect of modernity, technology was particularly appealing in the colonial view because, it was conceived of as apolitical, even depoliticising. The fertile plains of the South Coast were seen as places where, for example, colonial mavericks successfully evaded wrongful persecution by the state by establishing plantations (Gomes Silva, 1889: 15)[7]. Following the formation of political parties in 1974, the South Coast was similarly seen as a place 'beyond' politics. On a trip there in his capacity as Director of Agriculture and Forestry, Mario Carrascalao contrasted the area

[7] Gomes-Silva recounted the story of Raimundo Nonati, treasurer of the Customs House who was said to have fled Dili after bookkeeping anomalies had been discovered, without faith that his innocence would be proven. Welcomed by a community in Betano, so the story had it, he established a successful coffee plantation and waited several years before accumulating enough to pay off the missing monies, endowing the state with something that reputedly it was not due. Offered his job back, he chose instead to 'taste exile' again, but this time in Portugal.

with a meeting of supporters of Xavier do Amaral that he had passed through in the highland area of Maubisse en route to the south coast. On the south coast, 'agricultural machinery, ploughed fields, production units, production surpluses, crop disease, the pestilence of rats, drought, etc.' was more likely to be discussed than politics (2005:82). This faith in technology can also be seen from the promotion of technical and agricultural education in the last decades of Portuguese rule. The question of how modernity and technology related to missionary work and politics are considered in the next two sections, by further elaborating on themes of the Christian family and emplacement.

IV. The constituents of example: habitat and lineage

Missionary accounts like 'the Martyr Princess' presented the cultural competences of aristocratic East Timorese families to infer an appropriate - though never total – reproduction of a 'Christian habitus'. Key in this regard were examples given to prospective Christians among the population at large through the comportment, appearance and vocations of its members, and the environments in which they lived, mediated by missionaries. The backdrop to the creation of these competencies was a historical alignment with the colonial cause. The *regulo* of the southern *reino* [chieftainship] of Suro, Na'i Sesso, fought on the Portuguese side during the Boaventura rebellion (Marques Soares, 2003:109). His loyalty was rewarded when his son was sent for further education in Portugal. Suro, later known by the name of its capital, Ainaro, became a 'full' *circumscrição civil* [civil district] in 1934 during a territorial reorganisation absorbing parts of the *reinos* of Manufahi and Bobonaro. While a Portuguese administrator sat in the district capital, the family's distinctive

ceremonial authority was mobilised.

Na'i Sesso started attending church in the late 1920s, and was able to be baptised in 1931, when in common with earlier missionary-engineered unions of the *regulos* of Turiscai and Liquica, he was persuaded to renounce all but one wife. He was thereafter known by the name of Dom Aleixo Corte-Real. Father Eusebio Arnaíz Alvarez's account of his time ministering to the Corte-Real family in the 1920s, mainly records the life of Virginia, Dom Aleixo Corte-Real's daughter-in-law. Given that the family died during the Japanese occupation, it is intended as a eulogy, and taken as a whole, is probably a case for Virginia's beatification[8]. The memoir served to make the story of the family's lives available to a Portuguese-speaking readership, and to crystallise a history of loyalty beginning in 1912. Published in 1951, the year of a tour to the colonies of the statue of Our Lady of Fatima, it shored up a cult first recognised by the Catholic church in 1930, and at a time when 're-evangelisation' in Portugal was stalling (Castro Leal, 1998:832; Birmingham, 2002). During the period between 1912-43, the Corte-Real family is shown being transformed from loyal heathens, to Catholics, and finally to martyrs, accompanied and reflected in developments of appearance, bearing and habitat.

The government or missions employed all Dom Aleixo Corte-Real's three sons. Two began working in the civil administration in Ainaro as chief of post and secretary, while the other, Alexandre, worked as a catechist[9]. Alexandre married Virginia, the daughter of the neighbouring *regulo* of Samoro, also a Portuguese ally. The marriage was

[8] As far as I can ascertain, this was not realised.
[9] Alexandre eventually acted as a permanent interpreter for his father who could not speak Portuguese.

encouraged by priests, who discouraged marriage to Luís, the son of the *regulo* of another loyal *reino*, Manatuto, who was believed, with dubious logic, to have become a 'heathen'[10] after his return to Timor from Lisbon. Virginia by contrast reportedly had unshakeable faith, European social manners, a perfect understanding of Portuguese, all acquired at the Soibada school in her father's *reino* of Samoro (Alvarez, 1951:75). Redolent of colonial racism, her 'whiteness' was described as 'contrast[ing] singularly with the black colour of the indigenous' (Alvarez, 1951:25-6). Alvarez later recalled however, that while whiteness was a 'stamp of the nobility', in contrast to the disdain that fair-skinned *mestiças* showed darker-skinned students at the Samoro school, Virginia did not display this haughtiness.

Added to Virginia's manners and blood, and Aleixo Corte-Real's daily attendance of mass, other important demonstrations of living were expressed through habitat. Dom Aleixo's modern house generated superiority among his subordinates. It is instructive to contrast the following description with that of the residence of 'heathens' such as those in Nari (chapter six), where traditional houses were potentially vulnerable to theft and arson (Rodrigues, 1962:172). Dom Aleixo's house was

> … of modern construction, with a veranda around it, raised a metre and a half above the soil. Surrounded by orchards and fruit trees, with piped water, [the house] was almost a match for the best colonial residences. Through [the house], the vassals measure the power of the *regulo*. Outside the palace proper, were kitchens, dependencies, and the residences of workers… (Alvarez, 1951:66)

During a period in which Alexandre was employed as a catechist, the couple took up

[10] Since a priest made this observation at the beginning of a journey from Marseille to Singapore (and thus on the return journey to Timor) it is possible that Luís lost his faith as the result of his life experiences in Lisbon.

residence in a house in Balibo. Like the house in Ainaro, it was constructed along 'colonial architectural lines', with '…the kitchen separated from…where they lived, and the school just in front. [The school room] is ample, which on the occasion of a missionary visit, is transformed into a chapel' (Alvarez, 1951:67). In both Balibo and Ainaro, as well as in Virginia's own family's house in Samoro, the internal ordering of dwellings was marked by separation. Individualising functions associated with the space of the domestic environment – eating, worshipping and sleeping – gave the house internal order, maintained decency, and ensured that the kitchen remained separate from the main house, also a feature of some contemporary Timorese houses. It can be inferred from encouragements to live separately that this was intended to counter the 'utmost promiscuity' (O dia de Timor, 12) of close cohabitation, even though anthropologists later showed Timorese houses' meaning and order [*atoran*] (Cunningham, 1964:46-57).

If the internal order of houses was thought to be key in affecting mentalities, so too was this reflected in the exterior built environment. Marking the period following Dom Aleixo's conversion, Ainaro was described as having taken on a different appearance, with the *regulo* energised to change the environment of Ainaro town, with coffee plantations cultivated, a clinic built and streets constructed that stretched into the mountains. Priests noted a 'markedly Christian influence' in Ainaro town (Teixeira 1974:511). Echoing missionary interest in building new houses in Ai-Assa with durable materials, Dom Aleixo was reported to have been "the major assistance in transforming the old *povoação* [village] from huts into a delightful town, with houses of always white brick, an unforgettable beauty spot surrounded by the highest mountains in Timor…" (O Lusitano, 1990).

Dom Aleixo was thought to have influenced the appearance of the town following a visit to Portugal in 1934. Indeed, so transformative was this event thought to have been, that almost 80 years after, some Ainaro residents believed he converted to Christianity in Portugal (interview, 5 May 2010). At a time when Christianity was being made a thematic centrepiece of colonialism, the visit also appeared to demonstrate the limits of how far Christian subjects could be regarded as anything except indigenous, as Dom Aleixo and other East Timorese were subject to bodily examinations by anthropologists at the colonial exhibition in Porto who made use of theories of race and physical anthropology (Mendes Correia, 1943:66).

The story of the Corte-Reals is concluded by their demise, depicted as martyrdom, at the hands of Japanese soldiers and indigenous collaborators in 1943. The meaning of appearance in Alvarez's account foretold this development. As a theme of postcolonial politics it can consequently be traced to configurations of loyalty found in faith, comportment and habitat. The following section considers how martyrdom provided a means for the postcolonial state to assign value to ex-combatants (chapter two). First consideration is given, however, to how the missionary promotion of habitats during the Indonesian period mediated relations with local communities where they were based.

V. Missionary power in colonial and postcolonial perspective: Technology, territory and resistance

This section considers how claim making over space and family can be further explored

by considering the work of the Salesian religious order. At issue is how relations between the Salesians and the local community can be understood in the context of late-colonial Portuguese education, then the transition to the resistance politics of the Indonesian period. Two forms of power - distributive and disciplinary – are compared as a way to understand missionary-indigenous relations and political transition. Along with aspects of the 'modern' family already discussed, this section suggests a previously unexplored way through which missionary power may be understood to have endured in the postcolonial period.

The Salesians first took over an experimental agricultural school in Dare in 1924, originally opened by Father Joachim de Medeiros in the late 19th century. They transformed the school into the Colegio de Santo Antonio (Teixeira, 1974:95) in the late 1920s. Following these first engagements in East Timor, after the Second World War, the order moved from Dare and Dili to the eastern districts in an area otherwise regarded as previously having been 'outside religion' (Pélissier, 1996:27). The Salesian order is distinctive because its presence in Baucau and Lautem districts is underscored by a practical and rational ethos. This is at one level reflected in the Salesian origins in the area, a response to a colonial demand for technical schooling. It was also motivated by the Salesian belief that their presence in communities helped prevent sinful acts (Rui Gomes, interview). On another level, it has been derived from intensive interactions with the local community born of conditions associated with war. A fourth significant element of this interaction is the order's association with the armed resistance, particularly that of the Fatumaca school.

Opened in 1968, the Dom Bosco Technical College at Fatumaca was supported through a government dispensation of land, as was the Fuiloro school in the 1950s (*BOCT*, May 1953:352). Both schools attained varying degrees of self-sufficiency, with Government civil servants proudly declaring that Fuiloro was the only mission school entirely capable of supporting itself (BEDM, Feb 1975:168)[11]. The Fatumaca school became renowned for the resilience of its Italian priest founder, Father Eligio Locateli, who progressively pioneered technology on the site – wells, piped water, tractors and a mobile health clinic. With the Indonesian invasion at the end of 1975, the Salesian reputation for resilience was further enhanced. In keeping with earlier forms of missionary power through the care of children, the order retrieved orphaned children from forests in the surrounding areas in the 1980s (Eligio Locateli, interview, 9 March 2009). A mythology has built up around Salesian actions during the Indonesian period, and Locateli's charisma - for example relayed by locals through stories of his magic invincibility in the face of Indonesian maltreatment – is a feature of local relations with the order (interview, Vemasse). On the part of Salesians, they have accounted for their origins at Fatumaca by referring to children whose path towards conversion started with being shown a miraculous image of the Virgin Mary (*nain feto*) (Timor Post, 28 May 2009).

Locateli's actions during the Indonesian period have been acknowledged by the East Timorese state, a reflection of the esteem in which he is held among former members of the armed resistance. Fatumaca served as an unofficial staging post where guerrillas recuperated and the current head of the armed forces (F-FDTL), Lere Anan Timor, described in 2009 how he 'learnt war with the Salesians' (Timor Post, 28 May, 2009).

[11] This self-sufficiency later allowed the Indonesian military to use Fuiloro as a concentration camp (Mattoso, 2005:62).

Those that would later lead the resistance movement, including two of its 'troika' of leaders in the 1990s, Konis Santana and Sabalae, educated at Fuiloro, were able to access other educational opportunities in Dili as a result of their formative experiences with the order (Mattoso, 2005:41-2). The Salesians were embedded in both the wider milieu of late-Portuguese colonial institutions into which a small elite fed, and local communities where they were based.

As well as caring for children and the infirm, and educating the local population, the Salesian order produced technologies of value to ex-combatants and the local community, for example providing materials to Falintil soldiers after their release from imprisonment with which to construct houses (Albino da Silva Surea interview)[12]. Indeed, it has taken a keen interest in the built environment. Local residents at Fatumaca cultivated the school's fields of corn and rice using mechanized equipment, and sourced piped water (Collino, 1996:159-160; 167).

The order's interest in the built environment is also evident from a brick factory at the Fatumaca school in the Indonesian era. This was intended to teach bricklaying, but also had the effect of ensuring the reproduction of a particular built form. The bricks were characteristically large and white and became popular with local people who worked at the mission to the extent that they often acquired them as part of their payment for use on the construction of their own houses (Collino, 1996:160-161). The bricks both altered the physical landscape around the school and symbolised rectitude and propriety. Their value was can be seen in that they were an alternative method of

[12] The ex-Falintil guerilla Surea ('Sacoco') said, 'when I was released, I had nothing, no things, and no money at all. Locateli gave me materials and helped me build this house'.

payment, but they also signalled a degree of autonomy from the Indonesian state. Further exploration of the kind of power at work in these relations between mission and population can illuminate how much autonomy was involved. On one hand, as indicated, power can be seen through construction of houses through the mission's bricks. The population was indebted to the mission. Technical and agricultural education were seen as means of bringing about technological advance and material productiveness. On the other hand, in these mission-population relations, another process involving 'disciplinary power' can be seen (Foucault, 1991 [1977]:224) whereby the school's workshops were used as a means to cultivate its subjects, seen not only through what they produced, but also how they were made productive. The form of power at work was therefore not only distributed in the form of bricks through which its producers would be indebted; but also through the school's regime that cultivated its subjects. This form of power is to some extent of a piece with claims made of plantation regimes in the 1930s that reputedly made workers' lives better than living under 'ferocious' *regulos*: each involved a degree of autonomy in exchange for being subject to formation and moulded into productiveness.

The endurance of habitats forged by missionaries must therefore be explored in more ways than one[13]. This includes contentions that have arisen in the Salesian order's dealings with communities that have sometimes involved habitat. After independence, the local community at Fuiloro began to complain that the size of the area of land on which the mission was based had increased, compared with before 1975. The details of this are complicated, so that the local community had not felt 'brave enough' to broach

[13] The cases may not warrant a direct comparison, but it is worth at least considering Levi-Strauss's observations of the work of the Salesians in other contexts (Levi-Strauss 1976:286) 'Salesian missionaries were quick to realise that the surest way of converting the Bororo [in Brazil] was to make them abandon their village in favour of one with the houses set out in parallel rows'.

the issue during the Indonesian period because some felt indebted to the order. The grandson of one of the *liurais* that 'gave' land in the 1950s was dismayed, above all, that both the local community and the Salesians had reached an impasse with neither side prepared to negotiate (Arlindo Dias Sanches interview[14]). In Fatumaca, despite generally good relations with the local community, after independence, the order wanted to extend piped water across neighbouring villages, but was rebuffed by one family. Father Locateli used this example to convey his perception that some locals were using independence and the contemporary language of rights to make claims that were not for the 'common good' (Eligio Locateli interview).

Beyond the Salesians, the Catholic Church has also been involved in land disputes of a different order. Father Duarte's protégé in Ai-Assa in the 1960s, Father Apolinario Guterres, now Vicar General of Dili Diocese, is alleged to have ordered two families off their land in the Balide area to make way for a new Catholic University, UNICA, and during Holy Week 2013, is also alleged to have sent unknown individuals to destroy a border wall between this land and the University building. When two local priests relayed their concerns to the Diocese, they were reportedly called 'subversive', and one was sacked and transferred (TS, 17 May 2013). Thus tensions exist both in religious orders and the East Timorese Church's relations with the population on one hand, and an 'improving' orientation implicit not only in the idea of modernity but in missionary work in general on the other. Claiming space through buildings or technology and the disputes these have given rise to, also illuminate the broader issue of the state's codification in law of land questions, something delayed until recently because of complicated legacies of successive colonial periods.

[14] I was unable to establish if the interviewee was the grandson of the 'Rei of Nari' (chapter five).

While resolving land questions has been delayed, the state has given more attention to awarding the population for resistance against Indonesia. Following the widespread displacement of the population after the Indonesian withdrawal in 1999, for example, aid agencies' primary objective was to emplace the population. Such schemes were intended to ensure the population's prompt acquiescence, including those that had most recently been armed. The 'Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program' (FRAP), for example, established by the World Bank, was intended to reintegrate 1300 guerrillas back into civilian life while the creation of a new military employed 600 remaining Falintil troops. From a broader perspective, and after independence in 2002, a series of small houses were built for ex-combatants of the resistance movement, with corrugated-iron roofs, flimsy wooden front doors streaked with creosote, and uniformly painted a white colour. Neither large enough to accommodate a nuclear, much less extended family, nor numerous enough to accommodate all ex-combatants, the houses accordingly remained largely derelict. Kammen (2009:391) has suggested that in the Indonesian period, the resistance movement made promises to construct 'white houses' as an inducement to potential conscripts, situating this promise within a general scheme of postcolonial modernity to be pursued after independence. Pictured below in Ainaro, an example of such houses may well represent symbolic fulfilment of a *quid pro quo*.

Figure 5. **Ex-combatants' house. Author's photo, May 2010.**

It can also be noted that uniform habitat has represented aspirations to emplace and enumerate subjects that have appeared in other colonial and postcolonial contexts. Hence, in post-1975 Mozambique, a 'villagisation' programme carried out by Frelimo, involved the construction of standardised houses in quadrants, intended to 'render rural Mozambican society more legible and, thus, more amenable to state intervention' (West, 2005:176). Improving missionary and governmental projects have persisted in East Timor, moreover, with bases established in the colonial period until 1999 being used as springboards for such projects. This can sometimes involve 'rescue' of the population, seen where effects of the state's authority are diffuse or disappear, as, for example, during the 2006 political crisis when Catholic Church personnel oversaw several camps for tens of thousands of displaced people. The Canossian-run clinic in Ainaro for example, serves as a base from where the Church plays an active role in a programme with the Ministry of Health known as Sisca, where 'remote' villagers have ailments and diseases treated during regular visits. The visits also provide an opportunity to dispense advice to people in villages about correct ways of living, including encouraging people to create partitions in their houses. As a nun at the clinic reported, 'housing reflects people's mentality. People that live in one room do not think scientifically' (interview, 5th May 2010)[15].

As argued in chapter two, the state has also attempted to formulate, as the wording of legislation suggests, a 'quality of resistance'. It has materialised postcolonial hierarchies by using the resistance as a touchstone of contemporary politics: medals, Combatant ID cards, diplomas of honour, and burial in special cemeteries with presidential approval

[15] This view is not universally shared within the Church. For example, Baucau Diocese's mobile clinic is accompanied by a former Falintil nurse and practitioner of East Timorese medicine (cf. Tomasz, 1969) who conducts one-month long training sessions in the same each year and treats both chronic and less serious illnesses (Apolinario Sarmento interview).

show this (Decree laws 2006/3:22;29). In 2009, revised legislation was passed that sought once again to account for participants in the resistance against Indonesia, broadening considerably the definition beyond the original armed resistance. This had been done with a view to providing Combatants with financial support for their resistance. The new law supported previous legislation that decreed that participants would receive more money based on the amount of time they had been involved in resistance organisations, although it was at the state's discretion to effectively waive qualifications for meeting criteria to be recognised as a Combatant (Osorio Florindo interview).

A category of Martyrs exists within this legislation, whose names, as those of Combatants, have become capitalised. This category included the families of those that had died while involved in resistance, who were awarded a special 'survival pension' (*sobrevivência*). If the pension was conceived as a form of compensation for the deaths of ex-combatants, it may be viewed in one way as a surrogate of pursuing reparations from Indonesia, which has been repeatedly stalled by the state and its institutions[16]. Into the category of beneficiaries of the pension falls a family whose house was under construction in Ainaro town, adjacent to the derelict veteran houses. The family's father and brother had been killed in the first months after the Indonesian invasion, and the eldest son, a civil servant in Dili, intended that the proceeds of a survival pension would memorialise their lives, funded by revenues from the state petroleum fund (Lefolino Magno interview). The family's house partly reflects the idea that money for martyrdom can be made material, but implicitly too, illustrates hierarchies, signified through the relative grandeur of a colonial-style house made of stone from the local river.

[16] For a closer analysis of this issue, see http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Reparations/10ReparIndex.htm. Accessed 14 November 2013.

Distinguishing these hierarchies is significant, because it shows that mere ‘recognition’ for participation in the resistance movement is not all that is at stake when houses are constructed, and habitat formed that is, however distantly, associated with the colonial period. By conferring value the state affirms a version of history with which it is instituted. At the same time, the reproduction of colonial-vernacularized house styles also shows their residents’ affective imaginings, whether as monuments to the dead, or as recent work has suggested, the absent living, especially the increasing number of overseas East Timorese whose remittances fund their construction (McWilliam, 2012). State evaluations have therefore allowed a performance of a ‘quality of resistance’, and a relative place within a system of value. Such forms mark contemporary landscapes of the postcolonial state, in which semi-autonomy may be signified by state conferral and the meanings of objects constructed with its proceeds.

Figure 6. **A house being built from the proceeds of a survival pension. Author's photo, May 2010.**

VI. Conclusion

This chapter has elaborated on emplacement as an aspect of missionary power. This emplacement was a precondition for more evangelising, which revolved around converting women whose Christian influence would spread through their families. This strategy could also be seen through the portrayal of loyal indigenous aristocratic families as leading exemplary lives to which heathens could aspire. On the face of it, these bio-political strategies had a limited immediate influence. However, they brought into view themes such as martyrdom that subsequently became important in the context of sociality and politics in the ensuing decades. Strategies of emplacement also show that children were considered to be important receptors of missionary influence. The intertwining of emplacement with evangelisation attests to the continuing importance of women and children as an element of missionary power in the present.

Beyond this, as suggested in the introduction, this chapter has explored power in a relational and qualitative sense, suggesting that categories of modernity and tradition often present problems for understanding power within these frames. For example, one source of the power of missionaries was contingent on their ability to use a spiritual power to consecrate or damn land, sometimes as a means to prepare it for 'modern' usage. The Corte-Reals could channel ceremonial authority as authentic 'heathens' when required to be subordinate to 'modern' and secular colonial authority. As objects of scientific enquiry in Portugal they were East Timorese, yet as exemplary modern subjects in East Timor their house 'almost competed with' Portuguese residences, as if emblematic of relations with client vassals. Furthermore, plantations could be 'modern'

insofar as they shaped subjects, created profit and pioneered techniques of government, or mythologised and suggestive of the hardiness and overtly masculine qualities of Portuguese settlers when required. These paradoxes suggest that rather than identify the points at which modernity and tradition are unable to explain power configurations, what is required – and what has been shown - is how power reflexively operates to produce these categories and then continues to operate through them.

As such, an exploration of agricultural and technical education has revealed both the colonial belief in its effectiveness in averting rebellion, and also its quality of inducing change in its subjects through schooling. The application of technology to land rendered subjects productive but not political. Yet the Indonesian period appeared to produce a peculiar inversion of this logic as missionary educators were avowedly apolitical yet produced devoutly loyal guerrilla leaders. Part of this can be explained in that the Salesians were in effect by no means apolitical, if by political what is meant is the provision of moral and logistical support to an anticolonial movement. On the other hand, however, this perspective overlooks subtle, quotidian, even prosaic movements of power at work in the midst of more noticeable events. A technical education formed productive subjects, evidence of which could be seen in changes in the habitat surrounding the mission. It is as much the dynamics of this missionary formation of subjects as well as indebtedness from exchange that shows a pattern of the population's semi-autonomy from conditions of both oppression under military rule and proximity to missionary influence. Similarly semi-autonomous power configurations can be seen at work, I have argued, in the postcolonial period, as the conferral of pensions may be elaborated as memorials or symbols of status.

6. Reifying difference: education

‘Timorese who at meals, cut meat with a knife, started to cut it with a spoon, and those who drank coffee substituted it for tea served in a glass and not in a cup or mug as previously.’

Mario Carrascalao, Antes do Futuro

‘Through the table and play, people know us better’

Antonio de Conceicao, interview

‘Clothes are powerful things’.

George Orwell, Down and Out in Paris and London

I. Introduction – Habits and norms

This chapter proposes that the inculcation of norms and habits by missionaries has informed indigenous elite agency and contemporary politics. This form of bio-power is a key element of what I have called ‘missionary power’, together with sedentarized converts, explored in the previous chapter. This chapter shows how comportment and appearance were central to missionary power by examining a Jesuit missionary school, the *Externato de São José* in Dili, where the language of instruction was Portuguese, and crucially, which remained in operation during the Indonesian period. It is shown how the school cultivated an elite ‘habitus’, and in the process maintained and built on

already strong ties between missionaries and elites. In existing accounts, the school had been seen as significant because of its associations with the resistance movement and its operation outside the jurisdiction of the Indonesian authorities under Dili Diocese (Pinto and Jardine, 1999). The overall picture, as suggested, is more complicated. On one level, practices of 'good comportment' were underpinned by discourses of cultural distinctiveness from Indonesians and of commonality with Portuguese, yet the student body also remained aware, and sometimes resistant to overtones of 'old colonialism' in such practices. On another level, the school was the subject of controversy within Dili Diocese, with many of its personnel disagreeing with its continued existence as much as the Indonesian authorities did.

This point underscores the chapter's second argument relating to the embeddedness of missionary power in colonial power. I argue that elements of this relationship can still be seen in the postcolonial period, as the Church protested against its lack of participation in government. The dynamics of this in the recent past are explored by examining demonstrations organised by Dili and Baucau Dioceses against the proposed removal of religious education from the state school curriculum in 2005. Thus far, these demonstrations have been interpreted in three ways. One view has it that the demonstrations changed church and state relations and preceded the events of 2006-8. In this view, the demonstrators were dismayed not only with the Church's relatively 'subordinate' role to the state, but also held deep antipathies to personalities within the government. A second interpretation argues that while the demonstrations prefigured fractious events of the following year, demonstration leaders' speeches suggested that Church grievances stemmed from the past, not the present *per se*, in particular, that Church believed it had not been adequately recognised by state for its role in the

Indonesian period. A third position sees the demonstrations' significance in terms of its elite agents, asserting that some did not, contrary to what had been claimed, 'take advantage' of the shifting power configurations of the period to undermine the government in the following year.

I suggest that while the demonstrations were the harbingers of events of 2006-8, they did not decisively determine their trajectory. More importantly, the historical position of missionary work as deeply implicated in colonial power relations rather suggests that the Church's own invocations of its 'uniform' – the priest robes – should be examined by tracing their performative and symbolic significance. In common with military fatigues (chapter two), priest robes were both intended to be evocative of resistance against Indonesia, but were also part of a longstanding formation of power derived from the Portuguese colonial period. This analysis therefore shows that an alliance existed not only between priests and colonial authorities, but also between indigenous chiefs (*liurais*) and missionaries. Indeed, the durability of this relationship points towards constraints on the introduction of 'modern bio-power'. In short, missionaries relied on *liurais* and despite avowed aims to the contrary, could not expect 'tradition' to be supplanted in the name of modern civilised practices. Thus, a wider diffusion of norms of appearance among the population, signifying both elite formation in missionary hands, and latterly, power involved in resistance against Indonesia, must be mediated by these considerations.

The analysis begins with a history of comportment in mission schools and its association with 'scholarly' and 'religious and moral' education, before showing instances where norms associated with missionary education could later be seen among

the armed resistance. The context of late-colonial missionary education also explains conditions for the continuation of the *Externato* during the Indonesian period. A comparison of other colonial contexts indicates how gestures served to index changes in power relations over time, while noting the limits of a too-schematic analysis along these lines. The same section also situates an analysis of comportment among other analyses. The following section focuses on events of the year 2005, during which disagreements between the *Externato* founders and Dili Diocese came to a head over the Diocese' ending of co-educational arrangements at the school. This event coincided with Church demonstrations of the same year. A brief description of the demonstrations is followed by a historical analysis suggesting the significance of appearance as well as comportment, rounded off with examples of how wider dissemination and inculcation of norms of appearance accompanied more Christian conversion between the mid-20th century and the Indonesian period.

II. The relationship of 'comportment' to power and resistance

The significance of comportment to the resistance movement derives from the structures of education and missionary authority in this field in the late Portuguese period. A brief outline of these two factors helps explain its later appropriation to represent elite East Timorese cultural distinctiveness from Indonesia. Until 1911, Missionaries had been responsible for all education of the sons and daughters of *liurais*. Under these limited arrangements, missionary education consisted of 'scholarly' education. After the Boaventura rebellion in 1912, the newly installed Republican authorities became concerned that scholarly education was 'dangerous', because of its alleged potential to create educated indigenous opposition to colonial government. Alongside attempts to

make East Timor profitable, especially through coffee cultivation schemes, the Republican authorities expressed preferences for 'agricultural education' (Pimenta de Castro, 1944:202; 193n.1).

Missionaries also had strong views about their educational role. In 1924, the Mission Superior, José da Costa Nunes cited the British-educated elite in India whose 'literary courses' had created 'great difficulties' for the colonial government, warning against similar outcomes in East Timor:

> That [graduates of mission schools] have no jobs and judge themselves to be humiliated in doing manual labour, is itself to see the results [of their education]: the formation of a class of useless beings [*entes inuteis*] and possibly, damaging in the future…To prepare the *indígena* for literary careers without creating for him conditions to make a living produces grievances in him that he will later transform into an instrument of combat… I want an instruction above all professional, which educates to turn over the land, to transform produce, to explore natural wealth, which always finds an honest occupation and makes a living by the sweat of the brow. (BEDM Oct-Nov 1924:xxv)

The debate, still being had 10 years later, was not only about the functional outcomes of education. East Timorese students of missions schools should not receive either an 'excessive' literary education, nor should missionaries aspire to make the children of the indigenous aristocracy like their European counterparts (*fidalgos*):

> The mission does not pretend to make the simple Timorese 'fidalgised' [*afidalgada*]. It is an error to instil luxury habits and grandness in these *indígenas*, destined, almost entirely, to pass their lives in bamboo and palapa huts. We create in them habits of hygiene, we teach them to look after their health, and defend them from 1000 sicknesses that attack them - this is a duty of the missions, side by side with the duty to instruct them and form the heart.

(BEDM, Dec 1934:492)[1]

Education was therefore as much a delicate exercise in cultural calibration as instruction. Too much literary education and 'fidalgising' risked creating educated rebels[2]. From the late-1920s, Governor Teofilo Duarte created '*Reino* schools', which were independent of missionary control, some of which, like the later Salesian establishments, had their own 'farms' [*granjas*] (Grade, 1973: 220). In 1941, the *Estatuto missionario* (Missionary Statute), a piece of legislation signed between the Vatican and the New State regime, gave Catholic missions responsibility for educating colonial populations, although while the missions were given more resources and 'protected', and the first Diocese in the territory created in 1940, the structure of education in East Timor remained essentially the same (Pimenta de Castro, 203). Yet residual worries about the 'dangers' of a 'scholarly' education did not abate, and following the Portuguese reoccupation in 1945, Governor Oscar Ruas, inaugurated a two-tier primary education system. In the first tier, the state was responsible for two day schools (*externatos*) in Dili, for the education of European, mestizo and 'civilised' (*civilizado*) Timorese children (Felgas, 1956: 377-387) and another in Liquica (Grade, 1973:221). These institutions, schooling only 60 students in the early 1950s, privileged those educated in Dili. It also reflected the aims of educating an 'assimilated' (*assimilado*) class of elites who held a 'respectable' profession, spoke Portuguese proficiently, and otherwise displayed behaviour deemed to be 'civilised'. Missionaries educated by far the majority of students in 28 rural boarding schools (*internatos*), where

[1] This commentary accompanies the report of a government health inspector who visited the Soibada school (Servico de República, Delegação de Saúde da Zona de Leste. Viqueque, 8 Junho 1934. Nota N.51).

[2] A similar argument was used by the British colonial authorities in Malaya. Roff thinks that this was driven by the Malay realisation that only in education lay opportunities to compete in Malaya's plural society. Yet "at the same time, or so the British argument ran, they could not be increased too much or peasant society would be disrupted" (Roff, 1995:138)

the curriculum consisted of agriculture education for male students and ‘domestic arrangements’ for female students (Grade, 1973:221).

Missionaries thereafter continued to teach in *externatos*, with their work directed by the Diocese of Dili created in 1940. In urban areas in the 1960s, missions had responsibility for teaching at the primary level and ‘moral education’ in state schools, while training catechists in a special training college in Dare in the hills to Dili’s south, and running a primary school called the *Externato* of Lahane based in Dili. In 1970, the state approved Church teaching at ‘pre-secondary’ level, for which it opened the *Externato de São José*, that took students that were ‘too old or for other reasons’ had not been admitted to secondary schools (Costa). Thus, a division of responsibilities between church and state developed before 1975 based on space (boarding or day schools in rural or urban settings) in some cases mirroring a curricular division (technical/agricultural or scholarly) that was prefigured by an earlier debate informed by fears of rebellion. With the Portuguese departure in 1975 and the Indonesian invasion shortly thereafter, some missionaries schooled a small number of existing elites at the *Externato de São José* in which they integrated a mainly ‘scholarly’ curriculum. The section below examines this school as a case study. However, first consideration is given to the reception of moral education among resistance leaders.

According to José Mattoso, historian of the resistance movement, the idea of ‘good behaviour’ was taken up by one of its leaders, Konis Santana, who had been educated in a missionary school in the late Portuguese period. The term ‘moral’ education, as noted above, had become associated with missionary education, particularly so in state schools in Dili. It was long considered to have been a key part of a student’s ‘formation’

(a term with a wider meaning and different connotations to the English word 'education'), which was intrinsic to the aim of producing 'civilised' subjects. 'Good behaviour' (*bom comportamento*) was considered to have been part of an education that included a 'moral' and religious component. This form of education was given to students in missionary schools that fought in the East Timorese resistance after 1975, as noted. However, less explored are claims that 'good behaviour' was viewed as distinguishing elite East Timorese from Indonesians or other East Timorese. According to Mattoso, Konis Santana's education by Salesian missionaries allowed him to communicate with the outside world while he led the resistance movement internally:

> Although he was not [at the Salesian school] for more than 3-4 years, he was marked by this humanist education, learning "*boa maneiras*" [good manners] and the rules of courtesy which many years later, permitted him to send letters to the Bishop, to the president of the Republic of Portugal, and to the Secretary General of the UN. *The conviction that civility was an integral part of "civilisation" brought him to write a detailed text about courtesy and about the discipline that the guerrillas had to observe*, *despite having to live a life deprived of everything* (Mattoso, 2005:41, emphasis added).

Besides these observations, Mattoso went on to propose that 'civility' differentiated East Timorese from Javanese who, so an exaggerated stereotype had it, 'ate with their hands, defecated in public and made tea with foot-wash' (Mattoso, 2005:41). Evidently, some guerrilla leaders' formative experiences with missionaries created convictions that personal conduct was important. While this passage could also be seen as a Portuguese historian's attempt to make figures of the resistance more comprehensible to a readership unfamiliar with East Timor, '*boas maneiras*' were later reproduced on the initiative of East Timorese elites, after the departure of the Portuguese authorities in

1975[3]. Indicated in one of the epigraphs at the outset of this chapter, Mario Carrascalao's regret at the passing of an old colonial (Portuguese) order in the Indonesian period was signified in changes in 'civilised' eating habits. Carrascalao and other elites viewed these customs as part of the elite habitus, which, as argued below, was constructed and reproduced as part of resistance to Indonesian rule.

i. The *Externato de São José*: 'The last outpost of Portuguese language and culture'

The reopening of the *Externato de São José* after the Indonesian invasion in early 1976 continued a pattern of missionary tutelage of the Timorese elite. All other schools were abandoned as the population fled to the territory's interior. Despite damage to its buildings from Indonesian bombings and the earlier civil war, the *Externato's* directors persisted, relocating to nearby buildings owned by the Church. They continued to hold 'informal activities' for young people such as sports and choral singing, even in the month after the invasion (Costa). The school was restarted by four Jesuits, two East Timorese priests, da Cunha and Costa, and two Portuguese, Felgueiras and Martins, who started teaching classes in 1978, a period when, in the interior, the population was being subjected to aerial bombings, internment in concentration camps or summary execution. The school continued to operate after the establishment of the Indonesian state school system in the 1980s. By 1983, the Indonesian authorities had made it clear

[3] By the mid-1990s, the armed resistance movement depended more than ever on the support of East Timor's population to prosecute its struggle. These sentiments were reflected in 'Guidelines' issued in 1996 by the secretary of region 3, Riak Leman. Aside from confirming a continuing strategy of violence, countering Indonesian propaganda, and identifying and punishing spies among the population, Leman devoted the last part of the instructions to a section on 'behaviour' of which he wrote "…All guerrillas and leaders must show the utmost respect in their general dealings with the People …Guerrillas and members must set a good example by their own behaviour, speech and attitude towards our People, because we are sons of the People and are part of that same People. WE MUST, therefore, be absolutely correct in all our behaviour!" http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1997/05/07/0101.html (downloaded 16 August 2013)

that the *Externato* could no longer operate because of its Portuguese curriculum, the Portuguese language and because it was staffed entirely by the Catholic Church's personnel and associated volunteers. The school's directors avoided capitulating to these demands immediately, and were at the same time allowed exemptions from the infamous military operation *pagar betis* into which most adult males were conscripted (Pinto and Jardine, 83)[4].

The Indonesian authorities suspected that the school harboured anti-Indonesian sentiments and pressured staff to accept a curriculum in Indonesian. By the mid-1980s, the school accepted some of these demands, so that teaching in Indonesian was introduced, although priests continued to teach in Portuguese in secret. Subjects involving the teaching of 'patriotic' versions of Indonesian history, and the state ideology, Pancasila, were put on the curriculum. Morning Indonesian flag-saluting ceremonies were introduced towards the end of the 1980s, and in 1989 a pro-regime Indonesian Jesuit priest, Father Marcus Wanandi, was installed as the school's principal. In November 1991, the Santa Cruz massacre precipitated a crackdown by Indonesian authorities on the resistance movement. This included targeting perceived centres of resistance activity of which the Externato was one: within 18 months the school was closed.

During its existence, *Externato* students had become renowned for being active in the clandestine resistance movement. Messages were brought from the school to the armed resistance. The school provided a place where students could express their sentiments

[4] Pinto and Jardine wrote that 'the school was not well respected, [but] it still had some influence and successfully petitioned the military authorities for exemption for all students' (Pinto and Jardine: 83).

through group discussions or other ways. Students' theatrical performances, for example, had storylines from East Timor's pre-colonial past in which imagined confrontations were recreated between East Timor's *povu* and *liurais* (Pinto interview, 31 August 2009), as well as containing political allegory suited to the circumstances of the Indonesian occupation. Constancio Pinto, both student then teacher at the school, recalled a play that fitted this description in which he played a prisoner (Pinto and Jardine, 1997:83). Student paintings depicted torture and disappearances (Dias interview, 8 August 2009). The school premises were used after hours to organise resistance activity, passed off as recreation among students.

The school's continued existence for 16 years has been explained by reference to the politics of the Indonesian state's accommodations with the Catholic Church. Pancasila required all Indonesian citizens to believe in one of five state-approved religions of which Christianity was one. The state nevertheless continued to bestow patronage in the form of material support and privileges in the field of education on the Church. One source claimed that by the late 1980s the Church had 'complete authority in the school system and considerably expanded its educational activities' although this assessment must be considered against the background of the author's positive view of Indonesian occupation (Rocha, 1988:171). The school was also the training centre in Dili for seminarians, all of whom were taught in Portuguese (Felgueiras and Martins, 2006:122). As long as this policy continued, so the argument went, Timorese priests and nuns would receive a Portuguese language education maintaining a tradition beyond the control of both Indonesian Catholic Church and state. This created a schism between priests within the diocese that favoured integration, with some wanting the *Externato* abolished, and those in favour of its continued existence, so that it became 'the most

important problem of the life of the diocese in Timor' (Felgueiras and Martins, 2006:87). Unnamed members of Dili diocese tried to have Felgueiras and Martins retired in 1985, then wrote to Felgueiras when he was in Portugal the following year barring him from re-entry on grounds that 'Portuguese was not spoken anymore and [Felgueiras] was an obstacle to relations between the clergy and the Bishop' (Felgueiras and Martins, 2006:123)[5].

Evidently, the closure of the school was partly stalled for institutional reasons: it was a matter for the Diocese, where some priests argued that it had 'created divisions'. The school also survived because it was conceived of as representing the inner core of the old (pre-1975) education system, being described by its Jesuit sponsors as 'the last stronghold [*reduto*] of Portuguese education and culture in East Timor' (Felgueiras and Martins, 2006: 89). After the *Externato*'s closure, the Portuguese language reappeared as one of the school's Portuguese Jesuit directors, Felgueiras and other volunteers began to teach it in Dili in classes intended for the young, which had 3,000 enrolees. In Felgueiras' account, the re-emergence of Portuguese was a 'seed…[that] waited in the hearts of people, children and the young, for the moment to germinate' (Felgueiras, 2001:48-49). This rather lyrical description can be contrasted with the material objects of textbooks used to teach a pre-1975 curriculum to students. The latter disintegrated when buried to avoid seizure by the Indonesian authorities. Language could be immaterially instituted in the body, which also appealed to parents of students that saw an *Externato* education as an 'investment for the future' (Angelina Sarmento interview). According to the East Timorese Jesuit, Leão Costa, the school was as oversubscribed as

[5] Father Jose Antonio, Bishop Belo's deputy, then Vicar General after independence was East Timor's Minister of Education during the Indonesian era. When asked if the church became an instrument of the state he replied: "[the state] also gave money for books like the New Testament that were distributed to communities for free. And also hymn books in Indonesian…we can't judge [whether the Indonesian state used the Church] because they never said that, did they?" Interview June 2007.

the Portuguese courses that followed it, ‘perhaps from the just cause that defended gallantry and national heroism’ (Costa). The school was evidently seen as a way to maintain ‘Portuguese language and culture’. A key element of this culture was ‘civility’ and ‘courtesy’ that made elite East Timorese distinctive.

ii. Della Casa in the tropics: civility through practice?

Colonial-indigenous relations in East Timor in the 20th century involved gestures such as greetings by *liurais* towards colonial officials. According to one source, these had begun to change by the 1930s. In Baucau, for example, when the indigenous population greeted *liurais* they had previously used a ‘handkerchief kiss’, but this had all but died out in the eastern districts and was only in limited use in the west. However, it was still used exclusively for interactions with Europeans (Pinto Correia, 1934:46). The population continued to ‘put the left hand to the side of the head’ or remove their ‘conical Javanese-style hats’ when greeting *liurais*, but when greeting Europeans - priests, the governor, the military commander - they kissed their hand (1934:272). These greetings also varied by region so that in Aileu and Liquica (‘the most servile populations’) indigenous chiefs greeted the governor on their knees (1934:274). No less than in East Timor, in other colonies, gestures indexed relations, and were subject to diffusion more widely. Denys Lombard has noted of Java in the same period that the handshake became common in cities, while in rural areas touching the ends of fingers and placing a hand on the heart was maintained as a greeting (1990:132). The seating position in villages – cross-legged on matting – differed from urban areas where tables and chairs could be found, although 'the ritual of the table was not as rigid as in the West; one ate quickly without waiting and without speaking to neighbours’ (1990:132).

Yet at the beginning of the 20th century, all Javanese people had to squat in front of colonial officials (see note seven) and in such settings only Europeans and Javanese of a high rank could use chairs. In both contexts, customs involving comportment differed among indigenous populations, or when greeting colonial officials.

Gestures cannot serve as a schematic means of gauging colonial-indigenous and intra-indigenous relations, and there is a risk in making a too-stringent association between gestures in rural or urban areas. It seems especially important to recall this of East Timor where differences between the urban and rural may have been less easily materialised than, for instance, in Java. Nevertheless, when changes in customs take place over time, they reveal important aspects of their meaning in a wider constellation of power relations. As seen above, the colonial authorities strategized differentiation through the education system and aspired to do so through the urban environment. Moreover, 'formation', as a key element of the education system, was a key way through which a distinction between mission-educated students and others was structured. One of the key elements of formation was 'moral education', involving the diffusion of 'civility' and 'courtesy'.

Although this was seen as an important part of missionary education in general, the Jesuits were most associated with a combination of scholarly and moral education. In 1722, the Portuguese crown put two orders in charge of Macau and Timor, the Jesuits and the *Padres da Cruz dos Milagres*, effectively ending the monopoly of the Dominicans 'who could not provide the island with sufficient numbers of missionaries' (Morais, 1934:41). Throughout the remainder of the 18th century, the Church and Crown clashed over issues such as the departure of the Dominicans (1720s), the

procedure on installing a new governor (1765), and the decision to move the capital from Lifau (presently Oecusse) to Dili, (1769) (Morais, 1934:112-116). There appeared to be broad agreement on one matter after the departure of the Dominicans however: in 1738 the Jesuits and *Padres da Cruz dos Milagres* opened the first missionary school, marking the beginnings of Jesuit responsibility for education[6].

The Jesuits association with both 'moral' and 'literary' education has long been evident. The Florentine, Giovanni Della Casa published 'Galateo', shortly before the founding of the Jesuits in 1558, which instructed its readers on norms of civility and courtesy such as table manners and one's bearing in the company of others. More than any other religious order, the Jesuits used Della Casa's Galateo as a 'textbook of behaviour' (Bossy, 2010:120). The significance of these behaviours can be seen far beyond their texts, however. Norbert Elias thought that they accompanied state formation in Western Europe. For Elias this was a deeply complicated process, the salient aspects of which were that monetization in place of barter, and taxes, provided levies to feudal lords in the pre-medieval period, who with these resources were able to accumulate enough martial force over a territory. Over the course of several centuries, this reversed the centrifugal motion of power away from lords whose vassals were not bound to loyalty through oaths (Elias, 1994:276). Instead, power in the form of money, people and goods, was drawn towards these elites. This surplus of labour included that of the upper classes, and small armies and industries emerged from the courts of feudal lords (319). It was only after the ranks of these small court-societies had been swelled later that differentiation on the basis of comportment took place. The courtesies (*courtoisies*) of

[6] The Jesuit responsibility for education reached a high-water mark more than two centuries later, when they were put in charge of the *seminário menor* in 1958 after it had been moved from Soibada to Dare in the hills above Dili (Grade, 1973:239). Until 1964, the majority of Jesuit priests were from Taiwan, the Philippines, and Spain because East Timor fell under the Jesuit's Eastern province administered from Manila. In 1964, a 'large contingent of Portuguese Jesuits' arrived (Araújo, 2012:62).

courts later changed as one feudal lord came to predominate in a given territory, or state, among feudal monarchies, coming to be regarded as the King. This paved the way for a wider dissemination of 'courtesies' in the form of 'civilities'. Elias qualifies this point by emphasising that power did not only exclusively diffuse from top downwards, but worked dynamically through a subject's self-regulation and restraint. Manners were one manifestation of this, which, coming to operate at an unconscious level, were enacted by subjects in the knowledge that a centralized state had a monopoly on force, therefore discouraging arbitrary behaviour (450-1).

Bourdieu has a similar view of these dynamics of formation, but does not attribute them co-temporally to state formation. Bourdieu employed the concept of the *habitus*, to explain that the body 'remembered' past experiences, with gestures and bearing reproduced from previous historical periods and reinforced through practice:

> The *habitus*, a product of history…ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism, in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms (1990:54).

The primacy of reproduction through practice rather than the observance of formal rules is evident in the above, thus distinguishing Bourdieu's view from Elias's, whereby there was an interplay between the will of the subject and unconscious assimilation of court, then state-defined limits of acceptable public conduct. Yet Bourdieu's account also contains a Marxian division of perception, thought and action, indicating that the bodily assimilation and reproduction of manners may not only take place at an unconscious ('pre-reflexive') level.

It is suggested below that both Elias and Bourdieu's views are applicable. In other words, it is possible to see that the uptake of certain behaviours was a result of a didactic process of classroom learning but also practical institution through assimilation and association. In the *Externato*, a diffusion of manners by way of religious and moral formation were delivered in the classroom but also elsewhere. Especially, the environment of the school instilled differentiation between its students who regarded themselves as resistant to the influence of the environment forged by the Indonesian authorities in Dili (chapter seven).

Thus, moral and religious formation had come within the remit of the clergy in the late-Portuguese period, while instruction in other subjects had passed into the hands of 'secular' teachers. Especially important in the teaching of the first generation of *Externato* students, courtesy [*courtesia*] classes were also referred to as 'civility and politeness' [*civilidade e urbanidade*]. These classes involved simulating a range of social situations in order to prepare students for these occasions. Including such formalities as maintaining correct posture, manner of address and seating position in the company of 'important people', conventions differed according to whether an interlocutor was 'a priest, a *liurai*, a diplomat, or others' (Jose Amorim Dias, interview, 9 August 2009). The correct way to welcome people into a house was conveyed by instructions on opening doors, welcoming guests, knowing how to manage eating utensils, how to cut bread, and what to eat with food. Instruction was dispensed for less formal occasions, too; if students were at the beach, they were shown how they should behave if they were playing football; men shown, if walking 'with a lady' what their 'attitude' should be (Jose Amorim Dias interview, cf. Elias, 1994:333). Students were sometimes aware of the practices' origins in the colonial period:

> How to pick up our spoons, give plates to others, we used Portuguese culture for everything, because those teaching [*formadores*] were usually *padres*. We used the culture that they received [*hetan*] during their formation…so in this period they transferred all that back to us (Tome Xavier Jeromino interview).

Social etiquette was used by students among themselves to counter Indonesian assertions that Timorese were incapable of self-governing. As Pinto remarked, "we wanted to show them that we were not backward like they said" (Constancio Pinto interview). One set of practices was pitted against another. Students used a fork, knife and spoon when eating, and were accordingly "shocked when we saw Indonesians eating with their hands" (Constancio Pinto interview). This was elaborated by way of rumour so that a story of an Indonesian dining at Hotel Turismo who didn't know how to use a fork and spoon quickly circulated among students. Other more common distinctions were practised daily in the school. Students did not crouch (*hakruuk*) – a Javanese custom[7] - when either excusing oneself from a social gathering or walking between or in front of other people, assumed to be part of social etiquette practised in the presence of Indonesian migrants in public.

In the distinctions contained within these practices however, ambivalence emerged; students experienced similar taught practices in Indonesia, where they found Indonesian priests dispensing advice about courtesy*:*

> Some Indonesian priests said that [courtesy and civility] were international values, but that we shouldn't forget Javanese [values]…so that if we did a task,

[7] This practice is known in Indonesian as *Jalan Jongkok* (lit. 'squat walk'). It was and is usually evident in studied displays of deference in Java. Sutherland remarks about Java that 'the *priyayi* [Javanese upper class] emphasised that specific forms of behaviour, manner, language and dress were appropriate to particular social situations, and that it was imperative the forms used reflect the social ranks of those involved'. See Sutherland (1979:36)

> we could adapt to Indonesia's culture so that they would accept us (Jeronimo interview).

While students found variations on such practices in unexpected places, in other instances, to the dismay of others, the didactic nature of instruction was replete with overtones of colonialism. One recalled that while with the *Escuteiros*, the Catholic 'scouts' founded by Fathers da Cunha and Costa,

> Father Ricardo [*da Silva*] told us when we ate together to eat in a certain way. He said that we should 'eat like Portuguese, use a knife and fork, sit correctly, and eat more quietly.' That put me off participating, although some friends continued to be very involved in it (dos Santos interview).

However, norms of comportment required not merely the reproduction of 'Portuguese' behaviour. While missionary education of an urban elite was intended to cultivate norms that distinguished students as civilised, paradoxically missionaries also attempted to instil in students 'simplicity' associated with the districts. The Externato's reconstruction in Balide in the 1970s and early 1980s by the hands of its students, volunteers and the local community, their cleaning of its grounds, their engagement in 'rustic pursuits' such as keeping birds and growing trees in school grounds to prevent soil erosion, meant that they could not be confused with 'modern youth of Dili of advanced means' (Sousa, 2003:7). The East Timorese priest Dominggos Sousa explained that in pre-1975 East Timor, these youth were referred to as *Ba'i No*:

> …a word in Tetum that is a bit pejorative. It is said to be a person, usually a youth with some education, who likes to dress well and rejects physical work, for example farming…through shame [they] think that this kind of work is for people of a low social category (Sousa, 2003:7).

Indicating the significance of appearing modestly, Externato students were different in appearance by being dressed informally while state schools had uniforms (Felgueiras and Martins interview; Branco interview, dates)[8]. Other Dili elites were also called forth to differentiate *Externato* students. According to Father Costa, *Externato* students were 'non-conformists, and not merely the pitiful and disillusioned that had been led astray, as they called the elite of those devoted to the integration of [East Timor] into the 'great' nation of Indonesia…' (Costa).

On the face of it, two things account for the persistence of the *Externato* for so long during the Indonesian occupation. Didactically and practically, the school cultivated a *habitus* in students. Institutionally, the school's autonomy was maintained through being governed under Dili Diocese. Seen in a longer-term perspective, the practical and institutional are so connected as to be inseparable. For example, the view above that Indonesians were culturally different was for some underpinned by the view of East Timorese culture having a commonality with Portuguese culture. As Father Dominggos Soares (Father 'Maubere'), a priest closely associated with the resistance movement, expressed it after independence:

> The reason to 'bring people to resist', to not like Indonesia, we can say that this was primarily because of a political reason [*pauses*]…Or primarily a cultural reason. The contact between Timor and Portugal produced a culture that was much higher than Indonesia's. I think that the European culture is more open. Secondly, religion: the majority of Indonesians are Muslims. And in Timor, the Catholic religion entered people's hearts [*tama sira nia fuan*], in that it was centred on love, and put people into meeting together with God [so that] love can enter them… Islam puts people in the position of fearing each other, people are scared of God, thinking that God threatens (Dominggos Soares interview).

[8] Branco recalled he and fellow students being laughed at by young children who called out: 'look at the Portuguese school's clothes!'

If the idea of a superior 'hybrid' culture was set in stone in the minds of Church elites (cf. Silva 2012), as a legacy of the Portuguese educational system, the position of the school was more ambivalent. Partly this was related to language. According to Taur Matan Ruak, former leader of Falintil, F-FDTL and after 2012, President, Portuguese was used to 'oppose the Malay [Indonesian] language in the ambit of cultural struggle' (Carrascalao, 2012:350), but at the same time, after East Timor's independence, he opposed it as a hindrance to the justice system. His sentiments were not unique, as many of the population also disagreed with having Portuguese as an administrative language. Thus, when the *Externato* was reopened in 2004, it carried with it a similar double-edged legacy. As the current principal indicated, its alumni had assumed positions in government and other influential professions:

> *Externato* students made a contribution to independence; those in the government, not all, but many were students at the *Externato*…A Minister, a Secretary of State, President of the Republic, [we tell current students that] with the interest and the will, they can [become these people]. We say, in the past, your *maun boot* [big brother] who was here is now a minister. You can be the director of this school or you can be a teacher here (Fatima de Conceicao interview).

Yet the school also carried with it the burden of language. Although Portuguese was advantageous in gaining employment with the government and elsewhere, the school was trumped in resources, popularity, and exam performance by Dili's new lusophone school, *Colégio de São Pedro*, attended by children of East Timorese and foreign elites. Thus, while some thought that use of Portuguese was an indication of a higher, hybrid culture during foreign occupation, and despite the adoption of Portuguese after independence, its legacy was mixed.

Another part of the school's institutional legacy had implications for relations between Church and state. In the Indonesian period, cooperation between Dili's seminary and the *Externato* allowed trainee priests to attend classes at the latter, alongside its male and female students. Dili Diocese suddenly ended this arrangement without consultation with any of the school's Jesuit founders in 2005. In the same year, the Diocese demonstrated, ostensibly against the removal of religious education from the state school curriculum. The Jesuits were the only religious order not to participate in the demonstrations, which they considered a political matter and outside the Church's remit[9]. As David Hicks (2011) has noted, the 2005 demonstrations led to an alteration in relations between Church and state in which the church amassed many thousands of supporters in Dili. As I argue in the next section, there was indeed a significant alteration in the Church's relations with the state as a result of the demonstrations. However, to understand what the demonstrations foretold for the events of 2006-8, they should be seen in historical perspective. For example, the church invoked missionary power that had been historically allied and symbolically inseparable from the power of East Timor's *liurais*. Conceptually, missionary power is implicit in relations between *liurais* and priests. This is reflected in both the strong bonds between priests and the children of elites at the *Externato* on the one hand, and on the other hand, the idea of a superior culture forged through this colonial-indigenous interaction seen in Father Maubere's remarks above. Secondly, missionary power and colonial authority were in practice seldom separated. This theme is described in the Church's approach to its relations with the state seen during and after demonstrations against the government below.

[9] I have been unable to establish if the Diocese's decision to halt co-educational arrangements in the teaching of seminarians was revenge for the Jesuit refusal to participate in demonstrations.

III. The 2005 Demonstrations and their meaning

> The Church is not preoccupied with recognition from the state. What is important is that the state recognises the Church's right to its work. [the state] must not coordinate everything…it must recognise the Church as an institution with rights, and that the Church has obligations to the state. What the Church already knows is that *the Church and state are not two things*. The state is an institution and the Church is also an institution that serves the reality of humankind. The Church and state must not fight. They cannot be separated [*haketak*] nor only come together to compete with each other over work [*labele kahur para hadau malu servisu*]… But if the state can't give recognition to the Church, I personally don't really understand this, because [the Church and state] are the same. They both serve the people. For example, in a family, the mother and father both look after their children. It should not just be that father is stronger than mother or that mother is stronger than father (Dominggos Soares interview).

The Church-led demonstration in 2005 provide a way to understand how the Church viewed its relations with the state as indicated from Father Soares' remarks above. These events point a way towards a more in-depth historical exploration of missionary power, and its key symbolic and practical bases, elaborated from the previous section. The schooling of elites was not only a formalisation of missionary relations with elite families, but intrinsic to it, and in that relationship the family was key (Hagerdal, 2012). The family was a key basis of missionary relations with indigenous elites. Although references to 'Christianized royalty' only appeared in the first half of the 18th century (Hagerdal, 2012:31;317), the Portuguese strategy of converting rulers' sons and daughters had been operative since the 16th century. Indeed, familial metaphors, as seen from Father Maubere's remarks above, point not only towards the nature of relations between Church and state after independence but also the inseparability of *liurais* and missionaries. Second, understanding the relationship between missionaries and indigenous elites requires understanding the part that knowledge played between them. Again, and as shown in the following sections, this was not only formalised through the

'transmission' of knowledge to the children of *liurais* in the formal settings of classrooms. A negotiation of knowledge took place as priests catalogued indigenous customs[10], and served as intermediaries with colonial authorities. Third, the relationship is symbolically represented through dress. Just as uniforms became an important symbol of the resistance for the postcolonial military, F-FDTL, so priests' uniforms were similarly important[11].

The Church's April-May 2005 protests were prompted by a decision taken by the Fretilin government in November 2004 to 'remove the teaching of catholic doctrine' from state schools. The decision was accompanied by a series of other regulations, including giving parents and school staff responsibility for teaching religious education at no extra cost to the state, and in a way that did not 'prejudice' mandatory subjects (Hicks, 2011:121). Implemented initially in a pilot scheme beginning in January 2005, it was seen by East Timor's two Bishops, Ricardo da Silva and Basilio Nascimento, as a removal of the Church's prime method of maintaining influence among the population. Their response, to draft a pastoral note condemning the policy, became a lightning rod for opposition political parties that invoked the Church's role in the nation's development. The moment also served as an opportunity for the Church to leverage other issues that would lend weight to its calls to have the government's plan revoked. For example, shortly after their issue of the pastoral note, the two Bishops produced a broadside against the failure by the government to pursue justice against the authors of crimes associated with the Indonesian period. Their strongly-worded calls were timed to

[10] As priests had catalogued indigenous medicine in the 18th century, so they continued on this trajectory by publishing dictionaries of indigenous languages (Tetum and Galoli) and ethnographic accounts in the 19th and 20th century.

[11] During the Indonesian period, a well-known priest that had been active in the Portuguese period, Father Carlos da Rota Matabean Pereira, preached against use of the Indonesian language and expressed a dislike of *batik* [Indonesian fabric] (Antonio Moniz Male, interview).

coincide with the publication of a report by a UN-appointed panel, the Commission of Experts, that solicited opinions from members of the East Timorese public, politicians, and 'civil society' including the Church (Hicks, 2011:123). This call for justice was then assimilated into the vocabulary of priests that led crowds during the demonstrations, when protestors were encouraged to chant "justice, justice and truth". Priests from Dili Diocese also incited protestors to "fight against the Alkatiri regime".

At issue, then, was both the subject of demonstrations, and more broadly relations between Church and state. As Hicks notes of the former, neither priests' public addresses to crowds, nor crowds' banners broached the issue of the educational curriculum. Indeed, they were more likely to address 'justice', which became a byword for the resignation of the Fretilin Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, one of the key aims of the protests (Hicks, 2011:126). Partly, Alkatiri's brusqueness had hardly endeared him to the Church. Partly, too, however, those leading the demonstrations had personalised their attacks against Alkatiri and his faith of Islam. Also at issue was the question of the Church's relations with the state. One of the most interesting responses of opposition parties that aligned with the Church was to accuse the government of trying to separate religion from the state, although East Timor does not have a state religion. The view of their inseparability can be compared Father Maubere's familial view of Church and state.

Despite Father Maubere and other priests' rhetoric, the two Bishops appeared to soften their stance at the beginning of May by ruling out the demand that Alkatiri's resignation was a requirement for their negotiation with the government (Hicks, 129). An agreement, brokered in early May by then president Xanana Gusmao, essentially

signalled an end to the policy of removing religious education from the curriculum (Hicks, 2011:131) and at the same time appeared to commit the government to ban abortion except where a mother's life was threatened in the new draft penal code, and to introduce new measures to fight prostitution and child exploitation. Therefore, as the demonstrations dissipated, the intensity of grievances against the government and the person of Alkatiri subsided, and the focus on policy as a way out of the impasse became more prominent.

The demonstrations have been interpreted in three ways. In a detailed analysis, Hicks saw the protest as a 'defining moment' in postcolonial church-state relations, underscored by a confrontation between sacred and secular spheres. The demonstration was powerful for symbolic reasons, being an unprecedented performance of the Church's ability to mobilise crowds to the capital on a large scale, as well as asserting its stance on 'political' issues. Silva posits that the protests showed that the Church was attempting to shame the government into recognising it by invoking its struggle during the resistance period. Using the theme of reciprocity, Father Maubere's accusation that the government was a 'bad payer' alluded both to the halting of funds to the Church in the months before the protest, but moreover denied the Church's historical 'importance in the achievement of independence' (Silva, 2010:117). Both scholars interrogate the protests' implications for the 'crisis' during the course of the year that followed it. The eventual unseating of the government – the avowed aim from demonstration leaders' pronouncements and shown on their placards – was realised when Alkatiri resigned in July 2006. The demonstrations therefore unavoidably foretold the hardening of opposition to the government. By contrast, Nixon (2011) analyses the protests' significance to the events of 2006 by referring to its agents. Xanana Gusmao's defence

of the government against the Church in the demonstration's later stages 'proved' that he had not been involved in attempting to unseat the government in 2006. This followed accusations that some Church leaders had allegedly entertained the possibility that, under the circumstances, the government could be overthrown by soliciting the military's assistance[12]. Even while such an eventuality did not come to pass, its discussion indicates the strength of opposition that lay behind the demonstrations, manifested over the course of the following year.

Besides indicating a shift in state-church relations and foretelling opposition to the government, as indicated, the demonstrations showed a struggle over the past. Father Soares made explicit connections between past and present by explaining Fretilin's 'sabotage' of a national unity government led by CNRT (without any opposition parties) after independence:

> While other parties began to move forward, Fretilin told their people not to go with CNRT. Fretilin has had in its structure since 1975 the idea to bring all the people to independence, so all the people followed it. That Fretilin could be Marxist-Leninist was not thought about, [the people] didn't think about that. But in the jungle [in the 1970s] they began to open their eyes to see that Fretilin were communists, and then in 2000, they didn't admit to being a communist party. They said to the people 'we are struggling. We are winning. We will bring the nation forward'…So the people's desire was for national unity and the CNRT congress aimed to achieve this, but Fretilin sabotaged this, and now they are paying for what they did to the people, they have encountered a heavy burden (Dominggos Soares interview).

Thus, as outlined in chapter two, at stake was forging an 'authentic' version of history, by revealing its 'truths'. Establishing this authenticity can also be seen from symbols

[12] For example, Taur Matan Ruak was approached by one of the demonstration's organisers, Father Apolinario Guterres (chapter four), who arranged a meeting between Taur and two unnamed 'political' figures, of which Taur claimed to have had no advanced warning. These figures reportedly wanted Taur's support to topple the Alkatiri government (Carrascalao, 2012:376-7)

used by the Church during the demonstrations. For example, in a pamphlet published by Dili Diocese to coincide with the protests, the Diocesan priest, Father Dominggos Sequeira, wrote a wide-ranging tract condemning the government. One passage dwells at length on the Church's role during the Indonesian period. As is obvious from its opening lines, it is a response to Alkatiri's charge that the Bishop's pastoral note showed the Church to be acting as if it was a political party (Hicks, 2011:125). It is worth quoting at length principally because of its detailed record of priests' dealings with the armed resistance, as well as its repeated invocation of the priest's 'uniform', the robe, as a motif of resistance:

> [the government says] 'Priests cannot do politics, it's better that they take off [*kolu*] their robes [*batina*],' and that 'they have only recently become involved in politics'…in the resistance time *padres* also wore robes to confront the political situation, as follows: Father Dominggos "Maubere", as everyone knows, wore white robes together with the leaders and the clandestine youth, organised, coordinated and carried out activities with many political demonstrations in Dili, made contact with the people and the resistance in the jungle, received a mandate from the supreme leader Xanana Gusmao to establish an organiser's commission in Lisbon (Nov 1987), to [have] a general meeting of the political parties in the diaspora, in Peniche, Portugal (31/1/1998); Father Mario Belo wore robes to transport Xanana in his car from Tibar to Ermera, (April 1986) and bought guns to give to the resistance in the jungle; Father Sancho wore robes to transport Xanana from Dili to Ossu and hid him in his residence (Sep 1991); Father Rafael dos Santos wore robes when receiving a very important document from Xanana in Same, in order to give to Pope John Paul II, through Monsignor Marini, during his visit to Timor-Leste (Oct 1989); with robes, Julio Crispim bravely transported guns from Baucau to Ermera (1996), it was only because of his robes that the Indonesian military didn't stop Julio Crispim who, with selfless bravery [*aten-brani*] held a meeting, drank and ate, went to the fields to harvest with Lu-Olo, Falur, Eli Foho Rai, Riak Leman, Sabika, in his residence in the *Paroquia* [Parish] of Soibada, (1997-1998); Father Jovito, wearing robes hid Taur Matan Ruak in the *Seminario Maior* in June 1998; with *batina matebian* [death robes] Father Jovito hid Taur in the *Paroquia* of Manatuto (1998-1999), with robes Father Jovito and Father Luis Bonaparte brought Sumucho to Ermera-Dili-Baucau, bringing him back to Ermera; wearing robes Father Locatelli (Italy), Father Joao de Deus (Portugal), Andres Hane (Indonesia), Father Andre Hama (Indonesia), brought things to the jungle, food, clothes, medicine, for the people and the resistance forces (1976-1999)…with great bravery [*ho hahalok brani*

> *tebes*] Father Julio lent his robes to David Alex, who was sick, so that he could wear it to go and receive treatment." (Sequeira, 2005)

For Sequeira, the priest's robe (*batina*) became inextricably associated with 'politics', as a result of the Indonesian period. The analysis below however argues that priests' uniform was powerful before 1975. Two ways in which 'missionary power' was rendered are suggested: one fostered in educational and health institutions, and the other displayed symbolically and contextually through family, knowledge and appearance. In the following, these latter three themes are explored as it is argued that the robe has represented an important symbolic and performative element of 'missionary power'. The robe signifies an apparent unity both between missionaries and spiritually powerful *liurais*, and colonial government. This in turn points towards, but does not determine, wider developments connected with missionary work. In the 1930s, for example, more missionising took place, and a further requirement (apart from close proximity) was that native Christians had 'correct' attire. Appearance was a requirement but also conferred 'value' on its bearers as converts. In other words, to become Christian meant both to be encouraged to convert, but also to bear a sign of social status.

IV. The contexts and symbols of missionary power

The importance of Catholic missionaries to the Portuguese presence on Timor Island prior to 1975 is frequently suggested in Portuguese accounts. These account argue that missionaries brokered relations between indigenous and colonial authorities and that the conversion of *regulos* or *liurais* and lower-ranked *datos* and *suco* chiefs to Christianity, created a more 'stable' basis for the Portuguese colonial presence. By contrast, 'unstable' periods in the eighteenth century are attributed to problems with indigenous leaders' loyalties. In the following section several examples from Portuguese historical

accounts show that indigenous leaders' loyalties were perceived as strong or wanting by reference to their comportment and appearance.

Throughout the 18th century, the Portuguese vied with the Dutch for 'control' of Timor Island through forming alliances with local leaders. Although a treaty was signed in 1859 demarcating land borders, finality was not reached on this issue for another five decades. Competition persisted that involved Dutch and Portuguese attempts to sign vassalage agreements with local leaders. In short, powerful families were conscripted through these agreements which held the key to colonial 'sovereignty'. In 1766, two *regulos* on the south coast, Samoro and Lacluta, decided to hold church services in which they assumed roles as priests, without being ordained (the Jesuit establishment of the Soibada school is dealt with in chapter four and shows the continuing significance of this area). Dom Bernardo was invested as *regulo* of Samoro in 1766. In the same year, he mimicked a priest and is described as having sung 'the alleluyah in priest's clothes, without a missionary in the church' (Alvarez, 1951:19). Meanwhile, the *regulo* of Lacluta separately also gave a church service dressed in priest's robes, using 'sacred images and books' (Ibid, 19). Gathering together all of his people, he then tore up missals of sacred images and put them next to seeds planted in fields and

> invit[ed] the images to prove their miraculous power, so that [they] should prevent losses of seed caused by wild animals. Because during the night the seeds were destroyed, the *regulo* of Lacluta also destroyed the images. (Morais, 1934: 112-116)

Due to the indispensability of his family connections, his infractions were attributed to 'good intentions' and 'weak knowledge of doctrine' and the diminishing influence of Dominican missionaries. Dom Bernardo was descended from among the most powerful *topasses*, the Hornays (Teixeira, 1974: 567). It is also discounted that these events could have been carried out 'exclusively' by Timorese, with the author citing 'the cold hate

the Lutheran contains, for all that is Catholic, and in these abject deeds, it is certain that [the hand of the Dutch is evident]' (Morais, 1934:116)

This incident shows a sense of precariousness about Portuguese sovereignty. In 'excusing' Dom Bernardo's actions, good relations with 'loyal' *regulos* are prioritised. It also shows that missionaries were seen as worthy of imitation by donning vestments to ape their appearance. Priest and *liurai* power was intended to be seen as complementary or of a similar quality, a power represented in the performance of missionary rites and encapsulated in the robe.

i. Father Jacob's robes

By the late nineteenth century, the colonial state had fought dozens of rebellions in the preceding 50 years against *regulos* unhappy with terms of tax, or for more complicated reasons sometimes only distantly related to *regulos* 'disobedience'. Unlike previous periods, however, plans to bring recalcitrant *regulos* to obedience were accompanied by attempts to make the colony profitable. Second, the missions had been reorganised in 1879. Whereas making the colony profitable was seen as an objective of 'pacification', the Mission Superior Father Joachim de Medeiros blamed the outbreak of rebellions on 'paganism', in turn caused by 'bad and ignorant clergy' (Teixeira, 1974: 55).

These areas of pacification, profit and paganism converged, curiously enough, in the event of a search for gold in 1891. Seen in an international context, by this period, world gold prices were high, Portugal was effectively bankrupt, and in 1890 had received the infamous 'ultimatum' by the British in Africa (Clarence-Smith, 1985:83). Combined with rumours that gold was abundant in the south central mountainous and coastal areas of East Timor, and centuries-old memories of imperial greatness sustained

by gold, (Schwartzmann, 1989: 52) the plan to prospect for gold seemed like an attractive proposition. It was also appealed to missionaries that through their presence outside Dili had access to information on rumoured locations of gold deposits, which it passed on to the search team. The Mission provided its only native priest, Jacob dos Reis e Cunha, as a guide. Father Jacob was one of the only Timorese ever to have graduated from 'superior courses' in Portugal, and was related to *regulos* of the south coast. Thus he seemed to personify colonial-indigenous relations by vassalage and missionary work. His family also owned land on which gold was said to be located. Yet his conduct irked the government and missions. He claimed to have carried out up to 100 baptisms in a month from a neighbouring *Reino*, in 1887, but rather than endearing him to the missions, this made them suspicious that he was using his position to settle local scores and planning to expand his own 'fiefdom' (Teixeira, 1974:196).

The search for gold took place in late 1891, but resulted in negligible quantities being found, even after several months' searching. The government's chief medical officer, José Gomes da Silva, who had been designated as an observer, made excoriating attacks on Father Jacob in his report. Gomes da Silva thought Jacob wanted to 'annex' Maubessi and Tutuluro, rivals to his own *Reino* Bibico, so that it would have access to both 'bread and gold'. No mention is made of Jacob ever contemplating or promising this to the inhabitants of his *Reino*, although sometime in the previous century they had been driven off their land by an attack by the *regulos* of Tutuluro. The context bears out colonial reactions: in imagining Jacob's designs to make a *Reino* of 'notable importance in the future', (Gomes da Silva, 1891:10) he was expressing anxieties about the Portuguese position in East Timor, against the backdrop of numerous rebellions and more distantly, empire-wide bankruptcy.

The remaining accounts indicate that Jacob died shortly after the search for gold on his family's farm. Pinto Correa wrote that 'Jacob had been sent to Alas, on the south coast. He let himself be corrupted by '*tuaca*' [palm wine]; proceeded to dress himself as and live as a native…' Based on a report made of a visit by a Portuguese priest Padre Sebastião, Pinto Correia wrote that Sebastião listened to Jacob 'confess…that he didn't possess a robe' (Pinto Correia, 1934:200, n1). One can focus on a number of aspects in this and other accounts: Gomes da Silva's description of Jacob as 'like a Bismarck' (Gomes da Silva, 1891:10), skilled in political machinations; the absence of companions or kin; the sense of abandon in references to his alcohol consumption; and ultimately his death shortly after. To observers reporting on this ignominy, the absence of priest robes correlated completely with Jacob's 'paganisation'. The robes that had made him appear civilised were missing. On a normative scale of civilisation, he was at the bottom, and worse, a disloyal local leader dressed as a priest. Unlike the *regulos* of Lacluta and Samoro, who had strayed temporarily into the domain of the priest, Jacob's 'treachery' was represented through his abjection. Made a priest for apparently instrumental purposes, he was neither permitted to be a leader that fought and forged alliances, nor a missionary in an ideal paragon of a moral arbiter. After the Mission reorganisation had begun in the 1870s, Medeiros' view that missionaries were morally corrupt was personified in Jacob[13,14.]

[13] Despite his unpopularity with Portuguese, Jacob was highly influential among the indigenous population in some western districts of East Timor. One of his acolytes, Tat Felix, possibly a catechist, is still recalled and venerated in Aileu through the origin house called Hohul/Hoho-ulu. See Duarte, 1987 and Traube, 2008.

[14] Another episode In World War two, showed the robe as a symbol of priestly authority. Father Abilio Caldas died during the Japanese occupation, apparently killed by another East Timorese. Following the earlier killing of two priests in Ainaro by Japanese troops, the head of the Diocese, Father Jaime Garcia Goulart, decided that its European personnel should retreat to Australia. A single East Timorese, Father Abilio Caldas, like Jacob, was ordained as a priest, and asked Goulart if he could stay in Timor, because, 'being of the same colour he would be able to more effectively administer priestly ministry…[Goulart] had been of the same opinion'. Accordingly, Goulart's only condition was that Abilio should not wear his

ii. Deathbed conversion in Nari

By contrast, *O Rei de Nari*, [the king of Nari], a memoir of a Salesian priest, José Rodrigues, showed a *liurai*'s moral soundness by way of charting his conversion. The memoir also exemplified the significance of family to this conversion and establishing the missionary presence. Rodrigues recalled his time attempting to convert the aristocratic family of Nari while based at the newly established Fuiloro mission in the easternmost Lautem district in the 1950s. Starting with the 'pacification' campaigns of Celestino da Silva in the early twentieth century, the family lost its land over successive generations. Rodrigues noted that Governor da Silva - known locally as *Sawarica*, or scorpion – had terrorised the population on arrival, after which the intervention purportedly brought 'peace and wellbeing'. This lasted until the Japanese occupation of 1943-5, when Nari served as a refuge for the surrounding population. After these years of hardship the *Rei* 'was left poor and without resources' (Rodrigues, 1962:128). The details of the entire population's relocation to the post of Parla after the Portuguese reoccupation in 1945 remain obscure, with Nari representing a place of unrealised return.

This deracination was an allegory for a void that Christian conversion eventually filled, with the king converting on his deathbed. Prior to this, Rodrigues had already called on

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robes or cape, 'so that he could be better hidden' (Alvarez, 1951:83). In March 1943, Abilio was attacked while on horseback by a former student from the Soibada school, and accomplices, while returning from conducting a service. Alvarez describes how having been shot, the priest was seriously wounded in the shoulder and fell from his horse: 'The criminals ran in the direction of the victim, one firing again. Another hurled a stone at him saying, "go and listen to a confession". It is believed that the person that proffered these words was a student that had disappeared, while the others were pagans'. The explanation for the attack, in which Abilio died, was that the 'murderer had already shown strange mental anomalies in the boarding school of Beato Nuno' (ibid, 83), though it is not known if Abilio knew the former student. The killing of a Timorese priest otherwise nominally subject to Portuguese protection can be viewed as the result of his appearing without a robe, and thus being the same as other East Timorese.

a time-honoured strategy, by baptising the *Rei*'s grandson, Zevatau, who attended the Fuiloro mission school. Zevatau succumbed to a serious, unexplained illness, dying despite the *Rei*'s sacrifices to ancestors. In preparations for his funeral, and in contrast to the discretion apparently enjoyed by missionaries in Samoro and Ainaro, some relatives were upset to find that Rodrigues had been informed of the death, and had insisted on a Christian burial. With some angrily resisting the idea, it seemed that Rodrigues would be shunned, although the family later relented. The *Rei* pondered the response from the family to his question of why missionaries were informed of the death: *Hai Sarana*! *Hai Sarana*! [He was a Christian] – murmured the old man, amazed…He continued to repeat '*Sarana*, *Sarana*', and went into the house without saying another word' (Rodrigues, 1962:150). Even while it seemed that the king was lulled into agreeing with a Christian burial by the aura surrounding his deceased grandson, the resistance of the wider community – and his own family - continued. Zevatau was given a Christian burial, but Rodrigues pretended not to notice when he was intentionally diverted so that food could be secreted into Zevatau's grave to prevent 'hunger'.

The relationship between missionary and liurai can also be seen through the negotiation of knowledge. One area for this negotiation is indigenous legends [*lendas*], which Rodrigues embedded in his memoir. These also served a performative function, as Rodrigues' knowledge of them showed his mastery of indigenous culture. This knowledge was used to challenge what is presumed to be the *Rei*'s feigned ignorance when cross-examined about legends. Rodrigues' rebuttals ('you lie!') were based on his own accumulated knowledge, on subjects such as the whereabouts of severed heads of enemies, ostensibly from pre-colonial wars (cf. Roque, 2010). When Rodrigues'

knowledge was displayed, the *Rei*'s retinue gasped reverentially. Rodrigues noted 'a certain parallelism' between some legends and biblical stories (Rodrigues, 1962:240), while their symbolic props, for example a seventeenth century book of prayer in German and Latin, were both an object of indigenous veneration and a reified form of missionary knowledge (Rodrigues, 1962:266). In one *lenda*, a childless family were helped by a crocodile, which was really a white man, to whose 'very tall and white' house on an island the husband was taken and which was the repository of cures of every kind. An image of a colonial building that houses cures is suggestive of how missionaries saw the potential for Christianity to take root from indigenous perceptions of colonial technological and epistemological superiority.

In other words, a mutual recognition took place in which the *Rei* recognised missionary power through conversion, while missionaries coveted the *Rei*'s power. This was expressed through a symbol of enduring relations in the dénouement of the account. The 'truths' that the community protected (the whereabouts of heads) had been unearthed by Rodrigues. Against the backdrop of this earlier display, the King decided to be baptised on his deathbed in early 1957. Rodrigues carried out the baptism, giving the *Rei* the name of José Maria. As he was about to leave, the *Rei* requested that Rodrigues give him his priest robes:

> …I was not astonished when the *Rei* asked for my stole [*estola*] and surplice [*sobrepeliz*] because they were very nice. In view of the impossibility of satisfying his request, he was content with the smock [*guarda-po*] (Rodrigues, 1962:274)

Thus, the robe was evidently seen as a powerful symbol to *liurais* and priests, accompanying their interactions and representing their alliance, while the family and

knowledge were to be mastered or 'won over' to the missionary cause. Each account represented its subjective context, whether related to Lutheran subversion, missionary decadence, or the resistance to and burgeoning of missionary activity during the 1950s. Beyond these contexts, the next section considers how correct appearance was diffused. Focussing on the decades prior to the Indonesian invasion, it notes how the appearance of converts both showed their social status but later indicated resistance to Indonesian rule.

iii. Missionary power: comportment and appearance

The previous section showed that priest's robes were used to represent relations at different times between East Timorese leaders and missionaries. The varying degrees of steadfastness of this relationship could be seen in one way by the extent to which indigenous leaders were represented as adhering to Christian norms, in another through a negotiation of knowledge and family. By the same token, East Timor's population of Christian converts who were not all descended from *liurai* families were expected to adhere to norms of 'civilised' appearance. As I argue below, the Indonesian occupation later caused a partial transformation in the meaning of these signs of Christianity. However, appearance continued and continues to bear traces of hierarchies associated with the Portuguese period. On one hand, Portuguese writers contributed to a canon of effusive treatments of tropes such as Portugal's historical 'duty' to 'civilise' indigenous peoples (Castelo, 1998:86) during the 1930s:

> At the doors of the church can be seen groups of natives masquerading as devout people, dressed in black, moving lasciviously with bright eyes of pagan lewdness. The natives dressed in black! They are…iconoclasts, such vile

> hypocrisy the singular work of current missionary action, different, very different from that which Bishop Medeiros exemplified (Braga, 1936:10).

This passage shows a clear connection between comportment and appearance. 'Current missionary action' had permitted the 'immoral' behaviour of 'pagans' to be masked by the misappropriated attire of Christians. On the other hand, missionaries themselves viewed dress as a precondition for Church attendance and consequently, conversion. In common with the state's acknowledgment of those working on its projects (chapter seven), a step towards subjecthood, the Canossian sisters, who had returned with the Salesians in 1927 (Teixeira, 1974:441), reported telling East Timorese women that they believed in equality between Europeans and Timorese, and that 'there are no distinctions between races, but only of work'. The same account demonstrates a prominent preoccupation with standards of appearance for new converts. The Canossian nun, Rita Cassati, reported that:

> Missionaries…distributed clothes sent by our benefactors in Italy, because many of our novices [*neófitos*] could not present themselves in church because they didn't have clothes to cover up with (BEDM July 1933: 42).

Later in the same passage, requirements of being a Christian were decidedly difficult for the poor to overcome, a problem again solved by missionary beneficence:

> A tiny girl…responded promptly "I am Christian". But to the question of fulfilling her religious duties, she responded, showing the poor rags that covered her: "I don't have clothes to go to church!" We invited her to church the next Sunday where she was given all that she needed (Ibid).

Later accounts demonstrate the same assertions of a fundamental equality of Christian subjects. The visit of the image of Our Lady of Fatima in 1951 show initially, depictions of a uniformity of appearance between children of the rich and poor, a

seeming manifestation of the doctrine of equality of all in the eyes of God. Later in the passage the children of rich families are elevated, who are better disposed to fulfil the desired appearance of communicants:

> The baptised were the first to appear in the church…even the poorest were dressed in white. More it seemed than by clothing, they distinguished themselves through an air of satisfaction that showed through on their faces… After being baptised, a group of new communicants gathered. Some of the little girls, daughters of public servants and merchants, with their immaculate veils that gave them a delicate and angelic note…will receive the Bread of Angels for the first time (SEARA May-June 1951:147).

Assertions of equality among humans were tempered by requirements made of a convert's appearance. In short, until 1975, appearances displayed social hierarchies as much as they represented enduring relations between missionaries and indigenous authorities. Later, fleeing Indonesian persecution, the morality of pre-1975 converts' appearance became connoted with resistance:

> …the military sprayed the long grass with gasoline and set fire to it to drive people out. Unable to run due to hunger, the elderly were left behind and died where they sat, defiant and dignified, dressed, she said, as if they were going to Sunday Mass (Walsh, 2012).

The meaning of converts' appearances changed in radically different circumstances. Beyond the formalities of the last rites (Chapter two), in death, appearance signified the morality of resistance and martyrdom, contrasting with Padre Jacob's wretchedness in death after abandoning his robes.

V. Conclusion

This account has suggested that the inculcation of norms and habits was central not only to evangelisation and elite formation, but to missionary power. The resistance movement had attempted to emulate aspects of this power as a way to maintain cultural distinctiveness from Indonesians, and order. Other analyses have shown how, in the postcolonial period, an indigenous and Portuguese culture has been constructed in retrospect, casting Portuguese colonialism in a positive light. This analysis has shown that elite comportment with which this commonality was associated was the result of formation in mission schools, but was also maintained during the Indonesian occupation as a way to forge cultural distinctiveness. The Indonesian occupation presented limited opportunities for the diffusion of norms specifically associated with this form of elite comportment, but as noted elsewhere, propagated other norms through the education system, often with unintended consequences. In this regard, other accounts have shown the significance of young resistance activists educated in the Indonesian school system (the 'New Generation') who were often engaged in resistance activities alongside *Externato* students (Carey, 2003). This account has not attempted to show the extent of these relations. Instead, against accounts that stress that the distinctive feature of the country's lusophone elite is that they were not present in East Timor during the Indonesian occupation, it has shown that an element of this elite remained and was significant in that it constituted a 'civil(ised)' element of resistance.

By proposing that an elite habitus was transmitted and reproduced through bodily disposition, conduct and appearance, this account has considered how certain aspects of 'missionary power' were transmitted beyond the decolonisation of 1975, being

subsequently constructed and reproduced through an elite habitus. Yet on another level, the school existed under the institutional protection of the Catholic Church, the same source from which the school's founders encountered opposition. The configuration of power in this institutional relationship therefore demonstrates the limits of biopower. In this regard, the account has showed other ways that the postcolonial Catholic Church propagated missionary power, through symbols. The robe, for example, invoked both missionary-elite relations and acted as a justification for the Catholic Church's formal involvement in politics, once it had been refracted through resistance against Indonesian rule. Like symbols of the resistance, such as military fatigues, used to institute the state, robes indicated missionary power. Their invocation for example accompanied the public and performative disclosure of 'truths' during the 2005 demonstrations, indicating both past involvement in the resistance movement and a justification for continuing proximity to formal political power.

The events of 2005 therefore show other parts of the modalities of missionary power. The demonstrations showed that the claims the demonstration organisers made were directed towards the unseating of the Prime Minister, and were prospective insofar as they foretold the emergence of serious opposition to the government in 2006. However, they also signalled the recalibration of relations between Church and state. To this end, assertions from the Church of their inseparability from the state originated not through happenstance but from historical power relations. Relations between *liurais* and missionaries, and the symbolism of uniforms demonstrated this. Moreover, missionary work in the 1920s and 1930s and beyond signalled a wider diffusion of norms of appearance among more of the population. To this end, a subjective reflexivity to norms at both didactic and practical levels is evident, in that the meaning of appearance in

these contexts was connoted with ‘civilisation’ and morality. The following chapter considers further elements of missionary power aimed at securing broader allegiances to Christianity among the population.

7. Reifying difference: health and hygiene

I. Introduction – Habitats and norms

When approached from the elevated, winding roads that led into Dili from its southern outskirts in the early 1970s, the city seemed carpeted with vegetation. Occasional vehicles - military vehicles, private cars, Chinese-owned buses – followed roads near the city's waterfront, their movement barely perceptible from a distance. The roads, only one of which was paved, were dotted with even more occasional government buildings, clustered around the seafront and straddled by trees, which gave the city its green aspect. At night, the city was consumed by darkness: some of the few buildings with electricity were to be found on the hillside at Lahane, among them the Australian consulate (Araújo, 2012:53). By this period, Dili was increasingly subject to migration from the districts, people drawn by promises of trade, education, and jobs. East Timor's different ethnic groups mixed in markets, farmed plots of land, and for a small number, went to mission schools or worked in the civil service.

Whether from within clusters of palapa houses, the courtyards of convents or barracks, or from atop the hill hospital at Lahane, this view of Dili, an accidental garden city, changed markedly after the Indonesian invasion. The subsequent killing, and destruction and looting of property was a familiar theme in the last quarter of the 20th century and might be expected to have changed this view of the city most. Yet it was changes wrought in re-making the city as 'Indonesian' during the 1980s after its destruction, that most affected its appearance. This involved the population as well as the built environment. The transmigration scheme was a hallmark of New Order-era

attempts to spread, stem, and replace populations. Vendors from Sumatra and Makassar sold food from small stalls to civil servants from all over Indonesia, accommodated in government buildings that sprung up over a city increasingly recast in concrete. Bulls from Surabaya were led along Dili's dusty roads. Many of the entrances to government buildings took the form of traditional East Timorese houses from Lautem district. This was, however, less a concession to East Timorese culture, and more a statement of how this state-approved emblem of culture took its place in the Indonesian nation (Kipp-Smith, 1994).

Two Portuguese Jesuit priests who witnessed the transformation, Fathers Felgueiras and Martins, observed that as the city accommodated more people, the authorities dealt with public sanitation by hollowing out open sewers at the sides of roads, which filled the environment with 'a nauseating odour' (Felgueiras and Martins, 107). It is a peculiar irony, therefore, that at the end of the 1980s, Dili won an award for being one of the 'cleanest cities in Indonesia' (*Adipura*). Students and civil servants carried out a cleaning of the city's streets. This practice also followed similar government-approved practices in the rest of Indonesia, of *Kerja Bakti*, where residents cleaned their neighbourhoods prior to Independence Day celebrations (August 17) or other public holidays, intended to reflect the Javanese-conceived duty of mutual help, *gotong royong*, which, although voluntary, few thought it wise to avoid. In the context of Dili's reconstruction as an Indonesian city, its cleaning was a performance of East Timor's provincial status within Indonesia.

In chapter two, it was argued that official history was used to govern. Though it was unrealised in the postcolonial period, to its supporters, military service was a civic duty.

Given its objectives of preventing disorder, moreover, it was also evidently an attempt to make a part of the population recognise and interact with the state in this regard. It invoked Portuguese colonial government: many of the state's elites undertook military service. This chapter considers 'General cleaning' (*Limpeza geral*) in the postcolonial period, whereby the adult population, then civil servants, cleaned streets on Friday mornings. Like military service, *Limpeza* was posited as a civic *service*. Unlike military service, its historical origins are not immediately obvious. Its formal, civic dimensions, pointed towards what the relationship between the state and its citizens was, or should be. It was a policy to be devised and implemented to improve the hygiene and aesthetics of urban areas, from which state and citizenry could benefit. The effects of the policy could be seen, so it was argued, in both the urban environment and in an enhanced relationship between state and its citizens, and in the benefits it would bring by way of tourism. The effect of the policy defined its meaning: the transformations that it wrought were ideal demonstrations that East Timor was modern and past colonialism.

Against this view, *Limpeza* can also be seen as an example of the kind of practice that characterised relations between sections of the population and colonial authorities in the capital Dili under successive periods of colonial authority. The dimensions of this are complicated. Before 1975, to varying degrees, forced labour was still part of interactions between state and population. On the other hand, East Timor had not been formally subject to the *Indigenato*, the forced labour regime in operation across most of colonial Portuguese Africa until the early 1960s. In part, the practice of public cleaning defined an important part of what a city was: an area inhabited by citizens as opposed to the districts, occupied by subjects. Yet as others have indicated, the distinction dividing city and districts, citizens and subjects was more fuzzy than distinct (O'Laughlin, 2000;

cf. Mamdani, 2000). By definition, although such distinctions could be expressions of differences in topography and ecology, they were also designated by colonial authorities. Using the theme of health and hygiene, this chapter argues that a modern bio-political regime was invariably tempered by colonial ambivalence about recognising subjects, but also by indigenous resilience against colonial strategies. The gap between indigenous evasion and colonial ambivalence in recognising subjects except where work was involved, was to some extent bridged by Christian conversion, which similarly sought to make the population sedentary (chapter five). Nonetheless, certain aspects of these colonial practices and indigenous responses have persisted to the postcolonial period, suggesting not a social contract between citizen and state, but a practice that has coalesced around longstanding ideas, and has been mediated by the intervening years of the Indonesian occupation.

II. Dili: city without subjects

Perhaps the first instance of the city's place in reflecting colonial prestige occurred in the early 1830s, when Dili had only been the capital of Portuguese Timor for 60 years. The colony's political class had recently been effectively subject to a coup attempt by a priest, Padre Varella. In its wake, a new Governor, José Maria Marques, introduced plans to improve the city. At the time, wrote a later Governor, Afonso de Castro, Dili was a 'city with a miserable aspect, built without plan or method, with tortuous paths instead of roads that opened through thick palm trees that shadowed the entire population, preventing air from circulating' (Castro, 1869:129). Marques' re-alignments of roads cut across indigenous farms, mostly running parallel, a few constructed sitting at right angles to others. Constructed on Dili's marshy terrain, the project reportedly

raised few objections. After all, new roads performed the function, wrote Castro, of connecting the government with its subjects in villages in the south and west parts of the city. In contrast to the districts, a place where local authority could be subcontracted but not subordinated, an ordered city was a space where distances were bridged between coloniser and colonised.

In the 1890s, East Timor's longest serving Governor, Celestino da Silva, commissioned the design of sewers in Dili. Yet it was not until the aftermath of the 1912 Boaventura rebellion that further ideas of order in this connection clearly emerged. Celestino's da Silva's tenure, which ended in 1908, saw coffee-growing schemes intensified, intended to make East Timor profitable. This was taken further by the Republican government after 1912 when the population was forced to participate in mass coffee-growing schemes (Clarence-Smith, 1992). At the same time, the Republicans made Dili a municipality. The military posts established in the wake of the 1912 rebellion were ceded to civil posts by 1920, accompanied by the establishment of 'health delegations' in Baucau in the East, Bobonaro in the west and in Manufahi - the centre of rebellion – 'for reasons of political order' in 1918 (Costa-Barbosa, 1953: 2518-9). Thus, out of rebellion came remedy through both forcibly conscripting the population into cultivation schemes and installing outposts of the state in their midst.

In Dili, in the same period, Governor Eduardo da Camara established a Municipal Council in 1916, charged with inventing schemes for the hygienic improvement of the city, but which was disbanded in the 1920s. The Council's re-constitution in the 1930s coincided with further territorial reorganisations, and the advent of the New State in Portugal. The first thing the Commission did was order 'a cleaning of all of the city,

with cleaning of the roads, ditches, trenches and canals, repairing some roads and aligning others, at the same time as which various plots of the terrain and farms [*quintais*] of *indígenas*, residents in the east of the city, were drained' (Moura, 1942:193). By this period, in the name of improved sanitation, the Council was overseeing attempts to widen canals that brought more water from the mountains[1], and the draining of ponds on indigenous farms. It initiated a major programme of swamp drainage in the Caicoli and Balide neighbourhoods and passed regulations obliging 'occupants and owners of urban buildings to keep the roads and the areas around their buildings in a state of cleanliness' (ibid:190). With Hippocratic conviction, the Council proposed reducing vegetation in properties on public roads in Dili that stopped light and air circulating.

If sanitary interventions of the period seemed to represent a shift away from the forced mobilisations in the 1910s, traces of it still remained. One of the original provisions made by Camara's Council had been the establishment of a Sanitary Brigade, paid for by the Municipal Council. It was composed of prisoners and 'those condemned to carry out public works' (Moura, 1942:190). Yet by the 1930s, no reference is found to prison labour in public works projects[2]. On the contrary, and similar to accounts emphasising humane conditions on plantations (chapter five) in the same period, 'care' for labourers who constructed the new military headquarters (*Quartel Geral*) was shown through health treatment available to them in the event of sickness (ibid). This shift in portrayal – whether among plantation workers or construction labourers – is useful in understanding attempts to 'reach' native subjects that Governor Castro had hailed in his

[1] Much of the stone used to widen and lay beds on canals was sourced from the quarry at Fatumeta in the west of Dili.

[2] However, the colonial government appealed for funds for a prison hospital and the building of segregated quarters for the insane [*alienados*] from the normal prison population (Figueiredo, 2004:625)

predecessor's work in the 19th century. Rather than being derived from hollow-sounding Republican declarations of equality through indigenous citizenship, a city-dwelling native's presence could only be acknowledged when they worked.

If the appearance of healthy native subjects became more important in limited portrayals, so too did the appearance of hygiene in Dili's environment. A.A. Moura reported that the Municipal Council's work helped 'establish principles of the aesthetic city, that properly improved the nosological conditions of the environment'. This idea appears in Moura's account several times, when asserting that 'beautification' [*embelezamento*] of the city was inseparable from 'improvements to sanitation' (Ibid: 196). Yet he also unwittingly drew attention to the incompatibility of this pairing. For instance, the wrong kind of trees was selected to line the road running adjacent to the seafront, from the *Palacio do Governo* towards the 'indigenous' neighbourhoods of Bidau and Becora, their roots invading nearby dwellings and their circumference threatening to take up the entire walkway. The clogging of this road with aesthetic objects – connecting the seat of government with the eastern 'suburbs' – serves as a metaphor for the state's protracted attempts to 'reach' the native population in the city, one begun a century earlier under Governor Marques.

Aesthetics, then, did not merely signify the construction of environments according to colonial tastes. To designate an environment as aesthetically pleasing marked proximity to colonial power. Like a 'civilising light' shining from remote missionary stations in the same period, portrayal of the hygiene and health of subjects and their environment were indicative of colonial power (BEDM 1938). Patrick Joyce argues that aesthetics were a 'mode of indirect governance', through which the 'sanitary city' was conceived,

and a hallmark of 'liberal governmentality'. It is also clear that the same might be argued of colonial governmentality, where sanitation and aesthetics were also wedded. Constructing sewers, fighting back foliage, and organising sanitary brigades, was at once a performance of technological superiority and moral intent, and indicative of uplift and improvement (Joyce, 2001:144-5) Yet making Dili stand apart from the districts was tempered by slow progress. The same halting approach to the production of an aesthetic environment can be seen in the ban on the native population's huts. While the location of the housing of civil servants in Lahane had been established for two decades, plans mooted in October 1935 for a neighbourhood where natives would live [*bairro indígena*], were not realised by the decade's end (ibid, 196), nor were similar arrangements for Dili's Chinese and Arab communities. Similar schemes to emplace the population beyond Dili (chapter five) got further, in prototype, but not scale, and then not by much. The overarching point, however, is that from the mid-1920s, colonial authorities had begun to conceive of the possibility that the native population could be subject to intervention through its health. This was closely associated with the forging of limitations on territory, such as municipalities, civil districts, and the renaming of 'cities' in the following decade.

This reorganisation of territory was but one indication of the increased attention given to accounting for the native population. It took the ruptures of the Second World War, the Japanese invasion and then Portuguese reoccupation in 1945 to further 'reach' subjects. As Castelo put it, by this period, Portuguese rule had not moved towards recognising natives as subjects on cultural grounds because they lacked requirements to assimilate, nor on 'political' grounds because their 'conquest' as citizens remained incomplete (Castelo, 1998:47). Due to the impossibility, as the authorities saw it, of

bringing the population to the state's attention on the basis of citizenship, other ways, such as exemplary punishment, emerged. In 1945, newly arrived Portuguese authorities launched a 'hunt' for collaborators with the Japanese, of whom an unknown number were detained on Atauro Island. Moreover, they also intended to intervene in the population's health. Doctors described native reluctance to receive medical treatment in starkly pathological terms, as a 'stubborn new psychology of fleeing in the face of the doctor' (Barbosa, 1953:2520). This could no more be regarded as new, however, than it could a medical condition (chapter five). As a means to encourage native use of health institutions, the authorities made a number of reforms in the late 1940s and 1950s. As the Chief of Health and Hygiene, António de Sousa Grandão reported, these reforms included, *inter alia*, 'free healthcare' by 1949. Additionally, the creation of small 'guest villages' [*aldeias-albergarias*] temporarily accommodated the families of the sick that travelled long distances to be treated. Each of the 35 clinics in the districts outside Dili had such an installation. The aim of bringing the population closer to centres of colonial authority is evident in all of these schemes (Grandão, 1958).

Together with the re-organisation of six sub-delegations, stationed in district capitals, the health network was made more 'extensive and dense'. In Dili, by the end of the decade a new maternity ward at Dr Carvalho hospital saw 300 internees a year. From these installations, and despite only having some 40 nurses, including 10 trainees and seven doctors, significant numbers of treatments were dispensed[3]. Outbreaks continued, with Asian flu claiming 66 lives, and malaria a dozen or so more in 1956. A report into a possible malaria eradication programme by a team from the Institute of Tropical Diseases in Lisbon estimated that its cost would be extremely high, and on these

[3] By 1957, 91,000 consultations were carried out, 647,695 medicines, 367,000 injections, 46,000 parasite treatments, and 20,000 vaccinations dispensed (Grandão, 1958).

grounds, as well as claiming that mosquitoes would eventually develop resistance to it, Grandão rejected the plan. Accordingly, the cleaning of the city, begun in the 1930s, was continued.

While doctors presented evidence that mortality rates were reduced as the result of natives being interned, the logic for intervention among the population was broader, being envisioned as improving the health of the native body. They described legions of 'peripatetic corpses' covered in sores that emerged from hiding at the end of the Japanese period, caused by inadequate habitat and 'an aversion to the use and cleaning of clothes', insect bites and exposure to inclement weather. Native chewing of betel or intoxication by palm wine resulted in depressed immune function. The chances of overcoming a fever in this state, so European doctors believed, were remote. These explanations were also used to explain not only susceptibility to sickness but native 'idleness'. Medical personnel accordingly prescribed not only medicine but also encouraged the government to vigorously enforce regulations centred on native housing, food and clothing (Barbosa, 1953:2531). To understand how cleanliness became key to emplacing the population, it needs to be understood in the context of native Christianity, especially how conversion required the initial and continuing observance of rites.

III. Living and dying as a Christian

As ideas of how to reach subjects changed according to the logics of colonial rule, so too did thinking in this regard change in mission schools. This can be seen in a comparison of reactions to outbreaks of disease over time. During the cholera epidemic that swept into Dili following the siege of Maubara in 1894, for instance, the mission

school sent students and staff home from the school at Lahane[4]. Three decades later, by 1927, two outbreaks, first of conjunctivitis, then flu, transformed the *Internato* at Lahane into 'a veritable hospital', which saw attempts instead to contain the disease:

> The habitual bustle of recreational hours changed into silence, punctuated by moans and incoherent phrases, the administration of sacraments, and frequent medical visits during the night, producing an oppressive atmosphere…Only two students died, but many of them I judged to be lost (BEDM July Aug Sept 1927:393)

Sometime in the interim, a different approach to treatment - quarantining - had become acceptable. The interim had also seen vaccination campaigns of students outside Dili against smallpox on the instigation of the missions in 1909 (Davidson, 1994:219)[5]. Moreover, it was also evident from the missionary perspective that to die as a Christian was as important as to live as one. Missionaries approvingly commented on the sick's 'diligence in not being long without receiving the sacraments'. This attests to the effectiveness that socialising 'Christian' norms could have in the environment of *internatos* (ibid).

No rite of institution was as important as the last rites, although the observance of other rites continually was important for the living. Moreover, for these to have power and for their establishment as norms, missionaries had to sanction them, and one of the ways that this could be achieved was through invocations of mortality. As missionaries saw it, a triumph of Christian belief in a contest with indigenous belief over concepts of life

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[4] After student deaths, the mission head sent students home and divided Canossian nuns between the two mission stations in Dili in the town and Dare in the mountains. The epidemic killed about 300 people in Dili. The military action that preceded it left several hundred dead bodies in Maubara district, with the outbreak of cholera that ensued sweeping towards Dili. In the capital, several students at the school in Dare died, and much of the population congregated in the praca, in an attempt to avoid the disease. (Teixeira, 1974:211)

[5] In 1928, the authorities dispensed 7,479 smallpox and 3,718 yaws vaccinations, but persistently lacked enough medicine for tuberculosis (Figueiredo, 2005:628)

and death, required native presence and study of doctrine. As a missionary wrote in 1925, 'one of the biggest difficulties for the missionary is managing to make [Christians] meet constantly for the catechism, without which there is no possibility for them to change [their] lives" (BEDM, March 1925:3). Among converts confronted with sickness, missionaries encouraged a certain sequence: prayer first, without which they would 'not be dispatched in the court of the King of kings, and in the final recourse to earthly medicine [*medicina terrena*]' (BEDM, Feb 1939:531). Prayer and sacraments were a way of upholding the duties of a covenant with God, but also a way to familiarise converts with the spiritual authority of the priest, rather than spiritual healers, *matandook*, in matters related to the body.

Moreover, just as mission schools resembled hospitals during disease epidemics, missionaries became insinuated into a growing number of government clinics. This provided opportunities, for instance, for religious personnel – catechists and nuns - to remind nurses to 'call a priest to be with the dying, in the same way that they would call a doctor' (BEDM, May 1939:794; *Instruccoes* 1931:16). The catechism could be learned to prime a novice's soul prior to the administration of the last rites. In Dili's Dr Carvalho hospital, (named after the colony's Chief Medical Officer who perished in the 1894 cholera epidemic), missionaries recorded that the sick, without prompting, 'educat[ed] their friends in the formula of the catechism, so that if the worst came, they already had an awareness of the mysterious principles of faith in order to receive the baptism at the hour of death' (ibid).

As shown above, the ability to confront death as a Christian was initially predicated on knowledge of 'mysterious words' of (i.e. ability to recite) the catechism. But this seems

also to contrast significantly with other forms of knowledge. For example, the rites of conversion on which the spiritual authority of missionaries was based, were not open to all. An account from 1932 in Ainaro records attempts to convert the loyalist Corte-Real family (chapter five). The account also emphasises the population's fervour for conversion, but priests refused to baptise many of the local (Mambai-speaking) population, who didn't understand Tetum:

> My conduct has given occasion to edifying scenes of many weeping people that has conserved my resolve. In these cases there is kindness in cruelty…seeing that [if they don't know Tetum], they will not be able to conveniently confess, nor will they understand the divine word" (BEDM March 1932:542).

Yet the missionary assumption that doctrinal knowledge would supplant existing concepts of the divine within the native cosmos were clearly misplaced. Contemporary anthropological accounts suggest that indigenous agency has allowed and even encouraged Christianity to be accommodated into the native cosmos (Bovensiepen, 2010), with a certain degree of reciprocity. This was not always the case. Historical accounts suggest that the moral sanctions of Christianity may have enhanced indigenous beliefs such as ancestral worship. Father Jacinto dos Campos, a priest based in Lahane in the 1930s, wrote of a man who was burdened by 'the disgrace that his ancestors had died as heathens' (BEDM Sept/Oct 1938:224)[6]. Even though this shows an acceptance of the Christian precept of the sinfulness of heathenism, ancestors were clearly still accommodated in a convert's conscience, with irrevocable damnation tempering messages of salvation. There were other accommodations. Whereas missionaries believed that sickness could be countered with prayer and sacraments to protect body and soul, Timorese believed that sickness indicated the soul's displacement by spirits.

[6] Cf. Peake (2000:102) who writes that converts in Nias were 'so appalled by their new awareness of their sins, and consequences of them to come, that they committed suicide'.

By the 1930s, missionary instructions decreed that the soul was still present for a period in dead bodies before it went upwards to heaven or purgatory, with priestly blessings. Yet for Timorese, death would have meant the soul had been 'wrenched from its body' and that 'the dead soul flits back and forth between two worlds' until a ritual known as *Kore Metan* after 12 months intended to put the soul to rest (Hicks, 1976:24-5)

For all this eschatological preparation, missionaries portrayed their work as undergirded by western science. By all accounts, this had had a gestation period of some decades. There were important institutional reasons for the integration into church doctrine of contemporary sciences with the Vatican-approved advent of neo-Tomism after 1879 (Alexandre, 2006:15). The rise of anthropology in Europe and Portugal in the mid-19th century and its growing respectability and patronage by elites also account for this development (Roque, 2010). However, if extensive and formative missionary use and cataloguing of East Timorese indigenous medicine in the 18th century is considered, then the donning of western 'scientific clothes' by missionaries seems to represents less of a marked change (Tomász, 1969). Although their concern was with indigenous medicine, the practice of cataloguing can be seen as associated with deciphering medicine in terms of its uses and efficacy, i.e. how these things comprised a field of knowledge, characteristic of colonial practice. In parallel to similar scientific explanations among colonial authorities for perceived problems relating to the population, the elaboration of scientific beliefs and methods among missionaries continued apace through the 1930s. In this period, the priest-ethnographer Father Ezequiel Pascoal portrayed missionaries as promoting 'the light of western medicine', against a native 'fear of the European doctor' and a preference for *matandocs*. This scientific position was also written into the handbook on missionary practice published

in 1931. In it, missionaries were instructed to discourage native 'surprise' for their actions by prefacing extreme unction with a brief explanation about the 'scientific foundations' of the procedure (Missão de Lahane, 1931:16). Although the possibility that the dying would flee would have been remote, the injunction against making natives 'surprised' is informative of a belief that science would provide reassurance. The instructions also contained directions based on the most recent 'theological-psychological studies' decreeing that there was time between apparent death and real death[7] (Missão de Lahane, 1931:16), allowing priests to administer sacraments where a native Christian had, for example, died suddenly in an accident.

As conversions increased, so supervision of native Christians challenged both native and missionary perceptions of survival and mortality and its spiritual fundaments. East Timorese Christians were served by thinly spread mission stations, and supervision of the sick required long journeys to remote locations to administer the last rites, often for what were minor ailments[8]. Missionaries complained that these callouts resulted from native misunderstandings or deviations from doctrine. Yet missionaries also encouraged native Christians to summon priests when they became sick outside clinics, as well as cautioning against resorting to traditional medicine. While incomprehension of doctrine may account for being summoned to read the last rites 'because of an abscess on the finger' (BEDM January 1934, *Uma consoada em timor* [a Christmas supper in Timor]),

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[7] The difference between, respectively, 'the disappearance of respiration and circulation' and 'when the soul separates from the body', a distinction to be taken into account by a priest especially in the event of 'extrinsic' events such as electrocution or drowning, or 'intrinsic' events, such as death from cholera infection.

[8] In a Christmas dispatch from 1934, a missionary wrote: 'I had on one occasion walked 20 kilometres in rain, called by a sick person who had not spoken…on arrival, he gave me a confession: - '*Senhor* Padre, it's not needed, I received Holy Communion the day before yesterday and no one has accused me of any sin.' It was like that with Timorese: it was so easy for them to telephone [*fazem zunir os arames*] the Priest for reason of having a headache, obliging him to travel 10, 12 and more hours by foot, and not always free from danger through rivers - as [priests] expect that the infirm is in agony…[and] only to verify the death.' See BEDM January 1934 '*Uma Consoada em Timor*', p.570.

it also suggests that missionaries were seen as occupying the places of spiritual guardians against sickness as traditional healers. In other words, native Christians evidently continued to want protection against sicknesses, and observed procedure required of Christians in doing so.

Following their wider admittance in the 1930s, missionaries catalogued a period of indigenous conversions. These show the rites that were involved for East Timorese in becoming Christians. I have shown how some rites could be accommodated into native belief but also how in some instances, the observance of Christian belief such as sin caused anxieties. The overarching point is twofold: that this process constituted both the benefits and hardships of investiture as native Christians, which were conditions on which recognition as Christians depended. Secondly, these benefits and hardships were comparable with work, which, as noted earlier, was a proxy for subjecthood in the city (the status of East Timorese *assimilados* - no longer subjects but Portuguese citizens - was significantly defined by their 'respectable' professions). Health was a common feature of the way either missionaries or colonial authorities interacted with converts or subjects. As shown previously, this depended on their emplacement to ensure a regularity of interaction. The intent of making the population sedentary in the wake of the Portuguese return after the Japanese occupation had also been prefigured by territorial divisions. These were subject to designation in plans and maps, but moreover could be realised through the practical dimensions of emplacement or altering the environment. Aspects of this pattern are also evident in the Indonesian period, under very different conditions.

IV. The city from Indonesian to postcolonial rule

Normally, strange things circulate discreetly below our streets. But a crisis will suffice for them to rise up, as if swollen by floodwaters, pushing aside manhole covers, invading the cellars, then spreading through the towns' (de Certeau, 2000:1).

Following the Indonesian invasion, the population's separation from Fretilin and surrender in the late 1970s initiated an Indonesian military programme of emplacement. As Taylor has described, this involved initially the creation of concentration camps to 'resettle' the population in lowland areas. These camps saw famine, disease and malnutrition. These were transformed into more permanent villages, with the rationale of being easily supervised by the military and separating the population from the armed resistance, and adjoining agricultural plots producing crops for export (Taylor, 1991:159). With the resettlement of the population, other strategies were introduced to emplace the population. The establishment of a network of health clinics (*puskesmas*) at the sub-district level were intended to compel the population into accepting the state through its installations. And as noted in numerous instances, from these clinics nurses administered a contraceptive drug, Depo-Provera, without the permission of women subject to the treatment, a means of controlling birthrates among elements of the population since seen in other contexts[9] and regarded by the Catholic Church as contributing to the 'genocide' of East Timorese (statement, 1985). Schools were another way through which state interventions of this kind took place. Correspondingly, the response by female students to these campaigns when brought to schools in the 1990s continued to be evasion by absenting themselves from school (Inbaraj, 1997).

[9] The Israeli state administered Depo-Provera to its Ethiopian population without their consent.

Emplacing the population can also be seen through the military term ‘cleaning’ (*pembersihan*) or ‘sweeping land’ which was used as a metaphor for operations against the resistance movement. Thus, in 1981, as noted in Chapter five, the male population was forced to engage in the fence of legs operation (*pagar betis*). This operation was intended to ensnare Falintil in a human chain, though these objectives were seldom fulfilled. Similarly, in 1999, the language of cleaning and other ‘purificatory’ metaphors was used by pro-Indonesian militias to indicate the hunting of pro-independence supporters. There was therefore some surprise when this language, carrying reminders of Indonesian military operations, made the transition to the postcolonial period, used by Fretilin’s leaders in the run up to the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections. *Dasa rai* means ‘ground sweeping’ in Tetun, and their use of this phrase as well as ‘clean[ing] the garbage from the territory’s streets’, was deemed by East Timor’s Electoral Commission to be inflammatory and threatening towards its opponents (Lusa, 22 August 2001).

With these modalities of power considered, ‘cleanings’ have not always implied overt and covert threats of violence. Other instances of public cleaning after independence have been connected with nationalist commemoration and worship. For example, and as discussed in chapter five, the image of Our Lady of Fatima was brought to Timor in the 1950s coinciding with a moment when the civilising mission in the colonies was being restarted. By the 1980s, the same image was brought to Timor, representing both a commemoration of the 1950s visit, and a universal image beyond the jurisdiction of the Indonesian authorities. According to the Jesuit priests Felgueiras and Martins, it gave sustenance to the population and was worshipped by Falintil ‘under cover of the night’

(Felgueiras and Martins, 2005:142). The image brought peace in its wake[10], Felgueiras and Martins wrote, and was taken at night in an illuminated throne to Atauro island where it brought succour to political prisoners exiled there (2005:142-3). The visit of the image once again in 2002 coincided with the restoration of independence in May of that year, and was prepared for in many areas by a 'general cleaning' (TP, 11 May 2002). Primary and secondary schools in Laularu sub-district of Aileu for example cleaned Aileu town. The visit of the image was pronounced as an event of great importance for national history and therefore required a general public cleaning. There are other instances of this. As described in chapter one, on 12 November, the anniversary of the Dili massacre in 2002 was designated as a national day by both the government and Catholic Church. In preparation, the Ministry of Education ordered that secondary school students should clean the graves of the Santa Cruz cemetery, and 'public places'. Groups associated with the resistance such as Sagrada Familia and Renetil also joined in (STL, 14 November 2005)[11].

[10] Felgueiras and Martins point to the year of the image's visit 1987-8 being relatively peaceful with 'no fighting' between Falintil and the Indonesian military. They also note the absence of any military presence in Balide where the image was held, tribute, according to locals, of its aura of peace (2005:143-4)

[11] According to this newspaper report, only two schools obeyed the Ministry and carried out the cleaning. However, this belies the fact that people in neighbourhoods near the cemetery, including my own, Kintal Kiik, carried out preparations for the commemoration through their own volition, such as cleaning streets and laying candles on the side of the road.

Figure 7. **Public cleaning at the National University, UNTL. Author's photo, August 2009.**

Against the backdrop of multiple meanings, the aftermath of the events of 2006 again prompted the ritual of public cleaning as a means of redress. Hence, in the months following the events that precipitated massive displacement, international agencies, seeking to be seen to distribute funds quickly, began a so-called 'cash for work' programme called '*Servi Nasaun*' ('serve the nation'). The programme involved having 'the unemployed' and 'internally displaced' sweep the streets of litter, and clean drains and gutters in exchange for a maximum amount of US$2 a day. Participants could only work for a maximum of two weeks, and after travel costs, wages were negligible. Indeed, by the programme designers' own admissions, the programme was only intended to serve short-term goals, to prevent IDPs becoming 'dependent' on food aid and the relative safety of camps that at their peak in Dili accommodated almost 80,000 people. On the programme's introduction there was much fanfare about how it could complement a timetable for the closure of IDP camps by 'encouraging' returns ahead of a planned reduction in foreign military personnel, proposed to be in August 2006, although the closure of the last camp eventually occurred in 2009.

It is tempting to see similar intentions of making the population productive in pursuit of improving Dili some two years later, with the publication of Decree law 33 on 'Hygiene and Public Order' (33/2008). Anticipating a programme of decentralisation, the law gave *suco* chiefs responsibility for 'guaranteeing public order' and regulating the use of 'goods in the public domain'. The decree included prohibitions on dumping polluted water in drains or ditches, boxes or containers on public highways, and the burial of dead animals on public land. Fines of between USD 5-500 could be levied for

infractions, or double these amounts where more than one person was culpable. The 'organization, hygiene and cleaning of public spaces' fell to the police, (article 6) but the wording of the law did not make clear what they were required to do. It was only in the following year that a separate decree law was passed that provided further clarification:

> stability and security have been achieved…the principal social problems have been resolved or are being resolved, the important thing now is…the maintenance of the quality of resources through the cleaning and arranging of flowers, rivers, beaches, *povoações* and cities…so that [Timor-Leste's] population and all who visit can enjoy…its landscape (9/2009, preamble).

Building on decree law 33, the new regulation proposed 'civic service of cleaning in all the national territory', in which civil servants would be enlisted in the cleaning of all public space from 7-11 on Friday mornings (nos.1-2). F-FDTL would organise transport of waste outside Dili, with private companies that possessed vehicles with 'open sections' invited to similarly transport waste. It was also the responsibility of F-FDTL and PNTL to promote the 'cleaning of the roads and the beautification of space surrounding dwellings' (no.8). Kammen has argued that an agenda for beautifying Dili was a way to realise an elite vision of modernity (2009). It can also be seen as coherent with attempts to reach, emplace and manage the conduct of the population. Plans for order, hygiene and aesthetics were therefore, like Dr Moura's observations from the 1930s, closely related.

The elaborated guidelines echoed earlier schemes connected with public health. For example, in a press conference shortly before *Limpeza*'s commencement, the Prime Minister and three other ministers presented rationales for the programme. The health minister, Nelson Martins, quoted World Health Organisation statistics on deadly

diseases, noting the high incidences of these in East Timor, and the benefits that street cleaning could have for the control of these diseases. As in the 1930s, the incidence of malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases was attributed to unsanitary conditions that could be alleviated by street cleaning programmes (TP, 30 April 2009). In the manner of Sanitary Brigade in the 1930s, prison wardens at Becora prison compelled their charges to clean prison grounds. Although prisoners 'received punishment every day' for their crimes, the guards believed that prisoners could play a role as citizens and 'contribute to the nation' by cleaning. Despite being banned from talking to prisoners, furthermore, journalists faithfully reported guards' assurances that prisoners were happy to carry out the work (STL, 16 May 2009).

As in the past, schools played a role in the dissemination of ideas of cleanliness. The dimensions of these ideas were not only intended to be taken up through unconscious practice, but were subject to instruction. The vice-minister for Education, Paulo Assis, hoped that schools would participate in the cleanings on Friday mornings. The Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao justified the participation of students by noting that many absences from schools had been caused by sicknesses that a cleaner environment would ameliorate. Most notably, the Prime Minister told assembled members of the media and civil servants that cleaning must begin inside people's houses. Cleaning was intended to be taught [*hanorin*] so that it would eventually generate favourable habits of cleanliness as if radiating out from within homes, schools and prisons (STL, 10 Feb 2012). As Mitchell notes, disciplinary power works not 'from the outside, but at the level of detail, and not by restricting individuals and their actions, but by producing them.' (2005:xi) The rituals of establishing this as a routine can be seen in Kaviraj's observations of Calcutta's postcolonial government. 'Training' was a key way for it to familiarise the

population with ‘the new universal practice of modernity’, (Kaviraj, 1997:112) moderating the ‘plebianisation’ of public spaces such as parks by instilling habits in subjects themselves.

If the state intended to induce the population to be productive without recourse to coercion, this was not always obvious. Initially, during the course of these half-day cleanings, members of the public were conscripted as well as civil servants, although there was no provision for this in regulations. Police stopped people passing through the streets where cleaning was taking place and made them participate. The police sub-inspector of Dili assured the public through the media that police would ‘control’ the cleaning. They did this by stopping public transport and making ‘driver and passengers get out to do cleaning’ (STL, 8 May 2005). Initially beginning in Dili, operations soon began in the districts, though less spiritedly. The TV news showed the Prime Minister taking a supervising role in the programme in Dili by stopping a middle-aged woman on a bicycle on one of Dili’s main thoroughfares, and ushering her towards a spot to be cleansed. The same news bulletin, describing the public’s enthusiasm for the programme, showed a fracas between Portuguese paramilitary police (GNR) and members of the public that had been ordered to clean a ditch on the roadside. On the way back from laying flowers on the graves of deceased relatives, the PNTL prevented members of the public from returning to their houses after the operations had started at 7am, who, despite complaints, were given brooms and told to sweep the roadside. Such prohibitions on movement, as previously suggested, drew criticism from those made to participate. Any claims that improved public health would improve the attendance of sick students were negated when students were prevented from reaching school at all. The *mikrolet* vehicles that brought students across the city were prevented from

running, and the flow of traffic, especially from west to east, stopped completely (TP, 9 May 2009).

The disruption of schooling became a point of contention among members of parliament, some of whom, mainly the opposition, complained that it prevented some schools from operating in the run up to the second trimestral exam. Yet broadly, they did not raise objections to a general mobilisation of the population (TP, 12 May 2009). The population on the other hand complained to the media about inconvenience to businesses, restrictions on movement, and the use of the police and military as overseers. A letter to a local paper rhetorically asked whether it was the government that was serving the population or the population that was serving the government (TP, 11 May 2009). They agreed with the programme as long as it was carried out by civil servants, whose participation was seen as justifiable by members of the public because they were perceived as collecting a monthly salary without working hard. This was compared with the Indonesian-era civil service, whose work habits were indicated using the abbreviation D5 (TP, 11 May 2009). Indeed, eventually civil servants participated while the occasions on which members of the public were randomly conscripted were increasingly rare, but did not end completely. If public cleaning could demonstrate that civil servants were earning their salaries, its effect of 'teaching' the population remained unfulfilled. One complained that

> The objective of *Limpeza Geral* is for the Government and civil servants to give an example to the people of Dili. But we still see that people throw their rubbish everywhere. While the cleaning happens on Friday, by Saturday, the city is full of rubbish again (Limpeza Geral, 2009).

Others thought instead that the problem was that the city's streets rarely appeared different after the programme. In both cases the question of 'efficient government' and resource allocation was left unaddressed. Why was it seen as necessary – even common sense - for several thousand people to be mobilised on a weekly basis, rather than, for example, a much smaller permanent street cleaning operation? It is argued that the programme was less about either making cosmetic changes or better public hygiene, and more about affecting changes in people's mentalities. The same supporter continued: 'This shows that Dili's population does not yet have *a conscience of its own to clean their houses or neighbourhoods*' (my emphasis) (Limpeza Geral). Seen in this light, the population's reluctance to maintain the cleanliness of public areas derived from the fact that they were still practicing and internalising unproductive behaviours. Cleanliness, so the view had it, should start from within homes, then in neighbourhoods, before it became automatic across the capital city.

However much this was seen as what should happen, evidently, there was another perspective from above. The state imposed public cleaning as a citywide practice. This should be considered in the context of the events that immediately preceded it. 'Neighbourhoods' - *aldeias*, *sucos* and Dili's sub-districts, were the territorial units of the city, no different from the districts, that their inhabitants had often either 'defended' from outsiders or 'cleansed' of regional others (easterners or westerners) in 2006-7. Thus, although administered by *suco* Chiefs, and carried out by *suco* inhabitants, cleaning was intended to be supra-local, a concerted way of conceiving of a city as greater than the sum of its parts. As an idea, it transcended the territorial units retreated to in the previous two years by drawing out the population to a municipality, a designation intended to correspond to East Timor's 'cities', and proposed to be at the

apex of decentralised government. This was not without historical precedent. As a century earlier Dili was conceived of as a city by calling it a municipality, reordering it and cleaning it, so this process could happen again. Of course, cleaning was not the only way that this could happen, nor was history merely repeating itself. It fed into broader processes of 'redress'. For example, the state 'resolved' to rebuild 2,178 homes destroyed during late 2006 (5/2006) but operationalized this ambitious resolution patchily and belatedly. In this regard, the government has been seem to redress 'crisis' according to the path of least resistance, for example by giving inhabitants of 'IDP' camps cash sums in order to return to their abandoned properties (Bugalski, 2010:23). In this reading, state elites have shied away from dealing with potential conflict over re-inhabiting neighbourhoods, not by proactively sponsoring the building of new neighbourhoods, or promoting land and property legislation, but by throwing money at the problem. Yet, incentives and monetary inducements cannot be seen as the only approach to government. Government has meant the revival not only of history as an idea, but of historical practices such as public cleaning, the designation of names and boundaries, or the value of work, whether through civil servants' demonstrations of cleanliness through *Limpeza*, or historically, as a substitute for subjecthood.

V. Conclusion

Casting Dili as a city was limited by colonial ambivalence about recognising its East Timorese inhabitants as subjects, much less citizens. Their work indicated not formation in colonial hands, but that they observed a routine and regularity of interaction with the colonial authorities. It showed that working subjects were sedentary not itinerant, predictable not arbitrary, industrious not idle, compliant not warlike. In short, city

dwellers were – or could be made to be – unlike people of the hills (*foho*) beyond Dili. What the city was envisioned as not being, as much as what authorities aspired to make it, is informative of how distinctions were formed between city and the districts. For example, the city was a place where, unlike the districts, subjects could be reached. While not illusory, colonial government did not deeply structure or emphasise this division, introducing aesthetics and hygiene on a modest scale. In part, this can be related to means: its own poverty and lack of resources limited what it could do. The indigenous neighbourhoods planned for the 1930s were not realised, nor did 'superior inhabitants' of prototype villages beyond Dili remain there.

To the extent that a reluctance to recognise subjects marked the limits of bio-power, it was also marked by the resilience of indigenous strategies, such as fleeing, to avoid being drawn into the colonial orbit. Christian conversion could provide a more direct path to subjecthood, and, in the period of study leading to conversion, and perhaps beyond, sometimes supplanted aspects of indigenous belief. However, this process also saw pre-existing practices accommodated alongside 'modern' and 'scientific' norms propagated by missionaries. In this regard, some accounts suggest that this accommodation found institutional expression, as East Timorese sought to diffuse norms of hygiene acquired in missionary schools through a so-called nativist movement in the 1950s. Too much resembling an autonomous movement and thus perceived as a threat to the authority of the Diocese and Government, its members were stopped in their tracks after a short existence (Duarte, 1987)[12]. The movement's activities

[12] Duarte (1987) reports that in 1954, in the same period in which the state was attempting to draw the native population into its orbit via health institutions, an East Timorese priest, Father Ximenes, established the CPCC, established without the consent of the diocese in Dili, and headquartered in the Tetum-speaking heartland of Alas, an area with a long history of missionary contact. The CPCC maintained a number of centres, in Same, Tutuluro, Fahe-nehan, Betano (all also in Tetum-speaking areas) with a network of messengers moving between each. The movement interpreted the word of the

demonstrate that conversion was perceived not only as a matter of belief, but was related to practices, such as comportment and appearance, explored in the previous chapter. It also demonstrates the adaptability of Christianity and the possibility of power being expressed through varied locations and agents.

In the Indonesian period, despite an intensification of state bio-political strategies, and high government spending to control the lives of the population, a great gulf remained unbridgeable as the government failed to 'imagine East Timorese as Indonesians' (Anderson, 1992). Thus state health institutions were not only a means of engaging and persuading the population to accept Indonesian rule, but to make interventions in their lives. This is distinct from less subtly coercive forms of rule. Cleaning or sweeping was a military metaphor for eliminating the resistance movement, often in the districts, where military authority was less complete. Thus Indonesian rule also served to shore up a distinction between the districts and the city. Dili served as an opening to intensive inward and outward flows from the rest of Indonesia, reflected in its changing appearance as trading post, port, and home to transmigrants, but it was also a closing from a threatening hinterland, reflected in its appearance as a garrison and bunker. Colonial authority was insecure, accurately perceiving sources of power other than its own to exist throughout the territory.

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bible strictly, with its members ('disciples') going barefoot. One of its aims was to instil in members 'norms of hygiene', contained on a single sheet of paper: take a bath at least once a week, wash hands before eating, eat with your own spoon at dinner; of presentation in public ('do not walk outside the house with a blanket over one's shoulder'); and encouraged its members to maintain a 'natural diet' (to eat soup once or twice a week). Writing of the movement with a mixture of bemusement and scorn, Father Jorge Barros Duarte noted that the initiation ceremony for new members involved entering a hut where the movement's prophets observed a number of rituals, one of which involved new recruits holding a towel and soap aloft.

That other sources of power were also perceived to exist by the RDTL state (and which became obvious between 2006-8) is partly attested to by *Limpeza Geral*, an unconventional form of reordering territory and people. Although it was introduced in response to events of 2006-8, cleaning was far from being a policy without precedent. It crystallised through certain East Timorese interactions with the state. Cleanliness could be both induced in state institutions, but also enforced as people cleaned streets without recompense. Avowedly productive, bio-power invariably bore traces of repression. Public cleaning therefore showed an impulse that reacted as a contingency to events of 'crisis', called forth to teach Dili's inhabitants compliance as well as being used to conceive of Dili as a city again, of a piece with plans to rename territorial units and 'decentralise' power.

8. Conclusion

This thesis has argued that the nature of power relations particular to East Timor placed limitations on 'modern bio-power'. Such existing power relations were not significant only in the colonial era, but contributed to the practices of East Timor's postcolonial politics. This analysis therefore stands in contrast to many accounts that have seen the politics of post-1999 East Timor as a matter of statebuilding, or democratic consolidation through normative evaluations of state and society's strengths and weaknesses (Kingsbury and Leach, 2013). For the same observers, a weak 'rule of law' caused by a weak state/disempowered civil society framework, endemic to 'post-conflict' nations, was exemplified in 'crisis'. For others, a vibrant civil society, in the form of organisations that emerged from the resistance network against Indonesia, showed evidence of the potential to avert this situation through 'networked governance'. Democracy pivoted on 'good governance', and 'crisis' showed that it had 'lost balance'. Thus, low 'human development', inadequately addressed by UN and donor 'capacity building' programmes, an indigenous elite that fought among themselves, and failures of other institutions such as political parties were used to explain 'crisis'.

Instead, by centring the analysis on power and history, the ambit of power can be taken as broader and deeper than either an analysis of the events of 2006-'8 or even the decade following independence allows. In establishing alternatives to the normative, liberal perspective that informs most analyses of both these periods, I showed the extent and limits of 'modern bio-politics' at various stages of the 20th century. Longstanding patterns of power militated against a profuse modern bio-power, but also mediated its

nature. A central question addressed therefore was: what are the extent and limits of bio-power? To address this, the forms of power particular to East Timor that mediated bio-power can be made sense of in three broad ways.

i. Three forms of power: 'pre-modern', 'missionary-modern' and 'developmental'

First, while 'pre-modern' forms of power have been posited as having re-emerged after 1999, they were rarely 'unsullied' by having evaded colonial contact. Rather, the impacts of colonial contact show how a supposed pre-modern power was not irremediably 'traditional' but bore traces of colonial influence. Second, missionaries, rather than exclusively transmitting 'modernity', retained a prerogative of using magic. Priests' priming of land for 'modern' uses by banishing demons, for example, should present problems for making sense of these events according to conventional understandings of 'modernity' and 'tradition'. Yet such 'contradictions' revealed both the endurance of these forms of power while pointing towards how modernity and tradition, used to make sense of such occurrences, are themselves the result of designations of power-knowledge. Third, the 20th century saw a profusion of developmental ideologies under successive colonial regimes. Yet an intrusive form of bio-politics was tempered by colonial ambivalence and indigenous strategies of evasion and, eventually, resistance. Thus, whether in the 1930s or following the 'normalisation' campaign of the 1980s, the East Timorese population could neither be fully Portuguese subjects nor Indonesians citizens. This requires qualification, so that, for example, citizenship under Indonesian rule was dependent on the logic of a developmental calculation in which East Timorese were destined to remain 'backward', and 'normalisation' – a gross misnomer - was eclipsed by violence, intrinsic to the

occupation of East Timor. Yet despite the fact that bio-power was mediated by existing forms of power, successive colonial regimes aimed to make populations sedentary, simultaneously docile and productive, and to establish control not only of birth-rates but also the moral trajectories of families.

ii. Recapitulating arguments

Instead of discussing how bio-power was refracted through authoritarian and liberal developmental regimes, therefore, the thesis takes the state as a point of departure. As noted at the outset of the thesis, this approach chimed with the broader literature on the state specific to East Timor, but parted company with it in crucial aspects. Above all, as chapter one argued, the state was viewed as being instituted not on the basis of norms of 'good governance', but by being remade in the image of resistance to colonial rule. In this regard, the 2006-8 'crisis', is best understood by examining the schisms and struggles that took place in the resistance movement. Moreover, attempts to make the state in the image of the resistance movement, it is argued, essentially saw elite attempts to consolidate and inscribe an authentic version of history in the state. Doing this not only catalysed the resolve of groups that propagated alternative histories and did not recognise state authority, but also brought into focus the personal histories of the population at large, which did not neatly cohere in and conform to official histories. In the wake of the events of 2006-8, state elites again attempted to establish the state in the image of the resistance, by instituting ex-combatants in the state and bringing 'under control' the thousands of histories of the population that state elites saw as being out of control during 2006-8. Moreover, by establishing hierarchies among ex-combatants, and awarding them honours and pensions, not only could history become 'secure', but a

system of relative value would be imposed on the population's most esteemed living and dead. As such, the state was not the end result of the resistance period, nor was it merely a patronage machine used to distribute power in the form of sums of money, but was instituted in the image of resistance and, as such, was a site of continuing struggle. The process of conferring awards, making resistance symbolism merge with that of the state, and pronouncing on a definitive version of history, was inevitably subject to contestation.

Configuring the state within this framework by assigning hierarchy and award therefore excluded and disqualified those that fell beyond these categories, and 'collaborators', while sanctifying and elevating Founders and Martyrs above others. The image of the dead enlivened the state through connecting it with resistance history, characterised by the care of the families of Martyrs, repatriating and honouring the dead, and invoking disappeared ex-Combatants. This contrasted with an earlier, pre-2006 period of spiritless, technocratic politics inaugurated under UNTAET. This process also showed a particular kind of bio-politics at work that preserved the dead and living, placing them into a hierarchical order. However, this ordering was officiated over by the state. The history of the resistance period and foreign occupation in which a glorious, unified and homogenous resistance movement countered foreign occupation, with state beneficence bestowed on all nationalists, bore scant resemblance to antipathies that were magnified among the population under conditions of war.

This is in no clearer way illustrated than in cases where people were accused of having used 'witchcraft' to cause sickness, misfortune, and sabotage or disrupt the operations of the resistance movement or Indonesian military. Chapter two showed how

'witchfindings' eventuated under conditions of military occupation. It posited that such events could only be better understood when they came to light at all, using a framework that focussed on their deliberative, genealogical, territorial, and historical dimensions. The historical dimension was above all crucial in explaining that such events should be seen in a broader and longer-term perspective. In the postcolonial period, judicial proceedings against those accused of killing 'witches' were informed by colonial understandings about differences between Dili and the districts. Colonial epistemologies were used to assign, aggregate and disaggregate categories such as witchcraft, magic and religion. Moreover, as military occupation created conditions in which the population identified 'witches', so this was suggestive of the limitations of bio-power in two ways. First, colonial contact, rather than giving rise to exponential surveillance and an irresistible intrusion of a rational, modern form of bio-power that ordered lives, was shown instead to have instituted a 'bifurcated' form of authority. Different colonial and indigenous domains operated under different 'laws', reifying divisions between city and districts. These designations were not as diametrically opposed as assumed, yet they were operationalized in the postcolonial period as taken-for-granted distinctions between city and districts, that resonated with divisions common to successive colonial and postcolonial periods.

Second, chapter two also provided an alternative to the argument that sorcery and malevolent witchcraft is culturally determined and may be countered through 'modernization', by drawing attention to dimensions of power and historical contingency. This argument proposed that subsistence agriculture gave rise to power relations whereby *suco* chiefs perpetuated superstitious beliefs through their top-down authority, and traditional culture was inherently violent. In such an argument, elements

of culture were held to be common in economic and utilitarian terms whereby compensation levied on injurious acts caused by sorcery could be compared with similar sums of money involved in marital exchange. As an alternative, through the exploration of a four-fold framework for the understanding of witchfindings, power relations were conceived of as beyond economic transactions. The chapter revisits a theme of chapter one, positing that the state could not be viewed only in terms of a patronage machine from which power was distributed.

Chapter three posited that on one level, state formation in the early 20th century was accompanied by processes of taxation, forced labour, and monetization. On another level, this process was characterised and given coherence by evaluating life on the basis of work. At yet another level, work changed meanings of objects and symbols (and relations between people and objects in their midst). The practical engagements of work impacted on meaning more effectively than colonial attempts to change meaning by way of consecration, desecration or other representation. This point was made through an exploration of the lives and deaths of East Timorese that collected mineral deposits at the behest, or independently of, successive colonial authorities. Bio-power was mediated through a form of power contingent on historical colonial engagements, as people and objects were evaluated. Therefore, although the state ostensibly had at its disposal means – principally taxes and forced labour – strongly to influence power relations and ensure that an increasingly rationalised order eventuated at the local level, neither strategy was followed totally. However, despite an absence of a totalising regime, the population's work, and precedence, established during colonial rule were used to claim ownership of minerals in the postcolonial period. These claims were characterised by two things. First, claim making was affected as a result of altered

configurations of power after the Indonesian occupation in the interim. Second, the state conferral of rank and hierarchy on the population had been mediated through local views of the state. In this sense, the state evaluates and regulates life and death through recompense and through reburying and sanctifying ex-combatants in its own image. In short, the form of bio-power at work in postcolonial politics largely goes against perceptions of the state as a (necessarily) mechanistic, modern and rational entity.

As chapter three showed the state and others' evaluations of life and death, chapter four elaborated on missionary power as cohering with, yet semi-autonomous from the colonial state. This was underscored by similar state and missionary aspirations to 'emplace' Christian families. Missionaries attempted to emplace populations by projecting the influence of exemplary aristocratic Christian converts, and by cultivating women and children as the backbone of 'modern' families. Missionary authorities envisaged that this strategy could be buttressed by plantation agriculture. Neither strategy endured, but legacies of missionary power can be seen in other ways, for example by the care of children and the semi-autonomous reproduction of 'modern' habitat by the population. As in chapter three, it was argued that modern bio-power did not seamlessly manifest itself through an enumerated and sedentarised population. Yet traces of 'missionary modernity' have eventuated in ways particular to postcolonial East Timor, as the population has built houses with aesthetically 'modern' features. It was posited that such houses built with the proceeds of ex-combatant pensions serve as symbols of esteem, but also performative and affective symbols with which to remember the dead and absent living.

Dili was differentiated from the districts in a number of ways, and this division was also 'engineered' through education. Chapter five argues that missionary education reified this distinction through cultivating an elite by inculcating habit and comportment. Colonial and Christian notions of civility and comportment were a significant part of constituting a 'civilised society' in the capital, from which notions of a civil society later emerged (cf. Friend, 2003: 437). Such an argument was illustrated by examining the close correlation between language, comportment and appearance under the Indonesian occupation. Resistance elites were both influenced by, and circumspect about practices of 'norms of civility'. The chapter also shows how missionary power reasserted claims to government, by ostensibly demonstrating against the removal of religious education from the school curriculum. These demonstrations were significant for marking a shift in Church-state relations and showing the Church's dismay at not being adequately recognised for its role in supporting the resistance movement. Moreover, the demonstrations also pointed towards how its leaders viewed missionary power as being historically embedded in colonial power as well as being close to indigenous leaders (*liurais*). The Church's declarations and the symbols that it invoked (such as the priest's uniform) were used to perpetuate a role that had been historically instituted.

To further illustrate mediated forms of bio-power, particular to the context of East Timor, chapter six examined the postcolonial public policy of mass street cleanings. Although this policy ostensibly came to exist in the wake of the 2006-8 'crisis', it was of longstanding provenance, having been introduced in the colonial era as a means to define the capital city of the colony as an urban area as such. In colonial settings, cleanings showed that the population that carried it out could be regarded as subjects,

only when they worked. A limited recognition of subjects also served to limit colonial aspirations to 'reach' or emplace the population through reform of the urban environment. On the other hand, the benefits and hardships of Christian conversion and parallel missionary objectives of emplacement made subjecthood comparable with salvation. Through examining colonial authorities' attempts to alter the environment of the city and affect subjects, cleanings are suggested to be a continuation of broadly colonial practices, rather than as a civic activity that indicated peaceable agreement between state and citizen.

iii. Themes of the thesis

Each chapter has therefore adopted a longer-term perspective to establish characteristics of power that have forged contemporary politics. This perspective moreover, is suggestive of the nature of power itself. In particular, it indicates that power was manifested in multiple contexts, rather than issuing from the state and being counterbalanced by civil society, as the liberal view suggests. Allied with this perspective are questions regarding how the quality of power was to be regarded. If, as Foucault proposed, power is present in multiple locations and relations, wherever it may exist, should it not also encounter resistances that are coterminous with it? An example of this can be seen in the nature of resistance to Indonesian rule, which emerged during the course of internal struggle in the resistance movement. Sometimes this was manifested through ideological differences, such as in the schisms of May 1976 or 1983, or through insurgent sentiment some 30 years later, in May 2006. The thesis has not sought to explain the motivations of agents associated with challenges to power. Nevertheless, an examination of 'disaffected' individuals such as Mauk Moruk and L-7,

Ai-Tahan Matak or Alfredo Reinado, reveals, first, that they became resistant essentially from *within* the resistance movement and second, that the causes with which they were associated have had enduring postcolonial existences.

Second, the analysis further explored power's specific qualities by asking whether it was productive or repressive. In the postcolonial period, for example, if it is accepted that the state and international community aspired to forge subjects by using 'disciplinary power' with a productive quality, this was tempered by repressive forms of power. Yet if repression may be an obvious legacy of the colonial past, its deployment is also complex, so that successive colonial regimes were ambivalent about, but not ignorant of subjects. Subjecthood – in however limited a way the terms of this were understood - could take the form of recognition through work in the late Portuguese period. Similarly, and paradoxically, a strategy of repression was undermined as much by Indonesian ambivalence by failing to imagine East Timorese as Indonesians, as by actions of the resistance movement.

Third, interrogating power's quality has shown its inseparability from knowledge. It is in this regard that the extent of bio-power during the 20th century can be seen most clearly. Whereas the extent to which subjects could be recognised through work was limited insofar as its benefits were almost always outweighed by hardships that it brought, up to and including forced labour and death, salvation through Christian conversion may have had a clearer appeal to potential converts. The appeal of conversion was evident in that Christianity – in certain of its aspects - could be readily accommodated into indigenous belief (Hicks, 1976). Furthermore, if subjecthood was qualified by work, salvation was qualified through rites. Rites not only consisted of

negotiating conversion, but were imbued with a 'scientificity' that mediated an indigenous Christian's soul's place in an economy of salvation. Christianity was underpinned by western science that privileged the knowledge of its missionary purveyors. All of this facilitated intrusions into the population's lives.

Both work and the observance of rites also required regularity of contact with the colonial authorities. As such, emplacement, the 'anti-nomadic technique' (Foucault, 1991b:218; Scott, 2009) intrinsic to modern government intended to facilitate proximity to populations that missionaries increasingly evangelised. Given that emplacement had been a longstanding, 'pre-modern' strategy of ensuring missionary-indigenous, and indeed, colonial-indigenous contact, it had been integrated into, rather than suddenly emerging, as a tool of 'modern' government in the late-19th century. In part, what made older patterns of contact distinctive from 'modern' government were colonial health institutions. In and around these places, priests admonished the indigenous population for heathenism while encouraging them to put faith in the rationality of salvation guaranteed through scientific rites. Yet priests also continued to wield magic power, recognised by the same populations that were targeted for conversion. A significant limitation of bio-power could therefore be seen from the quality of existing forms of power. For example, priests' knowledge was less a dispensation than a negotiation of existing belief. Missionary power was therefore not only predicated on maintaining a sufficiently high barrier to conversion, and not just a matter of maintaining knowledge of a flock, but also required negotiating and appeasing indigenous perceptions of their spiritual authority.

iv. Implications for broader debates

The thesis has three main implications that concern how studies of postcolonial politics may be informed by analyses of power. First, it proposed that power may be understood by combining two approaches, one that historicised the bifurcated nature of colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996), and a poststructuralist approach that used different tools for historicising this division. Thus, following Mitchell (2005), the state has been taken seriously as an object of analysis, but diverging from Mitchell's approach, it has been conceived not only as being constituted by procedures, surveillance and arrangements, but also symbols, discourses and invocations of the past. Similarly, the study took the term civil society seriously insofar as its antecedents in colonial notions of civilisation were concerned. On the other hand, it identified some of these antecedents by examining Portuguese language education. As such the approach taken was not directly comparable with other studies of East Timor that have emphasised either the co-optation of Indonesian and growth of Tetum by a 'new generation' of East Timorese resistance (Carey, 2003). Nor is it directly comparable with other studies that propose that a key marker of the growth of nationalist consciousness was assertions of the validity of vernacular languages by elites in colonial schools (Anderson, 2006), or while incarcerated by colonial authorities (Zinoman 2001; Dikötter and Brown, 2007; Chriost 2012; Mac Ionnrachtaigh 2013). It diverges from the approach of these studies by showing how Portuguese – language of the ex-coloniser - was taken to be emblematic of nationalist resistance as much as Tetum. Yet from a postcolonial perspective, the relationship between Portuguese and nationalist resistance was not unproblematic, as Portuguese colonialism was recast in positive terms by elites and Portuguese became a language of the administrative elite (Silva, 2012). Second, by using a poststructuralist

analysis, language was held to have been inseparable from broader practices of comportment and appearance. Using this analysis, resistance may be understood as motivated not only through opposition to Indonesian rule, but as having drawn on a repertoire of colonial practices and responses to them.

Similarly, the thesis also compared state formation in the colonial era with postcolonial state formation by acknowledging attendant processes such as monetization. The thesis combined a broader literature that saw monetization primarily in causative terms (Elias, 1994; Simmel, 2004) with other insights that emphasised changing meanings of objects and symbols. It thus drew on another body of literature that saw currencies and symbols serving both colonial and indigenous objectives of stabilisation and emplacement (Keane, 2008; Foucault, 2013). The thesis developed the insights of these works by proposing that changed meanings of objects and symbols could eventuate practically, as the result of work, or by being imbued with relative values that operated in wider constellations of meaning. Thus, the thesis has developed an analysis that emphasises that changing power relations may be constituted by (as much as corresponding with) symbols such as uniforms, practices such as courtesy, and objects such as salt (Elias, 1994; Schieffelin 1976). These may collectively serve as an alternative way to analyse change rather than by referring to the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, which, as suggested above, can often be problematic.

Finally, the thesis contributed to a modest body of literature on East Timor that analysed knowledge in colonial formations of power (Roque 2010; 2012). Rather than, as studies of other contexts have emphasised, develop the notion that colonial rule was characterised by the unstable nature of colonial knowledge (Stoler, 2009), it differed

from this work by emphasising two aspects of power-knowledge. On one hand, it emphasised the mediated nature of power; and on the other, power's constitution of categories and designations. Thus, rather than being a historical study *per se*, the work showed how history was invoked to order and give a practical thrust to politics in the present through processes of evaluation. Analysing both the overarching creation of a system as well as assigning material and symbolic awards therefore stood in contrast to seeing evaluation of life and death as a simple process of awarding sums of money.

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